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To Angie and our children 
 
 
 
 
The Ghanaian adinkra symbol NKONSONKONSON (chain 
links) is used to signify solidarity. It is used to remind 
citizens that in unity lies strength and entreats them to 
contribute to the community. It was the rallying symbol of 
the 1997 abortive NHIS pilot scheme in the Eastern Region. 
 
 
Foreword 
 
 
 
 
When African states gained their independence in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, free health care at the time and point of use was a constitutional right. 
Health care delivery systems were supposed to be entirely financed by the 
taxpayer, a state of affairs that rapidly proved to be an illusion. The interna-
tional economic crisis in the 1970s had a dramatic effect on government 
budgets allocated to health. This eventually resulted in many African countries 
having a public health service that was free at the point of use but that had 
increasingly less equipment, fewer drugs and supplies available, and poorly 
paid and demoralised staff. ‘Free care’ had become a myth. 
The myriad of small health projects that were established during the 1970s 
and 1980s pointed to the potential of community financing in the form of user 
fees. The rationale behind the introduction of user fees in the public sector was 
pragmatic: to try to mobilise additional resources for an under-funded health 
care sector. At the end of the 1980s most African governments were openly 
shifting to more formal policies of direct ‘out-of-pocket’ payments. These 
policies were increasingly being legitimised by international organisations such 
as UNICEF and the World Health Organisation, for instance in the framework 
of the Bamako Initiative launched in 1987. User fees have now become a fact of 
life in virtually all African countries but their limitations have also become 
common knowledge. Today there is a wealth of empirical evidence accumulated 
in Africa that indicates that user fees reduce access to health care for the poor 
who, in many instances, are finding themselves excluded from the system. 
It is in the light of this evolution that the current interest in health insurance 
in Africa – with its potential to overcome the problem of access created by user 
fees – has developed over the last decade. Insurance is a technique that requires 
the pre-payment of a premium at a time of the year when the household has the 
necessary income to do so. Eventually, this will mean that no payment has to be 
made at the time and point of use of health care services. In addition, health 
insurance, when it is organised in a social perspective, implies a level of risk 
sharing between the healthy and the sick, and between rich and poor.  
There is currently huge interest in the development in Sub-Saharan Africa of 
community health insurance schemes implemented on the periphery of the health 
system, organised on a voluntary basis and co-managed by the beneficiaries. But 
one has the impression that for many international development organisations, 
and even for African governments, community health insurance has become a 
new magic bullet – which of course it is not. Community health insurance will 
never be a quick technical fix. 
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A certain naivety sometimes surrounds health planners’ enthusiastic pleas for 
community health insurance. Community health insurance is being reduced to a 
particular financial arrangement but, at the same time, its complex social and 
cultural dimensions are being underestimated. One could say, rather provocat-
ively, that community health insurance has become too much the exclusive study 
domain of health economists, whereas there is need to study and unravel, in a 
systematic way and in a variety of settings, people’s expectations and fears in 
these innovative but complex forms of health care financing. There is, therefore, a 
need for more qualitative research by sociologists and anthropologists. 
It is precisely here that the merits of Daniel Kojo Arhinful’s study lie. He 
critically analyses the gap between the official rhetoric concerning community 
health insurance and the reality of people’s views and expectations. He further 
investigates the links to be made, if any, between community health insurance 
and existing traditional solidarity systems in rural Ghana. His study findings 
point to the crucial importance of trust in the institutions in charge of the 
management of the scheme, and the need for an acceptable level of quality of 
care – and certainly relational quality – to be provided by health care workers. 
And last but not least, Arhinful shows that the Ghanaian community insurance 
schemes he studied do not constitute an option for the destitute in society. 
This study will definitely lead to a better understanding of the complexities 
of developing community health insurance in Ghana. Daniel Arhinful’s work 
constitutes, in my view, an important contribution to more evidence-based 
policies with regard to the promotion and organisation of community health 
insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
Bart Criel 
Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp 
November 2003 
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 PART  I 
 
 
 
GENERAL, HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL 
CONTEXT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why did Emmanuel Boadi die?  
An epitome of Ghana’s health care crises 
 
Brother, village life is war. We have to struggle to survive. Farm work is not good. 
The prices of everything have gone up and they continue to rise. We are surviving 
by the day on cassava. When you need financial help, no one will mind you. And 
woe betides you if any bad illness afflicts you. You will be marched to your grave. 
There is no security here for the youth so if you hear of any job opportunities in big 
city, remember me. 
 
This is a paraphrase of a statement by Emmanuel Boadi, or Emma, as he was 
commonly called at Sikakrom village. Those were his words when he spoke to 
me briefly in a short encounter during my visit a month earlier in connection 
with the funeral of my maternal grandmother. As is the practice in this small 
village at such occasions, the young men assist with various small tasks such as 
the raising up canopies at the funeral ground and the digging of the grave. The 
service is reciprocal. Those who help others on such occasions receive help 
when they find themselves in similar circumstances. On the other hand, those 
who do not help always have to pay in kind or cash for such services. Emma 
caught my attention when I saw him busily working on a small canopy alone. I 
walked to him to express my appreciation and he asked a few questions about a 
senior cousin who happened to be his peer and classmate in primary school and 
who was then out of the country. Of course I could not say otherwise to his 
request than assure him that I would try just to rest matters there. 
3 
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Barely four weeks later, I returned to Sikakrom to meet a procession of 
mourners conveying a coffin to the cemetery in a typical Roman Catholic 
fashion accompanied by solemn hymns. My enquiries revealed to my greatest 
shock and dismay that the body on its last journey through the lone street of 
Sikakrom was none other than Emmanuel Boadi. Death is unpredictable and 
inevitable during our transient earthly existence but the pain it strikes and the 
sorrow it leaves behind is unbearable if it happens so prematurely and unex-
pectedly in potentially preventable situations like the case of Emma. 
The circumstances of Emma’s death, as narrated to me by one of his closest 
friends, was that two weeks before his death, he was still the vivacious, ener-
getic postal agent’s assistant at Sikakrom. When he started feeling unwell, with 
the symptoms of fever and cough, his immediate intervention was the common 
first line therapy of resort in the village as indeed would be the situation in most 
rural parts of the third world: self medication. Two days later when his condi-
tion was not improving, he managed to travel to the district capital, which was 
only ten kilometres away, to seek treatment at a mission hospital. Then the 
agony that led to his demise began. 
He was asked to deposit the equivalent of US$15 in order to be put on 
admission for a suspected condition of enteric fever. Since he did not have the 
money himself he returned to the village to try to raise it by approaching a few 
family members and friends, but he could not get the needed financial assis-
tance. I learnt that one family member he approached was surprised that he 
went to him because as a postal agent, Emma was considered one of the few 
privileged in the village with a regular income.  
Unable to find the much-needed assistance, Emma stayed at home and his 
condition deteriorated. Only then did close family members become concerned; 
but their intervention was to send him to a spiritual healer in a local healing 
church. He remained there and died after three days. Ironically, when he died, 
the family was able to mobilise resources running into the equivalent of 
hundreds of dollars to organise a ‘fitting and deserving’ funeral for him.  
As I reflected on the circumstances leading to his death, my mind went back 
to the previous four weeks and Emma’s exact words concerning the difficult 
economic life in the village and his worry about falling ill and dying due to 
financial difficulties. “Coming events cast their shadows,” as the saying goes, 
but little did I suspect that Emma was already sounding his funeral dirge in 
advance. Suddenly, I felt pity and anger well up within me. My pity was for his 
poor soul and his last battle with life due to his inability to raise a mere US$15, 
which could have enabled him to live longer. My anger was directed in part at a 
health care system that has deprived a young man of his life, leaving behind 
three orphans comprising a young widow and two children to battle the harsh 
life alone. Part of the anger was at the family and friends who could not provide 
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US$15 for his treatment, yet managed to give him a fitting burial. May his soul 
rest in peace.  
Emmanuel, however, features as just one example of a phenomenally 
common problem in most of rural Ghana. It seems that people are just dying, 
but when you find out more about their deaths you get to know that initially all 
they required was just 15,000 cedis (US$2) to pay for needed medication. When 
they are sick they find it hard to go to the health facility because of difficulties 
with paying for the cost of medical care. At the funeral of Emma, a teacher in 
the village told me that a young expectant mother died the previous week 
because she could not afford delivery at the health centre and therefore went to 
see an old birth attendant when she started feeling contractions. Unfortunately, 
the delivery developed complications. A last rally to get her the needed health 
care in a medical facility was too late to save her. Another young woman had a 
simple boil but her family ignored the advice to send her to the hospital when it 
became critical and she needed surgery due to financial reasons. Instead, they 
confined her to home treatments. She passed away under miserable circum-
stances. The stories go on and on; it is the reality of the majority of people who 
eke out a subsistence existence in most rural parts of Ghana.  
 
Health care crises 
Emma’s case represents the user fee (popularly dubbed ‘cash and carry’) misery 
of health care in Ghana. Nothing comes for free. At health facilities, patients 
have to pay for the cost of treatment from recording cards through laboratory 
investigations to drugs and medical supplies such as syringes, needles and 
cotton wool. The user fees haves to be collected to keep revenue for such items 
coming in and thus the institutions financially afloat. In these circumstances, the 
majority of the people are denied access to health care due to their inability to 
pay. In particular, it is the poor like Emma who are less likely to report illness 
and seek treatment. Although this is influenced by perceptions of choice and 
preference, a lot of it is related to the impact of health cost on household expen-
diture relative to income. For example, according to the Ghana Living 
Standards Survey 3, the poorest quintile in 1992 spent 12% of their income on 
health, compared to a national average of 9%. 
The financing crises of health care in Ghana, as indeed for most of sub-
Saharan Africa, is a recognised fact. Scarcity of resources for government 
health services is the major factor hindering access to health care for the 
majority of the rural poor. Consequently, one of the challenges facing these 
countries has been how to organise community financing in a manner that does 
not deter the poor and vulnerable groups from seeking health care in time of 
illness. This has, however, been a difficult task in view of the generalised level 
of poverty in these countries. Most existing and planned community financing 
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schemes are however based on fee-for-service and only a few schemes provide 
risk sharing through the payment of premiums. One of the earliest reviews of 
community financing schemes in Africa carried out by Carrin (1987) involving 
twenty schemes, for example, found out that only one involved prepayment, 
although two others combined prepayment with fee for service at the time of 
receiving service.  
Social health insurance is thus one of the cost recovery options that has been 
proposed to promote community involvement in health financing while 
maintaining access to free, or virtually free, health care at the time of illness 
(Arhin 1994). Social health insurance in the present context is an arrangement 
designed to provide risk sharing for illness-related events and which is accessible 
to households in the informal and rural sectors of developing countries regardless 
of the orthodoxy of its operational modalities. Indeed since the 1990’s, a number 
of African countries, such as Burundi, Guinea Bissau and Congo have 
experimented with rural health insurance schemes that cater to rural communities. 
The schemes they have adopted have taken a number of forms, which include 
providing benefits at a central facility such as a district hospital or other lower 
levels of health care such as a health post. The administrations of these schemes 
have also been varied. Some are managed by central government organizations 
together with local officials, while others have been organized by community 
solidarity groups that are autonomous from the government. The experiences to 
date, however, indicate that their effectiveness has been limited because of lack of 
economies of scale, as well as the lack of the necessary managerial skill (Criel 
1998), and also the lack of the essential knowledge about people’s perceptions of 
how a pre-payment scheme should operate to suit their cultural needs. 
Ghana presently finds itself on the eve of the introduction of a national health 
insurance scheme. Like the situation in many low-income countries, the problems 
surrounding this scheme are enormous and include such uncertain factors as 
financial viability, as well as management and political will. This study 
investigates another aspect of health insurance, which has received insufficient 
attention from planners: How do “the people” view a state-based and/or formal 
health insurance? And how likely are they to participate in such a scheme? A state-
based and/or formal insurance program is radically different from the traditional 
reciprocity-based support mechanisms and it is highly unlikely that members of 
local communities will grant a state or formal organisation the same measure of 
trust, which they used to grant their close relatives. It explores and explains the 
“missing links” between reciprocity and formal or state-based health insurance. 
The purpose is to critically assess the government’s present plans in order to 
provide recommendations for a more culturally sensitive type of health insurance. 
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Theoretical framework: Social security, past and present 
 
Social security encompasses a broad array of academic disciplines that include 
sociology, political science, economics and anthropology. Similarly, several 
theoretical frameworks have been presented to analyse the phenomenon. For the 
individual researcher, this leaves the daunting task of making a choice that has 
meaning for the question of his study. Nevertheless, most debates on the study of 
social security mechanisms involving traditional welfare mechanisms — as is the 
case in my present study — revolve around Polanyi’s (1977) three basic 
“principles of social organisation” which are comprised of: the principle of 
reciprocity (solidarity networks), the principle of (state) authority (command 
networks) and the principle of the market (exchange networks).  
After Polanyi, the analysis of face-to-face solidarity into a collective system of 
risk insurance based on reciprocity has been the topic of extensive anthropologi-
cal, sociological, political economy and historical research. Much of the discus-
sion has focused on the conceptual, ethical and practical problems and issues of 
deprivation and fragility associated with the lives of so many people in so-called 
non-capitalist societies. Indeed, the ILO’s definition of insurance does apply to 
both micro and macro concepts of risk prevention: “The reduction or elimination 
of the uncertain risk of loss for the individual or household by combining a large 
number of similarly exposed individuals or households who are included in a 
common fund that makes good the loss caused to any one member” (ILO 1996). 
The dominant theoretical question has been the rationale for such provision; how 
and why do people come together into collective action to help one another 
through mutual insurance? A greater degree of altruism between related or 
proximate individuals has traditionally been put forward as an explanation (Cox 
1987; Platteau 1991). This has been countered by the argument that exchange 
behaviour is motivated by self-interest values in a risky environment on the 
basis of long-term reciprocity (Coate & Ravallion 1989). The concept of self-
interest also takes a central place in De Swaan’s (1988) theory of collective 
action, as employed in his study of the rise of state-organised care in four West 
European countries and the United States. I will now provide a brief review of 
some of these views. 
In the original exposition of “The Great Transformation”1, Polanyi argued 
that all economic systems up to the end of feudalism in Western Europe and in 
most societies were organised on the principles of reciprocity or redistribution 
or a combination of both. The organization of production and distribution in 
many societies, he stated, had been accomplished through social relationships of 
                                                 
1 Polanyi’s book is the outcome of an analysis of the work of many anthropologists, 
economic historians and other historians of thought.  
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kin or community obligations and counter obligations (reciprocity) and that 
other societies, on scales as small as a band of the !Kung or even as large as the 
planned economy of the former Soviet Union, employed re-distributive systems. 
This was characterized by “the absence of motive of gain; the absence of the 
principle of labouring for remuneration; the absence of the principle of the least 
effort; and, especially, the absence of any separate and distinct institution based 
on economic motives” (47). According to him, in much of Western Europe, 
these systems of distribution came to be increasingly supplemented and then 
replaced by market trading at the end of the feudal and manorial era, the control 
and encouragement of which was a major focus of medieval municipal and 
mercantilist national governments. Since I will be dealing with informal and 
mainly rural communities, his concept of reciprocity and how it has been 
applied is of particular significance for my present purpose.  
Until the late 1970’s, the dominant explanation to the underlying rationale of 
traditional mutual insurance in so called pre-capitalist societies which went 
unchallenged particularly in anthropology was the ‘moral economy approach’. 
The premise of the approach, which derived its name from the title of the 
seminal book by James C. Scott (1976) in which he echoes Polanyi’s views that 
solidarity mechanisms of peasants reflected two high ethical values: the right to 
subsistence and the principle of reciprocity. Therefore, for Scott, a model 
applicable to most peasants was that although constrained by the vagaries of the 
weather and the claim of outsiders, they commit themselves to the moral good 
of their society rather than seeking to maximise the well being of themselves 
and their families. Reciprocity thus serves as a central moral formula for inter-
personal conduct. The right to subsistence also defines the minimal needs that 
must be met for members of the community within the context of reciprocity 
(Scott 1976:167). But the moral economy approach of Scott was not without its 
problems.  
Its strongest critic was Popkin (1979) who attacked the orthodox view of 
Scott and those before him by showing that opportunistic behaviour also exists 
among pre-capitalist peasants. In his ‘rational’ or ‘political economy approach’ 
expounded in “The Rational Peasant”, Popkin emphasised that traditional 
village institutions, arrangements and norms had not been as effective in 
guaranteeing of the subsistence needs of community members. He therefore 
found fault with the explanation that peasants are either altruistic actors or 
passive subjects willing to respect social norms of conduct and moral principles 
of reciprocity.2 He contended that peasants in traditional societies are egoistic 
                                                 
2 Popkin emphasised that ‘insurance, welfare and subsistence guarantees within pre-
capitalist villages are limited’ and ‘the calculations of peasants driven by motives of 
survival in a risky environment led to subsistence flaws and extensive village wide 
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and hard calculating agents who seek by intent to maximise personal advantages 
from all actions. His pessimism about collective action led him to dismiss its 
success in even small communities. His critique however, failed to account for 
the well-documented existence of solidarity networks. 
In a paper in which he used economic theory to explain some of the charac-
teristics of so called primitive or pre-literate societies, Posner (1980) reconciled 
the two opposing traditions by arguing that mutual solidarity can be sustained in 
the long run by the existence of a lasting relationship between its self-interested 
members. He explained that opportunistic behaviour is prevented as long as 
short-term benefits from deviation are smaller than long run punishments.  
Following Posner, Platteau (1991) synthesised the views of Scott and 
Popkin. He faults Scott for confusing social security arrangements with 
altruistic behaviour. While agreeing with Popkin’s challenge of the idealised 
view of traditional mutual insurance, which many anthropologists were inclined 
to accept, he also levels two basic criticisms against him. The first is that he 
overdoes his approach to the moralist tradition to the point of even ignoring 
qualifying statements such as the limitations that mutual suspicions create for 
collective action. Secondly he lashes out at Popkin’s for having views of the 
traditional village societies that are equally as partial and incomplete as those he 
criticises. He specified his “most important conclusion” as that both Scott and 
Popkin have “somewhat gone astray by seeing the problem of the ‘moral 
economy’ as concerned only with the motivations of people in traditional 
village societies”. He shows rather that mutual insurance can take a variety of 
forms such as grain transfers, credit, access to land and labour assistance. He 
thereby patches up the two viewpoints by noting “since these mechanisms have 
proven to be workable, their success ought to be ascribed both to self-interested 
behaviour on the part of the individuals and to the ruling customs and norms 
that are designed to ensure continuity” (emphasis in original). He also cautions 
the continued usefulness of the traditional system as a major source of social 
protection against the background of numerous constraints arising from the joint 
impact of the market penetration, population growth and the rise of the modern 
state that have led to their gradual erosion or weakness. 
In a recent article, Fafchamps (1992) revisits many of the arguments of 
Posner and Platteau and conducts an analysis focussing on the key features of 
solidarity systems (rather than particular institutions). He explained solidarity 
networks “in the light of recent developments in the theory of repeated games”. 
He argues that solidarity systems are usually organised as a form of mutual 
insurance on the basis of delayed reciprocity contingent upon need and afforda-
                                                                                                                       
insurance schemes, but to procedures that generated and enforced inequality within the 
village (Popkin 1979: 32-3).  
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bility. Recipients of aid are not expected to give back the equivalent of what 
they receive but help others in return. How much help a recipient returns 
depends on his own circumstances at the time as well as the situation of those 
calling for help. He concludes by reasserting Posner’s view that people in pre-
industrial societies pursue their long-term self-interest as well as the ethical 
values of their society. This emphasises solidarity as a moral obligation and 
subsistence as a right. He thus reconciles the arguments of Scott and Popkins.  
How does Fafchamp, accommodate the two bodies of thought in his expla-
nation? According to him, without formal enforcements, the existence of 
solidarity mechanisms, and for that matter risk pooling, is achieved through the 
theory of infinitely repeated games, which is another illustration of the pris-
oner’s dilemma principle. All prisoners realise that they can benefit from coop-
eration although they all find opportunistic behaviour in their short-term 
interest. People who breach their promise can be ‘punished’ by being treated 
less well afterwards. The mutual insurance agreement thus becomes self-
enforcing based on voluntary participation but not coercion. The benefit of the 
cooperation according to Fafchamp comes over a long period of time. 
The idea of self-enforcing agreement without coercion resonates more 
profoundly in De Swaan’s (1988) theory of collective action, as employed in his 
study of the rise of state-organised care in four West European countries and the 
United States. He uses two processes to explain how and why people come to 
develop collective, nationwide and compulsory arrangements to cope with 
deficiencies and adversities that appeared to affect them separately and requiring 
individual remedy with two processes. One relates to external effects, which 
refers to the indirect consequences of one person’s deficiency or adversity for 
others not immediately afflicted themselves. He cites the example of the outbreak 
of cholera in 19th century Europe as an object lesson in the external effects of 
individual deficiencies. Linked to this, according to him, is the second process of 
chains of human interdependence in the course of time to foster group interest. He 
traces a link of this explanation to the historical sociology of Nobert Elias and his 
classical predecessors. Using the concept of ‘figuration’ as a reference to the 
“structured and changing pattern of interdependent human beings” he states that 
the changing attitudes towards the poor of those established in society were the 
result of shifts in the balance of mutual dependency which are the results of the 
emergence of nation states and the rise of capitalism.  
The application of the theory to explain the emergence of friendly societies 
and workers’ mutualism at the early period of industrial capitalism in Europe is 
particularly relevant for this study. The theory is chiefly useful in the sense that it 
deals further with the processes from small voluntary to large compulsory state 
schemes. He explains that participants in these voluntary co-operations were able 
to achieve a measure of solidarity through self-coercion by exerting pressure on 
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one another to contribute a small but fixed part of their income. Mutual funds 
were therefore able to achieve cooperation because participants were under social 
constraints towards self-constraint. This form of coercion that de Swaan 
indicates could also be applied to societies “where sharing en famille is taken for 
granted, the obligation to make deposits at set intervals provides a good excuse 
for withholding income from kinsmen who appeal to one’s moral obligation”. 
Overall, the analyses and explanations of solidarity institutions and networks 
have not been without their oversights and shortcomings. One significant short-
coming is that where the focus has been on so-called developing or Third World 
societies, the analyses have consistently been undertaken and pursued as mere 
‘objects of curiosity’ in pre-industrial societies (Atim 1999). This focus has 
invariably left a gap in the empirical study of how traditional solidarity systems 
function as mutual insurance mechanisms for solving the problems of health 
care financing in, for example, sub-Saharan Africa. In other words they have 
not been problematised in specific contexts. Such analysis is all the more 
important because although the well-documented experience of mutual 
insurance in Europe and the study of economic systems of the so called pre-
industrial societies provide important material for comparison and for testing 
generalizations, they certainly cannot be applied wholesale to today’s develop-
ing countries. 
In Ghana, as in most developing countries of Africa, traditional social 
security is still the major source of social protection for a large section of the 
population. However, as some of the cited authors above have called attention 
to, the processes of socio-economic changes in transitional societies tend to 
undermine the effectiveness of the existing cultural mechanisms of social 
security (although informal reciprocal obligations cannot be ignored). One of 
the pertinent questions that needs to be answered therefore is: Would the 
principles of traditional social security mechanisms within formal health 
insurance schemes be functional or feasible? And if so, how is that practicable 
in the situation of the increasing recognition of self-interest in such group 
dynamics? It is aspects of these social relations that I have set out to investigate 
in this study. In order to place the discussion in its proper contextual frame-
work, it is appropriate to provide some background. 
 
 
Background: Social security in Ghana 
 
The traditional system of social security in Ghana, as in most African societies, is 
based on reciprocity. It was first and foremost the (extended) family, which 
provided the social and juridical framework for long-term reciprocity. Its 
members were supposed to assist one another in times of hardship and misfortune 
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and the entire lineage was held responsible for the (mis) behaviour of one of its 
members (see e.g. Fortes 1969, Assimeng 1981, Nukunya 1992). Lineage 
solidarity showed itself for example during sickness, old age and death. The 
principle of reciprocity worked most prominently in the organisation of funerals. 
Significantly, among the Akan, the largest ethnic group in Ghana, people 
considered themselves members of one abusua (lineage) if they shared funeral 
debts. 
With the advent of colonial rule, a Western style of social security system was 
added to the existing one (Darkwa 1997). It was based on the principles of the 
market and the state. However, this form of social security arrangement was 
limited to the formal sector of the economy and left out the largest proportion of 
the population: those who earned their livelihood in the ‘informal’ (including the 
traditional) sector. People suffering the greatest insecurity, such as the aged, the 
young, women, children and particularly the ill or handicapped were often 
excluded from this new form of social protection. 
Both systems, but the traditional one in particular, are now under severe stress. 
Due to education, migration, urban employment, economic and environmental 
crisis and changing values, the old solidarity network is tearing apart. Recent 
research among elderly people in a rural community shows that ‘reciprocity’ no 
longer provides adequate security for the old (Van der Geest 1997). The 
introduction of economic cut backs in the form of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAP) and environmental degradation (leading to a diminished 
agricultural output) has hit women and elderly in particular and those in need of 
medical care very hard (Apt 1996; Senah 1989, 1997). 
 
The problem: Health insurance in Ghana 
Despite considerable progress in health care since the 1970’s, the health status of 
most Ghanaians remains poor as evidenced by high infant and maternal mortality, 
high prevalence of preventable infectious and parasitic diseases and poor 
nutritional standards (Asenso-Okyere 1995). Apart from inadequate government 
allocation of resources to the public health sector, there is also great inequality 
between urban and rural areas in access to health care. Since 1981 however, the 
government has tried several cost recovery measures as part of health sector 
reforms in the context of structural adjustment programmes to reduce increasing 
public expenditure on health care.  
One of the recent economic reforms that the state is implementing is the 
transformation of traditional social welfare mechanisms into a new form of 
social insurance. The new system is to assure health security for the most needy 
and at the same time reduce social expenditure in the state budget. The final 
report for the feasibility studies of a national health insurance scheme in Ghana 
summarises some of the long-term goals of the proposed scheme. These 
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include: achieving universal coverage of primary health care, making health 
care economically and geographically accessible to all Ghanaians, ensuring an 
acceptable minimum standard of health care at the primary level and generating 
additional sources of health care funding. The driving forces behind the scheme 
are the principles of equity and solidarity. It is thus proposed that the scheme 
will in the first instance concentrate on increasing access and raising the quality 
of primary care.  
There are, however, numerous obstacles to overcome. Among the 
complexities and problems of implementing a scheme of insurance which the 
government recognises include: the background of Ghana's low economic base, 
a relatively poor population, unplanned spending on health care, and a lack of 
expertise on socialised health insurance. Accordingly, it has initiated and 
carried out a number of feasibility studies that deal with the technical and 
financial aspects of the scheme to obtain the needed information to enable the 
scheme to take off smoothly. But Ghana, like many other low-income countries 
confronted with similar problems, finds itself at a difficult crossroad. On the 
one hand it needs to transcend to a more encompassing system of health 
financing, preferably one based on prepayment and on the other, it should ask 
itself whether it has to copy foreign systems of insurance which have proved 
their viability in relatively well-off countries but may prove less suitable for a 
low-income population such as the Ghanaian one. There are also other crucial 
issues of social and cultural nature that need to be considered in the design and 
implementation of such a system, but which have not yet received adequate 
attention. While the underlying principle of exchange in the dominant 
traditional arrangements is reciprocity, the proposed insurance system, however, 
is based on an entirely different principle: that of state authority. 
Lack of financial means and the unanimous relationship between citizen and 
nation-state entail an uneasy start for health insurance in Ghana. Scott (1972) 
notes in this regard that, “in new nations, values attached to the state bureauc-
racy tend to remain fairly formalistic and tenuous”. In a typical developing 
country context like Ghana, the prevalence of kinship ties, clientelism and the 
priority of other traditional loyalties over modern bureaucratic obligations 
(among others) lead to nepotism and corruption, as people in government 
service allow their family and traditional interests to prevail over those of the 
state. Nugent (1995), for example, has described the state in Ghana as 
commonly regarded as an enemy, a kind of vampire, which tries to extort 
resources from its subjects. Bayart (1993) writing about African states in 
general, speaks of “politics of the belly” while Ellis et al. (1997) view the 
affairs of African states as legalised crime. Citizens, therefore, mistrust state 
claims concerning “equity” and “solidarity”. 
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A state organised insurance thus becomes a highly ambiguous institution, 
which seems extremely vulnerable to two perennial constraints of any insurance 
system, both of which derive from self-interest and lack of solidarity among its 
individual members: adverse selection and moral hazard. The former is the 
tendency of people at risk to join the insurance more than those who are healthy 
and without risk. Moral hazard refers to the over consumption of health care by 
those who join the insurance. The latter in particular seems a formidable threat 
to health insurance in a low-income country such as Ghana (Criel 1995: 66-67). 
Methods of counteracting moral hazard are a major point in any health policy. 
The state, therefore, has good reasons to doubt the willingness of its citizens to 
fully participate in its insurance scheme and the citizens have equally good 
reasons to mistrust state claims concerning “equality and solidarity” (MoH 
1996: 2). This research intends to look into this political and moral stalemate. 
The question that needs to be answered is how the traditional mechanisms of 
reciprocal moral obligation can be “scaled up” or extended to an anonymous, 
more formalised state centred social insurance scheme. Particularly crucial is 
the question of how the concept of ‘family solidarity’ translates in the behaviour 
of the population towards the scheme in the light of their past experiences with 
traditional social security mechanisms. Given the strong family bonds in 
traditional reciprocal exchange, what are the guarantees that people are willing 
to pay to help others who are not their relatives, if the traditional force of moral 
obligation — reciprocity — is absent and an untrustworthy treasurer — the state 
— will administer their contributions? Indeed, as the findings of a recent study 
indicate, people are likely to provide assistance for close relatives because they 
feel morally obliged as a result of what they had done for them in the past 
(Arhinful 1998). To date, it is not clear to what extent the policy objectives of 
increasing the provision of and raising the quality of primary health care can be 
reconciled with what individuals and informal groups such as the abusua 
(family) know, do and want in health insurance. The conflict or uneasy 
relationship between ‘the people’ and state interests will be a central issue in 
this study on social security. 
 
Objective and research questions 
In light of the foregoing, this study seeks to provide insights into how a 
sustainable insurance system can be implemented in Ghana, taking into account 
the local traditions of insurance/security. It was envisaged therefore that the 
research will provide information on how to marry traditional forms of 
assistance to modern health insurance. This objective translates into a number 
of specific research questions: 
What are the principles of the existing traditional forms of support and how 
do these operate presently in the family? 
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What are the perceptions, values and limitations of a state-organised 
solidarity risk-sharing scheme at the different levels of social organisation, both 
among those who plan and implement insurance and among the community for 
which it is intended? 
Can traditional rules of reciprocity and solidarity be scaled up to or trans-
formed into a modern state-organised insurance system? 
Can a state-centred health insurance scheme improve access to the poor and 
vulnerable members of the community such as women, children and increase-
ingly elderly people and paupers? 
 
 
Brief overview of community health care financing problems 
in Africa  
 
Since the beginning of the 1990’s the relevant literature on community 
financing schemes in Africa has been growing with increasing interest in 
academic, policy and development spheres. Undoubtedly this growing interest 
has been fostered by the financial crises affecting public health care services in 
the region. Health sector reforms introduced to assure quality of care and 
improve access and efficiency from the 1980’s saw the introduction of user fees 
at the point of use. Although this led to some improvement such as the 
availability of essential drugs, it also led to untoward effects of decreasing 
access to the poor particularly rural populations (Waddington & Enyimayew 
1990, Nyonator & Kutzin 1999). 
Most rural based populations experience total exclusion from whatever 
benefits cost recovery may offer, due to their inability to pay for services at the 
time of need because of their low income. Lipton (1976), writing in the late 
seventies in support of his ‘urban biased’ theory, thus noted in relation to health 
care in rural Africa that “the townsman has nine times as good a prospect of 
medical attention as the villager in India, eleven times in Ghana, thirty-three 
times in Ethiopia”. In terms of access to health care, about 40 % of the popula-
tion of Ghana is estimated to live more than 15 kilometres from a health facility 
but rural communities are worse off since most of the facilities are located 
mainly in towns and villages along main roads (MoH-Ghana 1996). The 2000 
population census report of Ghana recorded a substantial increase in urbanisa-
tion from 32 % in 1984 to 43.8 % in terms of population based in localities with 
more than 5000 persons (GSS 2002). The reality, however, is that the provision 
of health care has not kept pace with this growth in population. User fees among 
rural households have therefore “contributed significantly to increasing the 
exposure of poor households to financial risks associated with illness” (Arhin-
Tenkorang 2001).  
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This situation has led to a greater interest in insurance systems as alternative 
and complementary options for sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, the grim reality of 
user fees has led some people to rather overenthusiastically describe health 
insurance as “virtually the only practical instrument through which African 
governments can get out of the expensive business of across the board subsidies 
for hospital care, and thus release funds for public health, preventive and 
primary services that benefit the poor” (Griffen & Shaw 1996: 143).  
In contrast to user fees, health insurance encompasses risk sharing through 
pooling of calculable, pre-paid contributions to reduce unforeseeable or even 
unaffordable health care costs. However, public and private health insurance in 
Africa cover the formal sector almost exclusively, and therefore achieve a 
coverage rate of no more than 10 % of the population. The majority of African 
citizens comprising a dominant rural population and informal sector workers 
have no access to this kind of social protection (World Bank 1994).  
For example, a survey of 23 countries in sub-Saharan Africa covering the 
period 1971-1987 by Vogel (1990) found out that only seven countries had 
formal health insurance schemes. The insured as a percentage of the total 
population ranged between 1 % in Ethiopia to 14.4% in Kenya. Vogel’s defini-
tion of health insurance included arrangements involving a formal pool of funds 
held by a third party or provider as in the case of a mutual health organization. 
The third party relies on prepayment by the insurees and excludes, for instance, 
employer provided health care.  
Partly as a response to this lack of formal social security and partly to the 
negative side effects of user fees in the face of persistent problems with health 
care financing, the analysis of non-profit, voluntary insurance schemes for rural 
and the urban self-employed and informal sector workers is gaining increasing 
prominence in sub-Saharan Africa (Jütting 2000, Atim 1998). These schemes 
are characterised by an ethic of mutual aid, solidarity and the collective pooling 
of health risks.  
But rural health insurance in Africa creates its own problems. In an extensive 
review of 82 health insurance schemes in the informal sector worldwide, Bennet 
et al. (1998: 11) mention that, “people outside formal sector employment create 
a much thornier problem for health planners because of frequent fluctuations in 
and the fact that their income is often untaxed and therefore it is difficult to 
collect premium payments at source”. The bigger problem is that widespread 
poverty among potential members is a serious obstacle to the implementation of 
community or rural insurance. If people are struggling for every day survival, 
they are less willing to pay insurance premiums in advance to use services at a 
latter point in time for an illness that may never happen. This has often put 
affordability at the forefront of such schemes.  
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Cultural habits also influence how people deal with the risk of illness and 
could also be a source of problem (Wieseman et al. 2000). People might tradi-
tionally save money for unpredictable events like funerals and marriages as well 
as the education of their children, but where a belief exists that saving money 
for eventual health care costs meant “wishing oneself the disease” they may be 
reluctant in joining community health insurance schemes (Garba et al. 1998). 
The prevailing concepts of illness and risk are also relevant to the decision of 
communities to purchase health insurance or not. If people see illness as a 
somewhat random event that can hit anyone, they are surely more willing to 
purchase insurance than if they perceive it as punishment for misbehaviour by 
magical powers. Furthermore, past experience with other community based 
initiatives with different logic such as savings and credit might induce misper-
ceptions and unwillingness to join schemes. For example, people might harbour 
the wrong perception that the money paid into a common fund accumulates 
over time and that the benefits will correspond to the contributions made 
(Batusa 1999). 
The lessons to date indicate that actual implementation of rural or 
community based health insurance schemes has had mixed results. Success and 
viability have largely depended on factors such as design and management of 
the scheme, community participation, regulations at the level of the health care 
provider, quality of services and in particular on the socio-economic and 
cultural context. As Bennet et al. indicate, many schemes had encountered 
substantial problems of adverse selection, were dependent on continuing access 
to some form of external support and still very few succeeded in reaching the 
very poorest. Nonetheless, their potential in enabling marginally poor 
individuals and households to regularise their access to health care remains 
quite attractive (Bennet et al. 1998: 3) 
Despite the growing interest in rural community schemes, traditional 
solidarity networks have not received the necessary attention in the health care 
financing debate, at least not from anthropology and sociology. Bennet et al. 
(1998) have pointed out another significant pitfall of most reviews; they have 
tended to focus predominantly upon the schemes themselves rather than the 
relationship between them and the broader health care context. In joining the 
ongoing debate about the potential of community-based health insurance to 
improve access to health care and social protection, this empirical study is 
aimed at filling out some of these gaps.  
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The fieldwork 
 
Study approach 
In its efforts to implement health insurance in Ghana, the Ministry of Health 
(MOH) has undertaken a number of activities. In order to relate the outcome of 
this study to the health insurance policies and plans of the Ministry, the 
following three local administrative districts in Ghana where voluntary health 
insurance activities had been initiated and/or were being carried out were 
selected for the fieldwork3: 
 
Nkoranza district, which operates a provider driven, private, not for profit health 
insurance scheme;  
Dangme-West district where previous baseline economic feasibility studies on 
rural health insurance were conducted and which is presently also implementing 
a non profit, provider driven district community scheme;  
Suhum Kraboa Coaltar district, which was one of four districts in the eastern 
region of Ghana, selected to pilot Ghana’s ill-fated national health insurance 
scheme (NHIS) in 1997. This scheme was initiated by the state and sought to 
create new structures within the ministry of health to implement it. 
 
Policy makers and implementers involved or connected to the three initiatives in 
both public and private not for profit sector in Ghana were included in the 
research at the Ministry of Health headquarters, as well as the regional and/or 
district administrative centres. Formal approval, notification and support to 
conduct the fieldwork in the three districts were granted by the ministry of 
health through its national Director of Policy, Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation. The fieldwork in each district was preceded by prior notification to 
the relevant regional and district health officials through correspondence. This 
was followed up with a familiarization visit to communicate the general 
objectives and the necessary details and expected logistics assistance necessary 
for the fieldwork. The fieldwork was carried out in two phases comprising a 
longer qualitative (exploratory) phase and a short quantitative (evaluation) 
phase as follows. 
 
Exploratory phase: 
During this phase of the project, I selected two sites in each of the three 
districts; one was the capital of the district in which the scheme is situated and 
the other was one other rural village further away from the district capital. I then 
applied the following research techniques: 
 
                                                 
3 A detailed discussion of the three schemes is the subject of Chapter 3. 
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Semi-structured interviews with 25 members in each research area (15 in each 
town and 10 in each village were covered comprising men and women, young 
and old. This mainly served as a pilot activity to obtain preliminary knowledge 
about the communities. 
Formal and informal interviews with key informants (community leaders-
including female group leaders, elders, health workers and administrators); 
Observation of activities taking place in specific situations or during events 
which require community solidarity: sickness, funerals and old age; 
Focus group discussions with various members of the community (men and 
women, young and old) on security and insecurity in the past, the present and the 
future; 
In-depth interviews with policy makers and health planners at the national and 
district levels; 
Study of policy documents and records. 
 
To facilitate rapport, conversation, interviews and focus group discussion 
with community members as well as a cross section of health staff were 
conducted in the local languages. In all three districts, I was provided with 
accommodation on the premises of the district hospital or health centre during 
my initial visit and throughout my subsequent fieldwork at the district. At my 
request, two district health staff were released from their routine duties to assist 
me. In Nkoranza and Suhum, a motorbike was also placed at my disposal to 
facilitate movement to the accessibly difficult remote areas in the district. One 
of my assistants was usually the driver. I also engaged one field assistant in the 
distant rural village. Field assistants provided guidance in recruiting informants 
as well as arranging interviews and discussions. The exploratory phase resulted 
in an intermediary report and provided hypotheses and specific questions that 
were followed up in the second evaluation research phase. 
 
Evaluation phase: 
During this phase the most relevant hypotheses from the exploratory phase were 
integrated into a short questionnaire and applied to larger samples in the 
Nkoranza and Dodowa districts.4 The purpose of the second phase was to 
validate the insights acquired through qualitative methods in small groups 
during the first phase with a bigger sample using a quantitative questionnaire. 
Suhum was excluded because the survey focussed on practical issues that could 
not be investigated there.  
The selection of study areas and sample sizes in the survey was done to 
cover all the administrative health zones or sub-districts in the two districts. In 
                                                 
4 The original proposal planned to carry out the survey in all three districts with the 
assistance of interviewers based on a targeted systematic random sample of +333 
persons from the three districts, making a total of 1000 respondents. 
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each district, six field workers were selected, in consultation with the district 
health director and insurance managers or personnel concerned. Apart from 
their knowledge about the community, another criterion used was participation 
in similar community research in the past. They were then trained and oriented 
in two days. The orientation also included a pilot study during which survey 
instruments were revised based on the outcome of the pilot test.  
In each district the questionnaire was finalised and then translated into the 
local language after a second role-play session. Although the instrument used in 
both districts were the same, it was conveniently adapted to suit particular 
characteristics and needs. For example, in Dodowa this involved inserting two 
additional sub-questions on awareness in view of the relatively shorter existence 
of the scheme. Adequate numbers of the English version were duplicated and 
given to the interviewers. Each interviewer also carried a copy of the vernacular 
version as a source of reference. At the end of the training, fieldworkers drew 
up a work plan that I used to monitor and supervise the fieldwork, which was 
conducted over a two-week duration.  
During the survey phase, further qualitative research was also considered 
useful and therefore carried out in all three locations to gain more in-depth 
insights into the issues that were investigated. The selection of informants for 
qualitative study during the evaluation phase was done in consultation with 
district health managers and insurance officers concerned in each district, just as 
it was in the previous phase. In Nkoranza district my arrival coincided with a 
training workshop for community stakeholders in the Nkoranza community to 
inculcate the sense of community ownership in the scheme. These included 
policy makers at the district administration, health staff, traditional and local 
leaders as well as fieldworkers who collect annual premiums in the 
communities. The event provided me with a direct opportunity to update my 
knowledge on the state of affairs of the scheme since my last visit the previous 
year. In view of the relatively shorter operational period of the scheme in 
Dodowa, the qualitative interviews in that district were limited to fewer 
stakeholders who had been associated with the scheme either directly or 
indirectly from its planning stages, thus a few health officials and key district 
administration functionaries and local leaders. The qualitative investigation also 
took me to the Eastern regional capital of Koforidua where I took advantage of 
a training workshop for promoters and initiators of mutual health initiatives in 
that region. Apart from the regional coordinator of the ill-fated NHIS who 
actively coordinates health insurance activities in the Eastern region (and who 
also hosted me), I had extensive conversations with leaders of some of those 
emerging mutual groups in the region as well as other targeted participants. The 
latter included health officials from Suhum district and a facilitator at the 
workshop.  
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Data analysis 
Data involving all conversation and interviews as well as focus group 
discussions in the qualitative phase were recorded, transcribed and manually 
analysed. Quantitative data coding and entry were carried out in Ghana with the 
assistance of data collectors and a professional data entry clerk respectively. I 
carefully edited this in the Netherlands. Analysis was carried out using SPSS 
and Epi Info statistical analysis programmes. The results of the two studies have 
been integrated in various chapters of the thesis.  
 
Study limitations 
The limitations of this study must be noted. I set out with the aims of exploring 
how “the people” look upon health insurance and how they are likely to partici-
pate in it based on their own traditions of social support in the family. The case 
studies selected were, however, all formal, top-down initiated insurance 
schemes thereby theoretically overlooking other alternative, community 
inspired and bottom up community approaches. Good considerations, however, 
justify my choices. In the first place, my focus was on heterogeneous, district 
wide schemes that serve a wide section of rural populations and that in fact are 
representative of the emerging and preferred trend in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Diversity also influenced my selection. Nkoranza was chosen because it offers 
Ghana’s first experience in community health insurance scheme and represented 
the mission or private not for profit variant. Most of the economic studies for 
the feasibility of health insurance in Ghana were conducted in Dangme West 
district. Apart from the availability of existing data, which provide a buffer for 
comparison, the district also stands out as the only wholly public sector 
functional health insurance initiative in Ghana although nurtured and operated 
by the district health management team. Suhum represented a fully central state 
inspired health insurance scheme and the experience of its failure is considered 
a useful lesson. Together the three schemes, though far from being selective 
examples, therefore provided a range of experience that informs the health 
insurance debate in Ghana and sub-Saharan Africa. Their rural demographic 
features are a good reflection of the practical situation in most of the sub-region.  
 
Fieldwork limitations 
In general, the fieldwork proceeded well, but was not without difficulties and 
limitations. Enlisting people who meet the overall criteria for various interviews 
defined by the methodology was not easy. One aspect of it related to the 
selection of “the few” from a wide target population. Another aspect however, 
was the practical issue of enlisted respondents who turned out to be “inappro-
priate” or reluctant informants for various reasons, although they had previously 
agreed whole-heartedly to the appointment. For example, I cancelled my first 
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interview in Dodowa because the interviewee honestly told me that he suffers 
from partial forgetfulness. I was pleased that my interviewee was very honest 
with me because he looked very frail and ill. I wondered how I could have 
coped with an interview with him. There was a lady in Dodowa who agreed to 
be interviewed when my field assistant met her to inform her about the study. 
However, when we arrived for the actual interview, she behaved as though she 
was uninformed about the subject completely. I later learnt through my assistant 
that she thought that talking freely on the subject might bring tax consequences 
for her chop bar business.  
Again I spoke to an opinion leader in an in-depth interview who decided to 
be rather speculative on some of the issues that I tried to probe into. For 
instance, at one point when the issue of premiums came up I asked him what he 
considered to be a reasonable rate and he told me 5,000 cedis per person per 
year. Later, I learnt through my assistant that he told him he deliberately quoted 
a lower figure to me. He considered 10,000 to be more realistic but he felt if he 
said that to me it might influence the decision. What was most interesting about 
this incident was that he indicated to my assistant that he could not confide in 
me because I could not speak his native Dangme language — call it language 
identity. Altogether, interesting but sometimes unfortunate issues such as these 
represent the practicalities one ought to expect in fieldwork of this nature.  
Focus group discussions were typically difficult and tiring to organise but 
interesting to conduct. The difficulty had to do with punctuality. Despite the 
fact that reminders were given about the time and place of discussions, the time 
interval between the average first reporting participant and the last one was 
often about an hour. 
The second phase of fieldwork was prolonged by nearly a month due 
primarily to electioneering campaigns in Ghana towards the end of 2000 and 
other public holidays in December. The anticipation and enthusiasm of elections 
in the country during that period was such that slowed down the fieldwork 
considerably. One observation about the elections though, is that as far as the 
data collection was concerned, the euphoria surrounding it gave a psychological 
boost to people’s confidence and resulted in open expressions on the research 
topic. Also, the travels to Nkoranza, for example had had its dramatic moments. 
On three occasions, the State Transport coach on which I travelled suffered 
mechanical problems and in each case we had to wait for hours before a new 
one arrived to pick us up to continue the journey. The dry harmattan season was 
at its peak during this time, compounding the problems and risks involved in 
travelling the dusty roads within the Nkoranza district. 
One problem encountered by data collectors in the quantitative survey was 
the reluctance of some respondents to be interviewed. In most cases they were 
sometimes persuaded to do so and those who refused outright were replaced. An 
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interesting incident reported by one interviewer was that in one village the 
community mistook him for a sanitary inspector and did not want to be inter-
viewed at first, but the problem was resolved with the assistance of the 
insurance field collector in the village. Getting transport to travel to some of the 
locations within the Nkoranza district as well as finding food to eat was some-
times problematic for fieldworkers. They did learn their lesson, though, and 
carried their food with them to villages where they were uncertain about 
availability of food. In one village in Nkoranza district, the interviewer had to 
solicit the assistance of an interpreter to interview a few people who did not 
speak the local language who live in that village. An interesting observation in 
both districts was that some in the community felt “farming” was not an 
occupation because it did not bring them any substantial income. 
 
Ethical considerations 
This study took utmost care to protect the interest of informants as well as 
stakeholders in the field of health insurance. 
In order to ensure that no physical or psychological harm was suffered by 
any of the informants, the highest level of ethical conduct was observed in the 
process of data collection, analysis and publication of the research results. 
Informed consent was sought from participants before they were included in 
the study. In doing this, adequate information about study objectives, purpose 
and importance was provided to give them the option to voluntarily decide 
whether or not to take part. The provision of such information was however, 
limited or delayed in observation situations or activities where informed consent 
was considered counter-productive to the validity of the data and/or the interest 
of subjects or the public good. 
In order to secure valid and good quality data, the researcher sought to 
establish a good relationship with communities and informants before topics 
and particularly sensitive issues were investigated.  
Informants in the study have been protected through confidentiality and 
anonymity. In this regard, the personal identities of those interviewed have been 
concealed except where it is officially prudent to reveal their identity. Such 
cases have been reported with the consent of the officials involved.  
In order to ensure that the various parties, groups, communities, individuals 
and stakeholders that took part in the study, get the maximum benefit of 
participation, the findings have been circulated as much as practicable. The 
means of communication to various parties has been determined and guided by 
their level of literacy, the comprehension of the material and the pertinence of 
the information to their benefit and to the expediency of communication. 
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In reporting the findings of the study, the individual autonomy as well as the 
health and well being of all subjects and parties has been respected. I have 
ultimately sought to provide a fair account of the phenomenon studied.  
 
 
Plan of the book 
 
This dissertation is organised in two main parts. Part one provides the general, 
historical and social context of the study. This constitutes the first four chapters 
of the book. Part two provides the empirical findings of the primary fieldwork 
in the subsequent four chapters.  
Chapter 1 sets the agenda for the entire study and specifies the objectives and 
purpose as well as the theoretical underpinnings of the problem of organising a 
formal health insurance scheme based on traditional principles of solidarity and 
reciprocity. 
In Chapter 2, I continue with the historical background of health care 
financing since the pre-colonial period. This background is necessary for an 
appreciation of the current problems in relation to people’s attitudes towards 
prepayment health care. 
Chapter 3 provides relevant background information on the three schemes and 
localities where the fieldwork was conducted.  
Chapter 4 concludes the material on the relevant contextual background with a 
focus on the traditional social security system in Ghana.  
Chapter 5 opens part two with empirical findings dealing with community 
perceptions, values and limitations of health insurance. It explains the 
dichotomies of attitudes towards different forms of insecure situations with a 
particular focus on sickness and organisations of funerals in Ghanaian society. 
Chapter 6 is the core conceptual chapter of the book and deals with the subject 
of why people join health insurance. I explore whether the rationale is based on 
solidarity or self interest and explain why people pay lip service to solidarity in 
how they speak about and practice health insurance. 
In Chapter 7, I discuss whether risk sharing health insurance solves the 
problem of access to the poor and vulnerable by arguing this is still problematic 
partly because the poor who cannot afford to pay premiums are left out. 
Ironically government exemption policies in the past have not been effective. 
Chapter 8 deals with how people perceive the state as a bursar of health 
insurance schemes against the background of the expected leading role of the 
state in Africa to use community financing schemes based on risk sharing 
solidarity to solve the problems of access to health care for the poor. I point out 
that people do not trust the state because it is perceived as corrupt and 
unaccountable. 
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In Chapter 9, I conclude with a summary and a discussion of the scientific 
importance of the study and offer suggestions by way of policy implications for 
a social and culturally sensitive health insurance for Ghana with implications 
for sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
 
 
2 
Health care in Ghana and how  
it was paid for: An historical  
perspective (1850-2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Financing of health care delivery in Ghana has had a chequered history. In the 
search for appropriate ways of raising revenue to supplement government 
allocation to the sector, various options have been tried. The strategies have 
shifted from the era of nominal fees to fee free health system and then back to 
user fees, all in an attempt to provide and guarantee universal access to adequate 
health care for all of Ghana’s people. This chapter focuses on an examination of 
the history of modern health care in Ghana and how it was financed over the 
years from the mid nineteen-century to the present. The objective is to offer a 
brief overview of the antecedents to the present state or public health services as 
well as to the financing problems they have had in their efforts to make health 
care accessible to the people of Ghana, particularly the rural poor. It is useful to 
start discussing the development of modern health care and how it was financed 
from 1850 because that is the period the colonial power, Britain, gained an 
enduring foothold in the Gold Coast. Data from that period is available and 
reliable. Indeed, an underlying theme of this presentation is that the health 
services available today developed directly from, and still to a large extent 
reflect, the character of the legacy bequeathed by colonial Britain.  
 For analytical purposes, the review is organized into two broad phases: colo-
nial and postcolonial health services. After a brief introduction to the pre-
26 
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colonial period situation, the discussion turns to what policies and developments 
were pursued to offer health and medical care to Ghanaians under various 
colonial and post colonial administrations and how those policies influenced the 
health care status of the population over the years. The examination particularly 
emphasises how various governments sought to generate revenue to finance 
health care and development, and the response and impact those policies have 
had on coverage and accessibility of health care to Ghanaians. The discussion 
offers the appropriate framework for understanding the problems and challenges 
of implementing health insurance in Ghana with implications for other sub-
Saharan African countries. 
 
 
Historical foundations of public health services 
 
Pre-colonial period before 1850 
The people inhabiting the area that was to become modern Ghana were not 
isolated from the rest of the world before European discovery. Some accounts 
have it that as far back as the AD 1200, Western Sudan Mande gold traders 
started to penetrate the country to establish small commercial colonies. Contacts 
with Hausa merchants through trade in cola nuts also date back to the mid 
fifteenth centuries. It is certain that these early, pre-European contacts for trade 
purposes were also accompanied by some of the major infections of the 
Eurasian landmass such as small pox, measles, and perhaps gonorrhoea (Patter-
son 1981: 3). On the basis of present knowledge about disease causation and 
immunity, it is probable that some serious epidemics took place from these 
early contacts, but their magnitude was curtailed by low population densities 
and limited mobility at the time.  
The early beginnings of modern health care can, however, be traced to the 
time of organised European presence in Ghana. It dates back to the 15th century 
when the Portuguese built a fort at Elmina in the central region of present day 
Ghana in 1481 under the expedition of Don Diego D’Azambuja. Subsequently, 
the Dutch, British, Danes and others arrived on the coast to build forts and 
castles for the purpose of trade in spices, gold and, later, slaves. Historical 
accounts of merchant activities along the West African Coast indicate that 
European ships and castles became centres for the spread of diseases like small 
pox, syphilis and yellow fever (Patterson 1981: 3). Anecdotal accounts of the 
havoc Europeans suffered from the fevers in West Africa earned the area the 
reputation of “white man’s grave” in colonial history. Some writers indicate that 
the Portuguese found the region so inhospitable that they vacated their posts 
when the Dutch challenged them in 1595. Mary Kingsley (1897: 681) captured 
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the health situation along the West Coast of Africa very well in her West Africa 
Travels:  
 
Great as is the delay and difficulty placed in the way of the development of the 
immense natural resources of West Africa by the labour problem, there is another 
cause of delay to this development greater and more terrible by far – namely, the 
deadliness of the climate.  
 
In his book, In the Niger Country, Harold Bindloss (1898: 57) even provides a 
more vivid picture of the situation he observed at Cape Coast: 
 
It is by no means an attractive place… Malaria fever is always there, dysentery and 
cholera strike the white man down, small pox is generally at work among the 
swarming natives, and a few years ago a scourge which was generally believed to be 
yellow fever, though the authorities said it was not, swept most of the Europeans 
away. 
 
An example of the low rate of survivorship could be found in the earliest 
documented English trade expedition to the west coast of Africa, which was 
organised by a group of London merchants in 1553. It was a two-ship expedi-
tion, led by Captain Thomas Windham, who intended to buy gold at Elmina and 
pepper from Benin (Blake 1977: 143). About one hundred of the 140-man crew 
died, including the captains of the two ships, Windham and Pinteado, a Portu-
guese man. Nevertheless, the survivors returned with valuable cargo to England. 
 Malaria was the chief killer on the West African Coast and this contributed 
to the reluctance of European traders to venture inland. In spite of the heavy 
losses in human lives, however, the trade continued mainly because of the high 
profitability of the slave trade. The profitability was determined by the delivery 
of healthy slaves to their destination in the Americas and the Caribbean. That 
need also necessitated the employment of ship’s surgeons whose duty was to 
ensure not only that healthy slaves were bought but also that they remained in 
good health until the delivery point on the other side. In a way, these processes 
led to the unplanned introduction of Western medicine to the West African 
Coast, albeit on slaves ready for shipment. However, it goes without saying that 
those surgeons who accompanied visiting European ships would have only 
serviced inhabitants who lived close to those settlements (Addae 1996: 9).  
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The colonial period 
 
The early beginnings of modern health care under British colonial  
administration: 1843-1870 
The significant historical landmark in the history of the Crown in what was the 
then Gold Coast was the arrival of George Maclean, an officer of the Royal 
African Colonial Corps, who took up duties on the Gold Coast in 1830 for the 
Committee of Merchants of London. His splendid administrative abilities and 
success led to the creation of what became the “Gold Coast Protectorate” which 
persuaded the British to resume control of the trading forts from 1843 on. The 
coastal Fanti states signed a bond in 1844 and came under direct British protec-
tion and justice administration. The Danes negotiated all their forts to the 
British in 1850 at a cost of 10,000 British pounds and left. By Letters Patent 
dated the 24th January, 1850, the British Forts and Settlement on the Gold Coast 
were separated from Sierra Leone and became a distinct dependency of the 
Crown, with their own Governor and Executive and Legislative Councils 
(Kimble 1963: 168, Claridge et al. 1915: 474).  
When officials replaced merchants as rulers, they undertook the construction 
of roads and railroads, provided sanitation, recorded scientific observations and 
introduce health measures. British government subsidies was four thousand 
pounds per annum and was limited to exceptional ventures such as the con-
struction of port facilities and railroads or grants for pacification. In order to 
carry out the social programmes the colony needed, the money had to be found 
from within the colony. At that time, there was no official national health 
system in Britain and the service was provided mainly through voluntary or 
charitable hospitals, which were tax financed. Meanwhile in 1850’s England 
customs and excise taxes provided almost two thirds of the revenue of the 
government (Clapman 1932: 423). The natural tendency then was for British 
administration to pursue a policy in the colonies similar to what prevailed in 
Britain. Since all the money needed for development could not be found 
through indirect tax mainly because of Merchants constant opposition to that 
and the fear of smuggling to nearby ports that such an increase could lead to, 
they resorted to direct taxation. The decision therefore was that if Gold Coasters 
(Ghanaians) needed health care they would have to pay for it. 
In 1850 therefore, the Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast, Earl Grey 
proposed direct taxation to supplement custom duties to generate additional 
revenue for social infrastructure and services like road extension, establishment 
of schools and hospitals and sanitation. He also realised, however, that direct 
taxation without a regular government for the whole territory would be an 
imposition so he decided to do so only with the general consent of chiefs and 
their people at the coast (Knoll 1967: 434). As it was, Governor Stephen J. Hill 
 
 30
(1851-53) succeeded in 1852 in getting some Fanti chiefs around the British 
settlements to agree to form a Legislative Assembly and to a Poll Tax of one 
shilling for every person in the towns and districts under British protection. 
Some of the proceeds of the Poll Tax were to be used for medical work.  
From the very beginning of Crown jurisdiction, however, the socio-political 
background of the Gold Coast through the impact of pre-colonial merchant 
control experience brought mixed blessings to taxation policies. Local chiefs 
were involved in the indirect rule as road construction supervisors, tax collec-
tors and sanitary inspectors in spite of the opposition of some British governors 
such as Governor H.T. Ussher (1879-80) because they perceived the chiefs to 
be superstitious and ignorant. On the other hand, the creation of an experienced 
ruling class through informal British rule also created its own problems for the 
colonial office. African and European elites and merchants became a commu-
nity of interest that resisted fiscal levies of the government and exerted 
concerted pressure for tariff education using the chamber of mines in England. 
African chiefs also adopted petitions to impede the enforcement of direct tax 
measures. The Fanti chiefs and elite in particular adeptly used democratic 
devices of petition and remonstrance to relieve themselves of taxation, an 
unwanted responsibility of local self-government. As a result of the persistent 
opposition, the poll tax had to be abandoned after a few years. Kimble (1963: 
189-191) reports that the poll tax failed after a few initial successes because of 
the failure to eradicate abuses of the system. These included dishonesty on the 
part of officials appointed to assist in the collection, improper keeping of 
receipts and an irregular system of auditing. While chiefs were paid stipends, 
benefits that were stipulated for medical officers and hospitals were not 
honoured and there was scarcely any expenditure for the public good. Persistent 
opposition to the poll tax therefore led to its total abandonment after a few years 
of operation.  
The attack on direct taxation was pursued with so much vigour that succes-
sive poll, hut, municipal and maintenance taxes had to be abandoned and with it 
the opportunity for developing social services, including health related ones. 
Nevertheless, in the few years that it lasted, health care was free because Gold 
Coasters were paying poll tax (Ofosu-Amaah, personal communication).1 From 
the beginning, the administration established posts for the Poll Tax Doctors or 
“Doctors to the natives”. The first two such doctors were Dr. J. Jenkins and Dr. 
R. Clarke. Others were soon appointed to the various British forts and settle-
                                                 
1 Professor S. Ofosu-Amaah is a distinguished Ghanaian public health practitioner with 
a long career in public health practice and education in Ghana. He was a key architect in 
the founding of the Post-graduate School of Public Health at the University of Ghana, 
which was set up with core funding from the Rockefeller Foundation. He became its 
first director and has also worked with UNICEF in New York. 
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ments with the instructions that the natives were entitled to gratuitous medical 
treatment from the physicians (Blue book 1955). Army doctors were also 
appointed to undertake part time duties. For example, in 1857, Dr. Martin was 
appointed to the office of colonial surgeon on a salary of hundred pounds per 
annum with the understanding his duties included attending to the natives. His 
decline of the position upset the Governor so much that he wrote to the colonial 
secretary in London complaining about how Dr. Martin expected to be paid five 
pounds a day for merely attending to the civil servants in Accra who happened 
to be only one person, Mr. Bannerman, a native and his son.2 Part of the 
expenditures, such as the salaries of doctors, would have been financed from the 
4000 pounds grant from Britain. However, by the 1870s the poll tax had 
stopped and the colonial administration started charging small sums for those 
who used the system. In any case by that time only a few people would have 
been using the new health system because the alternative medicine was very 
strong. 
 
Essential foundations of the Gold Coast Medical Department: 1872-1920 
The essentials that finally led to the creation of a colonial medical service 
started in the last quarter of the 19th century. Britain became the sole European 
power of the Gold Coast in 1872. This followed the Dutch cessation of their 
Gold Coast territory to the British in April of that year. From 1874, British 
power began to spread beyond the coast following the defeat of Ashanti. Then 
by letters Patent issued on 24th July 1874, the Gold Coast Forts and Settlements 
(with Lagos) were separated from the government of Sierra Leone, and were 
‘erected into’ a Colony (Kimble 1963: 302). Rapid expansion of the admini-
stration, necessitated by additional responsibility to keep the law and peace 
beyond the coastal settlements and forts, was accompanied by a rapid expansion 
of British business in commercial and mining areas as well as missionary 
activities. By the late 1890s, European population shot up to six times what it 
was in the latter 1880s (Addae 1997: 29).  
The population increase, however, created constant concerns for European 
health as a result of high death rates among them. This concern prompted the 
need to channel resources of the colony into securing their health. This led to 
the build up of a civil medical infrastructure, virtually from scratch, in the 
colony from 1890. An effective medical policy therefore became necessary 
from 1890 for two reasons: consolidation of British power and influence and 
concern for European health with the principal aim of reducing the abnormally 
high mortality of Europeans resident in colonial tropical climates, principally 
due to malaria. During that period (the1880s), a Gold Coast Medical department 
                                                 
2 Ofosu-Amaah S., unpublished monograph. 
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was established, headed by a physician entitled Principal Medical Officer 
(PMO), who was designated to administer the department. This remained so 
until 1923.3 He reported to the Governor through the Colonial Secretary, just as 
all departments did at the time.  
The primary mission of the colonial medical services during the early 
decades of colonial rule was first and foremost to protect the health of European 
officials and then other Europeans. Their next duty was to look after African 
civil servants, the military and police, inmates of gaols and asylums. Although 
little attention was paid to the native population, they were not completely 
ignored. Apart from self-interest however, there were genuine reasons for the 
European bias, such as “lack of resources and public (native) response” (Patter-
son 1981: 12). A medical officer travelled constantly under difficult conditions, 
as it were, to cover the wide area allotted to him. In between a doctor’s visit, a 
dispenser remained in charge of the health outpost.  
The emphasis on European health however, led to the provision of afford-
able medical resources at centres where there was an appreciable concentration 
of Europeans, while purely African towns had none. The effect was that in the 
1890s, hospitals and health facilities were spread along the major towns on the 
coast and in the south of the country to the disadvantage of the inland and 
northern parts of the country.4 As a result between 1878 and 1915, a European 
had about 300 times greater chance of admission into a hospital bed than an 
African, while one bed was available to 70 Europeans, the ratio for the African 
was 1 to 22,000 (Addae 1997: 30).  
As far as cost of health care was concerned, the system that was arranged 
during the time by the British was that private people would pay some money 
whereas people who worked in the civil and public services such as the police 
were given free health care. The fee charged to private people was half a penny, 
which was equivalent to two farthings. For a long time this situation remained 
the same until 1930-31 when, as a result of the great depression, the Gold Coast 
medical department decided that they would raise the fees charged private 
people from half a penny to one penny. One of the remarkable things about 
hospital charges during the period was its equity. Higher income workers were 
                                                 
3 At the Crown level the concern for the high death rates of Europeans led to a campaign 
led by the then Secretary of State, Joseph Chamberlain for the establishment of Schools 
of Tropical Medicine in London and Liverpool in 1898. Their principal aim was 
reducing the abnormally high mortality of Europeans resident in colonial tropical 
climates. 
4 For example, in 1878, army medical facilities located along coastal towns such as 
Keta, Accra, Cape Coast and Elmina were turned into civilian facilities. A civil hospital 
with admission facilities was also built in Accra. In 1890, four more health facilities 
were built Dixcove, Saltpond, Winneba and Ada. 
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expected to pay more when they exceeded their limit within which free care was 
provided. For example, in “The General Orders of the Gold Coast Colony 1907 
– revised up to 31st December, 1907”, it was stated that Government Officers 
with salaries of 250 pounds and over and their wives and children were charged 
3 shillings and 6 pence while those with salaries under 50 pounds were charged 
6 pence per diem on native wards. For persons not in the Government Service, 
natives other than labourers and paupers such as clerks, auctioneers, goldsmiths 
and their wives and children paid a per diem of 2 shillings and 6 pence while 
labourers and their families paid 1 shilling for the same facility. Service was 
free for paupers (Konotey-Ahulu 1973: 1-2).  
 
 
African reception to modern health care 
 
One issue that is worth considering in the present context is the African recep-
tion to modern medical care. As it were, the initial official neglect of Africans 
began to change and Africans who were not in the Government service were 
granted some limited attention and those who had access were even encouraged 
to use the service. This change in official attitude must have been stimulated by 
a sense of responsibility for African welfare. However, the initial response of 
natives, especially non-officials, to hospital admissions in particular was near 
boycott. A number of factors accounted for it.  
Before the advent of colonial rule, the native Gold Coaster was used to 
indigenous medicine provided by the traditional healer whose cosmology was 
based on physical as well as social causation of illness (Twumasi 1975). Their 
services included consultations, treatment of ills and prevention through protec-
tive charms. Experienced healers passed on their skills through apprenticeship 
training. However, due to lack of appreciation and understanding of their 
practice, the British administration sought to eliminate the activities of tradi-
tional healers during the colonial period. The administration thus devised a 
method to neutralise the influence of healers through a so called “enlighten-
ment” campaign directed at educated Africans, urban dwellers and opinion 
leaders, which characterised traditional healers “to be insincere, to be quacks 
who lived on the neurosis of their illiterate folks” (Twumasi 1981). Indeed, 
without any mandate or legal backing for their practice, they could only practice 
in secrecy and isolation. In their own way, missionaries contributed to the 
denigration of the practice of traditional healers and Christian followers were 
encouraged to shun them. These negative campaigns notwithstanding, the 
ordinary local African was so used to the native healer and his social and 
spiritual theories of disease causation and the remedies provided that the 
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modern physician and his remedy were considered alien and something they 
found difficult to relate to. As Patterson (1981: 15) describes it: 
 
The colonial physician was often a puzzling figure for Africans. He was usually a 
white male stranger who had to use an interpreter. He often asked impolite 
questions, demanded (for reasons unknown to patients), samples of blood, urine and 
faeces; and sometimes cut open the bodies of the dead. On the other hand, he 
frequently had great power over sickness and injury.  
 
At the beginning, therefore, most Africans preferred indigenous traditional 
medicine to modern medicine and their prejudice towards the latter and its 
practitioners kept them from seeking help from them. 
Another reason that accounts for the attitude of ordinary Africans towards 
modern health care was that many of those who were admitted died for the 
simple reason that they often reported late for treatment. They attended a doctor 
only after everything else that they had known and experimented with had 
failed. This did make them somewhat prejudiced towards the new service 
without any suspicion on their part that they were partly or fully responsible for 
the deaths. Their prejudice was particularly strong in cases of chronic diseases, 
which required long periods of hospitalisation. Even when threatened by an 
outbreak of epidemics or death, they were reluctant to submit themselves to 
hospital treatment (Addae 1997: 58). For example, in 1899-1902, when there 
was a severe outbreak of small pox along the coast, attempts by the government 
to isolate victims and vaccinate the general public was unsuccessful and so the 
government resorted to a system of giving the chiefs monetary incentive of a 
farthing or half a penny for every person that was vaccinated before people 
came for it (Patterson 1981: 70, Ofosu-Amaah 2001).  
Furthermore, another significant factor that accounted for the initial rejection 
of modern medicine must have been related to the payment arrangements. 
Before the inception of modern medicine in the Gold Coast, most elders knew 
what readily available herbs might be used for the cure of certain common 
ailments. If a family member fell ill, one of these remedies would be tried. 
However when that remedy failed, a traditional healer would be called in. If a 
healer decided to treat a patient, the sick person’s kinsfolk would appoint one 
from among themselves as the okyiginafo or supporter or representative. This 
representative discussed the details of the treatment with the healer and took 
responsibility for any fees to be paid or for procuring any supplies the healer 
would require. Before the healer prescribed any medicine to the patient, he 
discussed with the representative the ntoase or deposit that ought to be paid 
(Busia 1962: 14). Traditional medical care therefore was not free per se but the 
payment arrangement was reasonably flexible and negotiable. The cost of 
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treatment varied (and still varies), depending upon several factors including the 
type of practitioner, reputation and client’s financial status. The mode of 
charges and payment also vary. The sick person might be asked to provide 
money but also things such as eggs, fowls or sheep. Payment might be made in 
advance or after the treatment, but significantly, a client was not denied 
treatment for inability to honour immediate charges. Credit arrangements would 
be made when necessary and in some instances treatment might be given for 
free, but the service was not free per se (Asenso-Okyere 1995). The modern 
medical care that the British were offering did not involve or allow negotiation 
in price, nor were they made to understand the need for the amount of money 
that they were being asked to pay. 
Given the foregoing reasons, it was not surprising that when the first Hospi-
tal and Dispensary Fee Ordinance was enacted in 1898, the first response of 
Africans was to stay away from health facilities5. The fees prescribed for 
government officials and their dependants was a small per diem only in the case 
of admissions while non official Africans paid between six pence to three 
shillings and sixpence per day depending upon the type of occupation and status 
(Konotey-Ahulu FID 1973). Paupers were exempted. However, although the fee 
was small, it was still expensive for ordinary Africans. It must be said though 
that this negative attitude to fees was not peculiar to Africans. Non-official 
Europeans who were also required to pay a small fee to the hospital and the 
medical officer when they sought treatment often complained that hospitalisa-
tion fees were excessive and preferred, when ill, to remain in their quarters 
rather than incur the hospital admission fees.  
The point that needs to be emphasised here is that the system of health care 
that the colonial government introduced in the Gold Coast was that private 
people paid for health care in the government system while civil servants were 
exempted. That this was the case was not surprising because at that time there 
was no national health system in Britain. Hospitals in Britain at the time 
charged for services, though poorer people were sometimes reimbursed, but 
even so it meant paying for the service in the first place. The need for a national 
health service was widely recognised in Britain throughout the 19th century but 
it took the experiences of World War I, the great depression, and World War II 
which was the real impetus, before a national health service finally came into 
being (Eckstein 1958: xvii).  
                                                 
5 Addae also cites Dr. B. W. Quartey-Papafio’s report of 1899 on African reluctance to 
use dispensaries serving Saltpond on account of fees in GCGRMSD (1899: 261) as well 
as several colonial documents of despatches to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
regarding complaints about fees. See especially Addae, ibid. page 98. 
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A significant health care development that took place around the end of the 
first decade of the 20th century followed a major outbreak of yellow fever in 
1910-11, when the Colonial office sent a “Yellow Peril” team under Sir Rupert 
Boyle to the Gold Coast to investigate. By the time the team arrived in the Gold 
Coast, the epidemic had ceased, but the team went ahead to make recommenda-
tions for combating future epidemics. The most contentious proposal of their 
recommendation was to segregate Europeans from native dwellings with at least 
400 yards of no man’s land. As expected, there was great resentment, particu-
larly from European merchants who lived near their stores and warehouses for 
trade purposes and from educated Africans and politicians who read a racist 
meaning into it. Some disagreements even came from Governors in other 
colonies of the West Coast for fear of potential political effects. Nevertheless, 
the Colonial Office was firm about their decision and carried it out.  
When Governor Hugh Clifford assumed office in 1912, he was dismayed by 
“the conservatism, racism and complacency of much of his medical staff” and 
made it a priority “to afford to the native population of the colony a larger share 
in the benefits of European medical science than they enjoyed” (Gale 1973). 
European mortality rates had been reduced considerably by then, and there was 
a growing awareness of the “trusteeship” role of the colonial government. How-
ever, due to wartime pressures and the limited European medical staff at his 
disposal, he could not do much. Nevertheless, he tried to draw on his previous 
experience from Ceylon (present day Sri Lanka) where he was previously the 
governor, to establish dispensary schemes involving the employment of great 
numbers of African medical auxiliaries: nurses, midwives, dispensers, vaccina-
tors and other subordinate staff. He left office in 1919, with a legacy of 28 
dispensers and 64 nurses in the major hospitals of the colony. It was also he 
who prepared the ground for the social and infrastructural landmarks under-
taken by his successor Governor Guggisberg, which included the first African 
Hospital for the Gold Coast: Korle Bu Hospital. 
 
The firm foundations of medical services in Ghana: 1920-1930 
The construction of the firm foundations for medical services during the 
colonial period in Ghana is, however, credited to Governor F.G. Guggisberg. 
Construction began the 1920s and continued to the independence period in the 
1950s. The period saw the transformation of the medical service and facilities 
into a modern state. The general medical policy of the Guggisberg government 
was to deal with diseases in the order in which they most affected the general 
life of the people. The Gold Coast Hospital, Korle Bu, that he commissioned in 
1923, was in the following next year equipped with the most modern and latest 
technology of the time, and for many years judged to be the most sophisticated 
hospital in Africa. Its success derived not only from the treatment of diseases; it 
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also became a teaching centre for nurses, midwives, dispensers and sanitary 
inspectors. This was in keeping with the fact that as early as 1923, the general 
African appreciation of government health facilities was rapidly increasing, 
thereby made it necessary for the government to progressively increase hospital 
accommodation in existing hospitals or build new ones.  
In 1924, Guggisberg introduced the first ten-year development plan for 
Ghana. It involved a ₤25 million expenditure which had far reaching implica-
tions for economic, educational and health development in what was still called 
the Gold Coast. For this, he went into the history books of Ghana as the untiring 
person whose foresight, hard work and devotion to duty was responsible for the 
initiation of a basic infrastructural network for socio-economic development. 
His administration was the first to enunciate, in clear terms, a public health 
policy, that was both comprehensive and largely executed. This public health 
policy was organised under eight headings that included care of the sick, profes-
sional training of African medical and public health officers, sanitation and 
improvement of towns and villages and medical research. The care of the sick 
was no longer exclusively confined to Europeans. The majority of the hitherto 
ill-designed hospitals and dispensaries were re-designed and built in larger 
towns. Throughout his administration, expenditure on public health and services 
ranged between 16 and 18%, the highest ever (Addae 1997: 66).  
Despite his genuine concern for public health and the advancement of 
Africans in government service, Guggisberg refused to appoint African doctors 
to a common list with Europeans. In a speech in Britain, he argued that half of 
the Africans with MD degrees were incompetent. Africans hit back at the 
discriminatory policy against them; he was able to find very few among the 
handful of Gold Coast physicians who would accept appointment under terms 
inferior to those of Europeans. The number of African physicians in the service 
grew very slowly throughout the twenties and the thirties. One of his more 
liberating innovations was the hiring of female physicians, variously titled 
Women Medical Officer (WMO) or Lady Medical Officers (LMO). They had 
inferior status and, like their African male counterparts, were not members of 
the WAMS. But whereas African Medical Officers (AMOs) had rights to 
private practice and MOHs had an extra stipend of 150 pounds in lieu of private 
practice, WMOs had none. The WMOs were nevertheless very effectively 
engaged in work at infant welfare centres and his new children’s hospital and 
maternity hospital (Patterson 1981: 14). His passion for native education also 
led to plans to the establishment of the University of Ghana and a Medical 
School at Korle Bu, although the latter had to wait to be implemented by an 
African government.  
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Latter stages of colonial medical services: 1931-50 
Like the situation in Britain, the nature of the health policies adopted during the 
thirties and the forties were shaped by the depression of the 1930s, and the 
outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. Together these factors laid bare the 
weaknesses, shortfalls and problems of the health system. The first problem was 
related to finance. As a result of the depression and the war, revenue to the 
public health sector was highly curtailed and this halted any further expansion. 
A number of already existing hospitals and dispensaries were closed down or 
downgraded (Addae 1996: 74). Ironically, hospitals had by that time become 
the basic health care unit in colonial Ghana with one or more resident medical 
officers. Africans’ confidence in modern medicine had by then been won and 
people went to outpatient clinics for most complaints; those who had serious 
conditions and would agree to hospitalisation were admitted to the wards. How-
ever, although the number of hospitals and beds had increased, the number of 
African hospitals and African hospital beds remained small and static, even 
though the annual number of African patients rose astronomically (Patterson 
1981: 17). The cumulative effect was overcrowding at hospitals and dispensa-
ries, inadequacy of the medical staff and deterioration of sanitary conditions.  
In order to deal with the health care problems of the time, one measure the 
colonial government took was the replacement of the West African Medical 
Service with the Colonial Medical Service in 1934. This transformation was 
done in an effort to Africanise the service personnel and doing away with the 
British bias in the service. Another way the government dealt with the problems 
was to extend the responsibilities of medical officers beyond the districts they 
were originally assigned. Similarly, responsibilities of junior personnel such as 
dispensers, nurses and nurse-dispensers were also extended while new nurses in 
training and new dispensers were engaged. Village dispensers were put in 
charge instead of nurse dispensers. Hospitals were complemented by dispensa-
ries, which were usually located in rural areas and supervised by African 
dispensers who were periodically visited by a medical officer. These were 
geared towards outpatient care; bed space was limited and serious cases were 
referred to hospitals. The foregoing measures, while solving one problem, 
undoubtedly over-stretched the facilities and compromised the quality of care.  
The government also sought to solve the problems of revenue shortages at 
the period by encouraging Native Authorities to build their own village dispen-
saries for which Africans’ preference for outpatient treatment would support. 
Local or regional administrations provided subsidies in the form of building 
materials, drugs, dressings, equipment as well as trained medical personnel to 
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communities that built their own dispensaries according to approved plans.6 
These measures, though, were cosmetic responses to the deep-seated problems 
that plagued the service at the time.  
The desired major policy changes that the health service needed were 
initiated when Sir Alan Burns became Governor of the Gold Coast in 1941. 
Having served under Lord Luggard in Nigeria, Governor Burns was sympa-
thetic and well in tune with African opinions. Against strong opposition of the 
medical department, he advocated and obtained the abolition of the segregated 
hospitals and the gesture freed additional hospital accommodation for Africans. 
In a five year development plan7 that he published, Sir Burns sought, among 
other things, the immediate and long-term remedy of the appalling overcrowd-
ing, the upgrading and extension of existing hospitals and construction of 
several new ones. This position of Burns which privileged cure over prevention 
was however opposed by his DMS, Dr. Balfour Kirk, who rather preferred to 
place emphasis on preventive work to curative work. Burns countered that 
Kirk’s position would provoke a storm of indignation and gravely imperil the 
reputation of government in the eyes of Africans. The Secretary of State 
provided a truce to support immediate long-term measures to improve hospital 
accommodation and also promote preventive medicine based on a suitable 
balance between the two approaches (Addae 1997: 77). 
In August 26, 1942, the Governor made a 13-point Regulation under the 
Hospital Fee Ordinance in which outpatient charges were increased for the first 
time from their 1907 levels. One important aspect in the new pronouncement 
was that within the limits permitted, the amounts charged in any particular case 
were subjected to “the discretion of the medical officer concerned, and the 
approval of the Director of Medical Services” (Konotey-Ahulu 1973: 5). This 
left a gap for financial abuse of the system. What the 1940s is best remembered 
for is that it became a period of grand plans and proposals for new hospitals and 
health centres, including a ten year hospital development plan, which could not 
be implemented as a result of shortages of building materials, delayed imple-
mentation and revenue shortages. Dr. Kirk’s grand proposal embodied the 
establishment of a network of several rural health centres in small communities 
around major hospitals. To date, the rural visionary plans of Kirk remain the 
means by which health services reach the majority of rural people in Ghana.  
Another element that is worth mentioning is that until 1946, the Colonial 
government allowed specialists to have private practices so ordinary private 
                                                 
6 This scheme first took root in the Northern territories in the mid-1930s, to be followed 
by others in other parts of the country in later years.pp76 [GCGRMSD (1933/34) P. 44.]  
7 Sir Alan Burns (1944) Five-Year Development Plan, Government Paper on Develop-
ment for the Gold Coast, Accra: Government Printer. 
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Ghanaians paid them directly, even in the government hospitals. From 1946, 
however, although the Secretary of State had issued a clause in their letters of 
appointment prohibiting them, no regulations were issued to stop them. 
Naturally, it could not be stopped since not all received the notice in their 
appointment letters. In effect, some patients paid more while others paid less. 
Some of the professional fees paid ranged between 2 shillings and 5 shillings 
for brief outpatient visits to medical officers, while outpatient visits to a 
physician or surgical specialist cost two pounds two shillings. The Gold Coast 
had actually the cheapest fees for such services. 
 
The period before independence: 1951-1957 
When the first African government assumed internal self-rule in 1951, it 
inherited a medical service that was tremendously curative with several inherent 
weaknesses. The success of vaccination campaigns and modern treatments 
against previous outbreak of yaws, trypanosomiasis and small pox as well as 
other diseases such as leprosy, venereal diseases and pneumonia, had led to 
public confidence in the medical services. However, the success of modern 
medicine also became a source of limitation since it could not meet all demands 
and expectations. At the beginning of 1951, rural health had only three health 
centres and virtually nothing to show in terms of preventive medicine, yet rural 
populations were the ones that needed them most. By and large, colonial 
medicine had ignored the rural communities due to its highly biased primary 
policy of securing European health. When the new African government 
assumed power, one of the things it sought to do was to develop a policy 
framework for the development of health services in the country.  
The most important change in the early fifties was the incorporation of the 
Medical Department into a Ministry of Health headed by an African with the 
administrative machinery also headed by an African. Furthermore, it sought the 
services of Sir John Maude, a former permanent Secretary of the Ministry of 
Health in the United Kingdom to head a commission to review the health needs 
of the country. Its terms of reference were defined as: 
 
To review the measures taken and projected in the Gold Coast, either by government 
or by enterprise; for the development of preventive and social medicine, including 
health education; for the development of curative medicine, including the provisions 
for hospitals, health centres and dressing stations and for the training of personnel; 
for medical research; to examine the adequacy of the administrative structure and 
organisation of the Medical Department in relation to such development; and to 
make recommendations (Maude 1952: 5).  
 
Among its significant recommendations were: 
i. Hospital fees and all charges were to be abolished; 
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ii. The building of more health centres and dressing stations;  
iii. Hospital and health centres were to be under the control of the central 
government, but dressing stations and maternity homes were to be the 
responsibility of local government; 
iv. Large municipalities employ their own MOH’s and should operate school 
health services; and 
v. Urban and district councils were to be responsible for sanitation in rural and 
urban areas. 
 
Although the recommendations of Maude were far reaching, some were 
misjudged. For example, the separation of hospitals from public health units 
under two authorities created confusion. One of the greatest aberrations was the 
recommendation regarding hospital fees. Throughout the colonial period until 
that recommendation in 1954, medical charges were levied. Minor modifica-
tions were sometimes made in the grading of hospital per diem, but the 
principle of fee charging did not change. In general the private patient seeking 
treatment in a government hospital was liable to pay: a private professional fees, 
a statutory dispensary fee, and the cost of any medication prescribed.  
The statutory dispensing fee actually did include the cost of any medicine 
prescribed although where the patient was able to pay, a charge was made and 
credited to government revenue (Konotey Ahulu 1973: 5).  
The regulations were interpreted literally and so “patients in the Gold Coast 
were made to pay the cost of drugs dispensed rather than pay something 
towards the cost”. Whether deliberate or inadvertent, a circular from the chief 
medical officer in 1955 confirmed that prices fixed were “carefully calculated to 
equate actual cost price to ourselves from Crown Agent sources plus a 15% 
marginal charge for overheads”. Maude’s recommendation that abolished it 
placed successive governments in great difficulty in terms of raising revenue to 
finance the health sector.  
The best way to appreciate the far-reaching recommendations of Maude, 
particularly regarding fee charging, is to place them in the context of overall 
British politics at the time. Significantly, in 1951, the British Labour Party was 
in power in Britain and as a matter of policy, the party saw all health care as 
socialised. The Labour Government of 1945-51, led by Clement Attlee, in its 
first majority in parliament, introduced substantial reforms that created the 
National Health Service (NHS), established a universal state welfare and 
nationalised 20% of British industry (Fielding Stephen 1995). Among the key 
principles of the NHS in Britain that might have influenced Maude’s commis-
sion were that everyone was eligible for care, including those who were tempo-
rarily resident or visiting and such care was entirely free at the point of use. The 
British service however, also clearly indicated that the service was financed 
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almost 100% from central taxation and the rich paid more than the poor for 
comparable benefits. Yet Maude prescribed a free health care service for 
Ghanaians but failed to analyse how the government of the Gold Coast, (later 
Ghana) was going to get the money to finance their health system. That created 
an everlasting problem for health financing in Ghana, one that has plagued them 
to date.  
It must also be emphasised that user fees at the point of use are merely a 
small amount that supplements or reduces the recurrent expenditure of the 
service provided. The major financial burden of providing health services such 
as capital cost was borne by the colonial government. Apart from the govern-
ment, missionary bodies shared some of the work of providing health care in 
Ghana. Therefore, it is important to take a brief look at the missionary contribu-
tion.  
 
 
The contribution of the missionaries to health care 
 
The introduction of Western medicine and public health in colonial Africa was 
in most cases, pioneered by Christian missionary societies during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth century. 
Initially, most of the missionaries sought to propagate the gospel without a 
commitment to the health needs of their potential converts. However, the 
realities of the appalling endemic and epidemic diseases compelled them to 
pioneer medical services to their host populations (Goody 1988: 14). In many 
territories, missionary hospitals and dispensaries were in place several decades 
before the colonial government accepted any general responsibility for African 
health care. Unlike Medical Missionary work in other British colonies, such as 
Nigeria or East and Central Africa which were begun in the late 1800s, 
missionary hospitals were not started in the Gold Coast until 1931, when the 
Basel Mission started the Agogo hospital in Asante Akim. This was followed by 
the Catholic hospital at Breman Asikuma in 1943. By 1951 there were two 
more at Jirapa (maternity) and Worawora. Before hospitals were started though, 
medical missions in the Gold Coast had taken off as small dispensaries, aid 
posts and clinics. The unique feature of the spread of missionary health services 
in Ghana was the fact that unlike the government facilities, they developed in 
the rural or least accessible parts of the country. 
Between 1951 and 1960, the growth of mission hospitals jumped from 3 to 
27, which were distributed all over the country, particularly in the Northern 
Territories, Ashanti and the Volta Regions. This growth in mission hospitals 
was facilitated by the government’s acceptance of the policy, advocated by the 
Maude commission, of enlisting the aid of missionary societies and other 
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voluntary agencies in the provision of health facilities. Although the missions 
built and ran the hospitals, the government provided grants-in-aid to them to 
facilitate their work.  
One remarkable aspect about the mission facilities, as far as health financing 
is concerned, has been that the collection of user fees had always been part of 
their operations. No common fee schedule exists as such, and user prices might 
vary from mission to mission and from Church denomination to denomination; 
but some mechanism exists by which fees are matched with the costs of the 
services provided. Such charges usually covered recurrent expenditures; the full 
cost of drugs was passed on to users. They nevertheless granted exemptions to 
the poor. Their ability to do this has likely been helped by the fact that since 
they operate mainly in the rural settings where people are likely to know one 
another, identification problems are not difficult to deal with.  
The government recognizes the significant contribution of mission health 
facilities and makes a budgetary provision for subsidizing their operations. This 
is channelled through the Christian Health Association of Ghana (CHAG). 
CHAG was started in 1967 with the help of the World Council of Churches, the 
Catholic Bishops Conference of Ghana and the Christian Council of Ghana and 
duly registered under the Trustees (incorporation) Act of 1962. Its mission is “to 
provide holistic, affordable and quality health care in fulfilment of Christ’ 
mandate to go and heal the sick” (CHAG 2000). In order to achieve this 
mission, CHAG collaborates with the government and its stakeholders. The 
missions, represented by CHAG, are presently the largest single provider of 
health services after the government with 128 health institutions, 49 of which 
are hospitals. The government now provides about 80% of the salaries of health 
staff. 
CHAG meets periodically to discuss pricing policies and to compare ranges 
of prices charged for specific forms of care and procedures. Price revisions are 
carried out based on changes or increases in the average prices of supplies and 
equipment that they buy from the free market. Since 1979, most of the drugs 
and pharmaceuticals that they use have come from foreign donor sources. These 
donations are channelled through the Christian Medical Commission of the 
World Council of Churches in Geneva. It depends upon its own resources to 
import any pharmaceuticals that its members desire over and above those 
received from donors. 
One significant observation about mission institutions is that there is a public 
perception that the quality of the service they provide is superior to that of 
government-run health care facilities in the sense that staff are more dedicated 
to their work and provide a friendlier interpersonal environment. One funda-
mental problem that they experience is finance. As a non-profit organization 
devoted to serving the poor, CHAG operates mostly in the remotest parts of the 
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country where user charges are far below the cost of the services rendered. 
Although they implement their own exemption policy, their financial situation 
has been made worse by the government’s wholesale exemption policy for 
certain categories of patients. Those exempt are children less than five years, 
pregnant women and those aged seventy years and above. The source of the 
problem relates to the government’s inability to refund institutions the exemp-
tions that are provided on a timely basis. Given that mission facilities receive 
higher patronage by such exempted patients as compared to alternate govern-
ment facilities, the revenues from these exemptions are quite substantial. 
Apart from the missions, other quasi-government concerns, mining compa-
nies and private individuals also made modest but important contributions to the 
growth of non-governmental health facilities from the 1950s. In the early stages 
of their inception in Ghana, most of them were situated in the colony and South 
because of the location of mines in those areas. Educational institutions in the 
colony and Ashanti areas ensured that quasi-government hospitals were built 
there. Nowadays, most private modern health care practitioners are mainly 
found in urban areas. Since they thrive on full cost recovery and profits, users 
pay for all the services they receive. Their charges, however, vary from facility 
to facility depending upon location, services, reputation, amenities and the 
goodwill that the provider(s) commands in the population. User fees in private 
facilities tend to be beyond the means of ordinary people since there does not 
appear to be any regulation on price setting. 
 
 
Postcolonial health care and its financing: 1957 to date 
 
When Ghana eventually attained internal self-rule, the Nkrumah government 
launched a 10-year development plan in which a huge investment in the social 
development of the country was sought. The health component of this included 
the expansion of the number of existing health facilities, while cost to users of 
these facilities was made either very low, or in most cases, completely free. 
Private practice was abolished in government hospitals in September of that 
year to forestall the policy on free health care. This was followed in 1961 by the 
banning of private professional fees charged by government doctors, dentists 
and specialists. In lieu of those fees, the government paid an annual allowance. 
Further concessions were offered to various categories of Ghanaians in May 
1962. This included free outpatient care for Ghanaian and non-Ghanaian 
children and adults resident in Ghana. Civil servants and members of the 
security services were charged a token fee for in-patient treatment and drugs. 
Mission hospitals that were charging fees for their services were reimbursed for 
services provided to the various categories of people. Pragmatic measures were 
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also introduced for the rural areas. Thirty-five new rural health centres were 
established between 1960 and 1966 (Senah 1989: 250). In line with Nkrumah’s 
‘African personality’ agenda, steps were initiated to study and organise 
traditional healers to form an association for the advancement of their 
techniques in the delivery of health care. 
It did not take long for the impact of the socially inspired programme of 
Nkrumah to take its toll on the economy. It led to shortfalls in revenue for most 
parts of the 1960s, which eventually compelled the government to impose 
foreign exchange and import restrictions in 1965. In the area of health, the 
restrictions affected capital-intensive equipment, essential drugs and supplies 
with attendant shortages and inadequacies in service delivery. Ghanaian 
doctors, who had inherited the elite and conservative disposition of their 
colonial forebears, became aggrieved and critical, and vented their frustrations 
on the Nkrumah government. 
The military regime of the National Liberation Council (NLC) that toppled 
Nkrumah’s government in 1966 was ideologically pro-Western and introduced 
policies that sought to divest the state from the socialist programmes pursued 
under Nkrumah. It appointed a committee headed by Dr. Easmon to investigate 
the health needs of Ghana. Among many suggestions, the report of the 
committee recommended not only the raising of hospital fees but also the strict 
enforcement of their collection. Because of these recommendations, a statutory 
dispensing fee (30 new pesewas) was introduced in February 1968, but the 
directive was withdrawn following public outcry. It was, however, re-intro-
duced through an official gazette to be effective from October 1969 when the 
military junta would have handed over power to the new government of Dr. 
K.A. Busia. It was again suspended after public protest. 
When the civilian government of Dr. Busia’s Progress Party took office, the 
issue of health financing had become so sensitive that immediate measures had 
to be taken to resolve it. The Konotey-Ahulu committee was set up to investi-
gate all issues relating to hospital fees in the country. In its far-reaching report, 
it recommended that outpatient treatment, including antenatal care, should no 
longer be free and that a nominal amount had to be charged for drugs dispensed. 
On the basis of those recommendations, the government introduced the Hospital 
Fee Act of 1971 in government health facilities with the aim of reducing 
excessive demand and contributing to recovering part of the costs of curative 
services. However, the charges imposed were so low that only a minimal 
percentage of total costs were recovered (Waddington et al. 1989). Other fees 
were instituted for referrals from lower to higher levels of the health care ladder. 
Again, apart from charges for private patients, fees for inpatient services were 
raised. Significantly, in the spirit of its vigorously pursued rural development 
programme for the country, attendance at rural health facilities was made free. 
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In addition twelve new health centres were established and electricity, feeder 
roads and piped-borne water supply were extended to the rural areas in the 
relatively short time the administration lasted. 
The National Redemption Council/Supreme Military Council (NRC/SMC) 
overthrew the Busia government in a military coup after (twenty-seven months) 
in 1972 and ruled Ghana until 1979. During its term of office, hospital fees 
remained the same as they were during the Busia era, but moderate budgetary 
allocations were made to the health sector. 
Things did not change much with respect to health financing during the 
Limann administration (an Nkrumah offshoot) that assumed power in 1979 after 
the stopgap administration of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 
regime. An important landmark in Ghana’s health policy took place in the late 
1970s when the Government of Ghana (GOG) adopted the primary health care 
strategy as the vehicle for achieving Health for all by the year 2000. But as a 
result of the economic crisis that drastically reduced resources available to the 
health sector in the early 1980s that resulted in the deterioration of the popula-
tion's health status, the primary health care goal was never achieved.  
The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) seized power from 
Limann at a time when the economic conditions and in particular the drug and 
medical supply situation were in bad shape. In order to prop up the situation, the 
PNDC introduced surcharges on imported drugs and hospital equipment, but 
this merely worsened the situation. The prevailing general poor economic 
conditions in the country at the time led to a mass exodus of doctors and other 
professionals. Patients did not only have to “scavenge” for their drugs from 
private sources, but they, in addition, had to carry their bedding, food require-
ments and sometimes even stationary with them when attending some public 
facilities. The response of the PNDC to the crises was to increase fees for 
hospital services. For the first time non-Ghanaians were asked to pay higher 
fees for medical services. Even this could still not salvage the situation; the 
need for more pragmatic measures became apparent. 
In the mid 1980s when World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
structural adjustment programmes became a major feature of Ghana’s economic 
policy, reforms in the health sector led to the introduction of user fees in public 
health care facilities in 1985 and full cost recovery for drugs. This was institu-
tionalised as the Hospital Fee Law, otherwise known as Legislative Instrument 
1313. From the point of view of the World Bank, user fees are a precondition 
for self-financing as otherwise the public would lack an incentive to participate 
when no- or low-cost health care is available through government facilities. 
Again user fees (together with self financing health insurance) is perceived as a 
measure that allow governments i) to allocate scarce funds from curative 
services to preventative measures to combat such epidemics as HIV, tuberculo-
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sis and malaria and ii) to reallocate resources to needed subsidies for the poorest 
segments of the population with the worst access to health facilities (World 
Bank 1996).  
The objective for the introduction of user fees in Ghana was to raise revenue 
and to deter frivolous use of scarce health resources. The regulation stipulated 
that patients were to pay the full cost of drugs and nominal fees for other 
services, except for vaccinations and the treatment of certain diseases such as 
leprosy and tuberculosis. Health institutions were to retain the fees collected in 
order to establish a revolving drug fund, even though these institutions 
continued to collect drugs free of charge from the central and regional medical 
stores. Consultation fees were charged according to the level of institution 
visited. Ministry of Health staff and their immediate dependents were exempt 
from all charges.  
Although the measures led to some improvement in the drug supply situation 
in the public health sector, the attempt to recover part of the overall government 
health expenditures through user fees produced less revenue than expected. One 
serious setback was that it resulted in mixed effects on the demand for health 
care; some potential patients were precluded from health care because of their 
inability to pay for services. One of its internal handicaps was that although it 
stipulated that paupers and indigents were exempted, it did not say who was to 
pay when someone was exempted. Ignoring the lessons of history, people were 
thus exempted without knowing where the money to pay for them was to come 
from. Additionally, no controls were set up to monitor the monies collected and 
some health care staff took advantage of the situation to abuse the system 
through illegal charges and the proliferation of local charging practices. 
In 1987, Ghana embraced the Bamako initiative programme as a means of 
solving some of its problems of access to health care by rural, deprived areas. 
The initiative was a programme adopted by African Health Ministers at a 
meeting in Bamako in 1987. The basis of the initiative was that UNICEF and 
WHO purchased drugs and sold them to communities at an affordable price. In 
turn, the community could use the savings to upgrade its basic health care 
system. Conceived to guarantee access to primary health care by all popula-
tions, the Bamako Initiative was considered one of the most important strategies 
in the area of health promotion. At one point it was implemented in 33 countries 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America, based on four components, namely:  
Revitalisation and extension of peripheral public health systems in order to 
provide a package of essential health care — training, equipment, micro 
planning, follow-up and supervision — through a policy of decentralisation of 
decision-making to the district;  
Adequate supply of basic drugs to ensure access to medical care at a reasonable 
cost;  
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Introduction and enhancement of co-financing systems by the community in 
order to ensure their sustainability;  
Involvement of communities in the management of health care centres. 
 
Ghana could, however, not make any progress with the initiative and virtually 
abandoned it after three years. 
In order to deal with the problems of cost recovery system introduced in 
1985, the regulation was restructured in 1992 under a scheme dubbed “Cash and 
Carry”. From that time, health institutions were made to pay for drugs they 
collected from the medical stores. The rationale behind the programme was to 
make health institutions more efficient in the management of drugs at the sub 
district level (MOH 1996). Although the scheme led to some improvement in 
the drug supply situation, there were problems with the way it was imple-
mented, particularly in relation to issues involving availability and affordability 
for low-income patients, paupers and indigents as well as for emergency treat-
ments. Other problems related to operational pressures, which made its capacity 
to revolve a difficult exercise for managers and the consequent negative impact 
on quality of care. To date, the problems of user fees for most households as 
Akosa (2001) summarises it, have been:  
 
A gradual diminution in uses of health facilities because of affordability, resulting in 
69% of the population unable to attend/use the health service. The majority have 
resorted to self-medication, herbal or traditional medicine, or healing crusades or 
prayers or resigned themselves to their fate not by choice but purely because they 
cannot afford health care.  
 
Accordingly, one of the critical health care challenges for Ghana has been the 
obtainment of additional resources for the financing of health care without 
deterring the poor and vulnerable from seeking care when they need it. Other 
struggles have been to improve quality and access as well as manage resources 
efficiently. The search for alternative and/or supplementary means for health 
care financing became focussed on health insurance. It has been regarded with 
hope and enthusiasm as far back as the mid 1980s. The main thrust of the 
government for a social health insurance in Ghana is that Ghanaian social and 
cultural systems has an built in social insurance scheme through the extended 
family system whereby the family members have collective responsibility for 
the welfare of members of the family (Addo 1995). Most government officials 
(past and present) and many outside the government seem to believe that social 
insurance will help solve the government’s health financing problem, and that 
its introduction will release substantial resources from government revenue for 
preventive services. Indeed in 1997, the idea was taken a step further with an 
attempt by the then government to implement a national health insurance 
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scheme particularly suited to the rural informal sectors on a pilot basis in four 
districts in Ghana. Laudable as the idea is, the social and cultural problems and 
challenges of an insurance system that may prohibit a feasible implementation 
are empirically pursued by this research. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Colonial rule has always been intended to be profitable for the colonizer. 
Likewise, in the institutionalisation of modern health care in Ghana, it had a 
direct relation to the situation and interests of its bearers. British colonial 
administrators, with a monopoly over the governance of the state, used their 
position and privilege to set up a health service that enhanced their status and 
interests; i.e. protected the health and interests of European officials and 
merchants. The system they set up was therefore self serving and the legacy 
became an urban biased health care service. The service was curative oriented 
with hospitals located mainly in cities and major towns where European 
officials settled. At the dawn of independence, a vacuum was created in the 
manpower resource when many of the expatriate doctors resigned. Although the 
immediate post-independence government stepped up the training of local 
health professionals and provided facilities for their practice, with the building 
of additional health centres, it still maintained the curative emphasis of the 
health services.8 The number of health centres increased from 10 in 1957 to 41 
by 1963. Indeed, it became more politically expedient for Nkrumah’s nationalist 
oriented government to build modern hospitals and clinics than to promote 
public health.  
Regarding the financing of health care, colonial health services were 
financed mainly through general taxation, apart from the small fees charged to 
non-civil servants. This, however, did not create a public problem because the 
service was at its early stages where public interest and patronage in alternative 
traditional medical service was rather high in the society. By the time of 
independence, when the use of modern health care services had picked up 
among ordinary Ghanaians, government policy on health was influenced by 
social considerations to provide basic health and medical care that was nearly 
                                                 
8 In 1964, the training of pharmacist and dispensary technicians was instituted in the 
new University of Science and Technology, which was opened in Kumasi. Also in the 
same year a medical school was opened in the University of Ghana and located at the 
facilities of the Korle Bu teaching hospital in Accra. Nursing training was also stepped 
up with the opening of new colleges and a new post, basic nursing, at the University of 
Ghana.  
 
 50
free. The cost of providing free health services, however, soon became a major 
problematic expenditure item for government. In a matter of time, free care 
became a myth. Drugs shortages in the public sector left patients with no choice 
other than to pay for more expensive drugs in the private sector or report at 
health facilities rather late and moribund. The solution to this was the introduc-
tion of user fees in the late sixties with the passage of the hospital decree of 
1969 (NLCD 360) as a means of partial recovery from patients. Although user 
fees led to some improvement in the drug supply situation, it also resulted in 
limited access to health care for the poor, particularly the rural poor whose 
income were marginal and seasonal.  
The pattern of the public health service financing has not changed from what 
was obtained in the past. The bulk of the expenditure is provided by the 
government and covers the services infrastructure, salaries and wages of health 
care personnel in both government institutions and non-governmental (mainly 
mission) institutions, running costs, training expenses and health education and 
promotional programmes. Significantly, a considerable portion (about 85% of 
the total annual expenditure), goes into recurrent expenditure, with little spent 
on maintenance and development of infrastructure. Donor assistance also 
constitutes a substantial source of funding. For example, when capital expendi-
tures are excluded, donor pooled funds in 2000 constituted 20% of public health 
expenditure. This is significantly lower than the contribution in 1992, which 
constituted 28% of government expenditure on the health sector (Sudharshan et 
al. 2001: 31). These donations have mainly been in the form of supplies and 
equipment, drug donations, rehabilitation of health care facilities, training of 
human resources, as well as technical assistance in the area of disease preven-
tion, organisational reform and institutional building. Overall, although 
government funding to the sector has been increasing over the years, health care 
delivery in the public sector has been deteriorating in quality and quantity 
mainly due to under-funding.  
The lesson from history, therefore, is that the continued reliance on general 
taxation revenue and donor assistance to finance health services delivery in 
Ghana has created problems and thwarted the development of the service. 
Similar to the situation in other sub-Saharan African countries, it is this 
financial crisis in the public health sector that has brought into focus the need 
for additional financing methods and led to heightened interest in the develop-
ment of social health insurance. In particular, solidarity based social insurance 
schemes have emerged in discussions as favoured options because of the 
peculiar socio economic and socio cultural nature of the Ghanaian setting. As in 
other sub-Saharan African countries, it has a low economic base, unplanned 
spending on health care, limited capacity of the ministry of health in terms of 
workload and lack of expertise on socialized insurance. Additionally, such a 
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scheme would entail a relatively poor and large rural informal population whose 
incomes are low and seasonal. Given such a socio- economic profile, it is 
questionable whether centralised state or large commercial schemes like those 
in rich industrialised countries would be feasible in the Ghanaian context (Arhin 
1995; Criel 1998; Criel 2000). This is in spite of the factors such as a strong 
demand from the public for an alternative to a user fee system of “cash and 
carry”, an on-going decentralization process, which is steadily increasing 
management capacity at the district and sub-district level (MOH 1995).  
The policy relevance of health insurance to the Ghanaian context therefore 
suggests the innovation of a “risk sharing mechanism employed to harness 
private funds for the health care and reduce the financial barrier faced by 
vulnerable groups to obtaining care” (Arhin 1995: 2). The organisation of such 
a scheme must of necessity become an action that must take the form of a social 
security programme, which takes into consideration the peculiar historical, and 
socio cultural imperatives of the population. It must also involve dialogue and 
negotiation with them in order to ensure that the package is socially and 
culturally acceptable to them. The foregoing lessons from history obviously 
provide some insights, but at the same time invite further questions and discus-
sion about the context of existing social health insurance schemes as well as 
traditional mechanisms in Ghanaian society. These are tackled in subsequent 
chapters. 
 
 
 
 
3 
Overview of the three case studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The three community initiatives that constitute the subject matter of this 
research have different origins but a similar historical background. They were 
all conceived within the context of a need to make health care accessible to poor 
families in rural communities, but were initiated by different actors in the health 
care milieu. This chapter provides the background information of the three 
initiatives. It traces how each of them developed and how they survived or 
faded away. They are chronologically presented on the basis of when they 
emerged. Each section begins with a brief profile of the district. This is fol-
lowed by a description of design features relating to membership and coverage 
as well as management and financial administration. I then examine how in 
each case study the parties involved in each scheme look upon insurance in 
terms of success and failure. The chapter concludes with a brief synthesis and 
questions of the socio-cultural challenges pertaining to the feasibility of com-
munity schemes in the Ghanaian context. 
 
 
The Nkoranza Community Health Insurance Scheme 
 
This is the most established and frequently cited health insurance scheme in 
Ghana. It was inaugurated in February 1992 by the Sunyani diocesan health 
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administration of the Catholic Church. Before I describe its origin, I will pro-
vide a brief profile of the Nkoranza district.  
  
Brief profile of Nkoranza District 
Nkoranza District is one of the 13 administrative districts in the Brong Ahafo 
region of Ghana. It covers an area of 2300 square kilometres and is made up of 
about 120 settlements. According to the 2000 census provisional report, the 
population of the district is 127,519 comprising 64,123 male and 63,396 
females. It is ethnically diverse and hosts a large number of migrants from other 
regions, particularly those from Northern Ghana, who constitute about 65% of 
all inhabitants in the district. It is mainly rural and about 95% of the economi-
cally active labour force are subsistence agricultural workers. Forty-five percent 
of the people are below the poverty line with 17% being under the margin of 
hardcore poverty. 
Infrastructure and social services in the district are inadequate and the 
conditions of roads, especially feeder roads, are poor. Only 6% of the popula-
tion has access to electricity and the majority of them (90%) depend on fire-
wood and kerosene for energy. About three quarters of the population depend 
on stream water for drinking, making the incidence of water-borne diseases 
very high. The district has one hospital, which hosts the insurance scheme. Poor 
sanitation and nutrition constitute some of the public health problems in the 
area. Similar to most parts of Ghana, malaria constitutes the major medical 
problem in the area with others being stomach disorders, rheumatism, boils, eye 
problems and hernias.  
 
How did the scheme originate? 
The story behind the formation of the Nkoranza Health Insurance Scheme dates 
back to the late 1980s. Following the introduction of user fees at 1985 in health 
facilities by the government of Ghana, Nkoranza hospital, like most others in 
the country, began to experience rising costs and unpaid medical bills particu-
larly in relation to in-patient bills. The impact of the high bills was two fold, one 
a consequent of the other. First the effect of the rising costs on patients and their 
families as well as potential patients was such that many reported too late or 
could not afford the services of the hospital and so there was a significant rise in 
reported deaths from treatable clinical conditions. As a consequence, the 
stability of revenue accruing from patient attendance to the hospital suffered 
considerably. In 1989, the concerns of the policy makers of the Nkoranza hospi-
tal, the Catholic Diocesan Health Administration at the regional capital, 
Sunyani and the policy implementers at the hospital in Nkoranza led to discus-
sions on alternative ways of financing health care.  
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Based on a first hand experience of what the diocesan secretary at the time, a 
reverend sister, had previously witnessed in Bwamanda in the Republic of 
Congo (Zaire), she suggested the setting up of a similar insurance scheme for 
in-patients in Nkoranza. A project proposal was written in 1989. In 1990 
experts were consulted and MEMISA, a non-governmental organisation of the 
Netherlands was approached for technical and financial assistance to set up the 
scheme. Preparation of legal and other regulatory documents as well as 
consultation with traditional and opinion leaders in the district and the district 
health management team followed suit. The scheme was finally inaugurated in 
February 1992. Dr. Ineke Bosman, the Dutch-born Ghanaian district director of 
medical services and medical officer in charge of the Nkoranza hospital at the 
time, was responsible for coordinating the insurance activities. In a conversation 
with me, she narrated the details of the formation as follows: 
 
First of all we had this new hospital building, which was completed from scratch in 
the late eighties, but was not accessible to the people even though it was relatively 
cheaper compared to other places like Korle Bu1 in Accra. So we thought a commu-
nity health insurance, something that the whole community pays together would 
help. The diocesan secretary at the time, Sister Marianne, had seen Bwamanda in 
Zaire and I had also done my Master’s in public health at Antwerp so I had heard 
about it. Thus when she mentioned it I became interested and first discussed it with 
Madame Dora, the District Secretary at the time and the doctors and we all became 
totally enthusiastic about it. Call it luck but once you have all the people who 
mattered interested, it did not become a burden but an inspiration to do it. The 
Bishop and Marianne agreed that if we wanted to do it we could go ahead.  
 
We therefore studied the original papers of Bwamanda in Zaire and travelled to 
Holland to visit MEMISA who upon consultation agreed to shore it up for three 
years. We read from the Zaire programme that they used printed stamps to identify 
those who pay their premiums at each renewal period so we made a request to 
MEMISA for similar assistance and they agreed to do it. Madame Dora was very 
supportive and I travelled with her to Holland for those negotiations.  
 
When we came back, we held further meetings with the staff of the hospital and 
health centres in the district to discuss the problem of hospital fee until everybody 
became convinced that a prepayment scheme would be the most sustainable and 
practical way to deal with the health care payment crises in the community. From 
then on we started to talk to other ‘big shots’ and groups in town: opinion leaders, 
church leaders, teachers’ association and education officers. After they had all given 
their blessing we constituted four teams in threes and fours and started a crusade into 
the communities to convince the people. We went to the villages early in the 
mornings with public address systems. Usually we sent messages ahead of our 
                                                 
1 Ghana’s first and largest teaching hospital in Accra. 
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arrival and organised durbars to explain the problem, introduced the idea to them to 
find out their reactions and answered their questions. We spent about three hours in 
a village and we could do about three or four villages in a day. After visiting virtu-
ally all the villages the reaction was overwhelmingly, ‘YES we like it’, especially 
among heads of families and households who had responsibility for shouldering 
medical bills. It was very tiring and at some point I fell ill with malaria but I liked 
the idea so I persevered because I knew I was going to succeed.  
 
As part of our plans we also formed a strong advisory board team that was basically 
a facilitators group with responsibility for dealing with practical decisions involving 
the scheme and the community. It met every week and it included the DS and the 
chief and all the church leaders. So in short, this is how we basically did it. After the 
awareness campaign, we appointed fieldworkers in every village and divided 
Nkoranza township into several sectors because of its bigger size and assigned 
fieldworkers. Altogether we had over a hundred fieldworkers and instituted a bonus 
system to them for hard work. The fieldworkers went from door to door in their 
communities and ensured that households registered their whole families because if 
you only had the man with the hernia2 registering then that was not good. Our policy 
was to do the whole family and to keep it simple we said everyone should pay the 
same fee.  
 
From an operational point of view, teamwork was one of the most essential 
features that got it off the ground. Again, Dr. Bosman continued: 
 
Our ability to get it started was much enhanced by teamwork. We had a team of 
dedicated people who had the patience and exuded power and respect in the 
community and that made a lot of difference to our success. It was a mix of all the 
community leaders including the chiefs and religious leaders because that is where 
the power is and we worked on humanitarian grounds without thinking about 
economic incentives. So basically the community did it. We, as health implemen-
ters, were partners. There was a young Catholic priest who was different from the 
old conservative type and was very supportive. Madame Dora was also a very crea-
tive person and together with the others picked up the idea and knew much better 
than I how to approach the community and keep them on their toes and that was 
very wonderful.  
 
Before the inauguration of the scheme, workshops were organised to orient 
various stakeholders in relevant aspects of it. These included communication 
                                                 
2 One of the common testimonies about the scheme is the solution of hernia cases in the 
district. The medical doctor in charge of the hospital explained to me that high 
incidence of hernia in farming communities like Nkoranza district was not unusual.  It 
results from repeated strain or pressure exerted on the abdomen through intense farm 
labour.  The bending posture that people commonly adopt in farming activities also 
contributes to it.   
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skills for district and sub-district health management teams and hospital staff, 
education for members of the advisory board to be educators and durbars for 
chiefs and the community at large to explain the policies and benefits of the 
scheme to them. Final preparations for the scheme involved the production of 
identity cards (ID cards) for subscribers as well as family cards, registers, 
receipts and other such paraphernalia for record keeping purposes. The scheme 
was finally launched in February 1992.  
 
Design features  
Membership, benefits and exemptions. Figure 3.1 provides the organisational 
chart of the scheme. Membership of the scheme is open to all residents and 
native non-residents of the Nkoranza district. It is voluntary and subscribers are 
obliged to pay an annual fixed premium per head, which is determined at the 
beginning of every year. Entire family registration is required in order for indi-
viduals to receive benefits. 
The policy covers admissions to the Nkoranza hospital, in which case the 
total admissions bill is paid as well as snake and dog bites. In addition, mem-
bers referred from the hospital to other hospitals are also reimbursed with a sum 
equal to the average monthly bills of Nkoranza hospital during the particular 
month in which the referral was made. Bills of drug prescribed that are not 
stocked or out of stock by the hospital are fully reimbursed to insured patients. 
As much as possible, doctors of the hospital are obliged to prescribe only from 
the ministry of health approved essential drug list (EDL).  
Apart from outpatient cases, various criteria for what was exempt from 
coverage have been defined on the basis of what the owners perceive and the 
community accepts as good health and what is morally acceptable and unac-
ceptable behaviour. Thus, the policy of the scheme exempts cases of normal 
deliveries of babies, complications associated with self-induced abortions, 
retention of patients for less than 24 hours on observation and cases involving 
alcoholism and alcohol related injuries. 
 
Administration and financial matters. At the time I conducted this study in 
2000, as indeed had been the case for most of its existence, the organisational 
structure of the scheme comprised the Bishop of the diocese of Sunyani as the 
ceremonial head who also symbolises ownership of the scheme. Under him is a 
hierarchy of officers, but the actual management team was made up of all four 
members of the hospital management team: the senior medical officer in charge, 
the administrator, the matron or principal nursing officer of the hospital and the 
accounts officer. Others are the district director of health services, the manager, 
coordinator and the assistant coordinator of the scheme and the chairperson of 
the insurance advisory board. 
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The insurance advisory board was made up of prominent members of the 
community and had no designated authority other than a moral one to influence 
community participation and interest in the scheme and the resolution of matters 
and complaints that crop up between the management and the community.  
Contracted field workers complete the organisational structure of the 
scheme. These are mainly community personnel who collect premiums from the 
communities. They are usually contracted for two months during the premium 
collection period and receive commission on the basis of how much they 
collect.  
 
 
BISHOP OF SUNYANI 
 
DHC OFFICE 
 
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 
 
DIOCESAN PHC CO-ORDINATOR 
 
INSURANCE MANAGEMENT TEAM 
 
INSURANCE ADVISORY BOARD 
 
CONTRACTED FIELD WORKERS 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Organisational chart of the Nkoranza community financing scheme 
 
 
Financial administration. The scheme is entirely funded through premiums paid 
by subscribers. Its accounts are kept separate from that of the hospital. All 
premiums collected are sent to the bank the same day or the following day and 
deposited in a savings account. Only a quarter of the funds are however left in 
the savings accounts for payment of expenses and administrative charges. The 
rest is invested in treasury bills and fixed deposits, which yield substantial 
interest and generate revenue for the scheme. It also receives donations in kind 
from MEMISA, such as the stamps that are used as receipts and identification 
for yearly registrations. Occasionally it receives assistance from NGO’s. 
Payment to the hospital is made when members are treated under the conditions 
specified by the policy on a monthly basis. Three signatories comprising the 
manager, a co-ordinator and an advisory board chairman have to sign all 
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payments to the hospital. For daily routine expenses the staff keeps an account-
able impress which at the time of this fieldwork amounted to 200,000 cedis. 
 
How do the parties involved look upon the scheme? 
Undoubtedly the Nkoranza scheme has brought some relief to its clients and 
made hospital admissions accessible and affordable to subscribers who other-
wise would have found it difficult to access health care. The scheme is a source 
of pride particularly for implementers for its pioneering work in community 
health care financing in the informal sector in Ghana. My observation in this 
research indicated that the community endorses the scheme particularly as a 
great health security and help to the rural poor. Ordinary community members 
value it as having provided the means for many in the community to have their 
“parker”3 (hernia) removed. At the end of 1999, average annual enrolment stood 
at 27.11% or 39,288 clients from an estimated (or rather over-estimated) district 
population of 144,900.4 Five percent of these were admitted and made use of 
77% of the annual revenue as hospital admission bills. In 2000, the total 
registration was 43,688 clients. Based on the official 2000 population and 
housing census report figure of 128,960 residents, the proportion of actual 
residents in the district comes to 33.88%. This however is deceptive since it 
does not include non-resident citizens of Nkoranza. One of its important 
solidarity aspects is that high and expensive health risk factors of chronic nature 
such as diabetes and cardiovascular conditions are all covered by the scheme.   
But the scheme has not been without its problems and challenges. Its annual 
average population coverage at 26.6% to date remains low, while annual 
registration figures show no tendency towards significant increase in coverage. 
The scheme’s implementers and managers attribute this partly to negative 
community perceptions such as the community view that the insured receives 
inferior drugs and that doctors are reluctant to admit them. On the other hand, 
there is also a perception in the community that hospital staff have negative 
attitudes towards patients. In a way, the accusations and counter accusations 
show the expected changes in power relations during health insurance. The 
view of the implementers about the community’s negative perceptions about the 
scheme could be explained as an indication of the community’s desire for better 
service not only in terms of technical but also social status in a health insurance 
regime. On the other hand, it shows the reluctance of providers to remain at the 
pedestal of their prescribing power.  
                                                 
3 When I tried to find out how “parker” emerged as a name for a hernia, I received a 
speculative explanation that the name is probably a description of the way the condition 
“packs” at the lower end of the abdomen.  
4 Source: 1999 Annual report on the Nkoranzaman Community Financing Health 
Insurance Scheme, page 4. 
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Most clients in the scheme live closer to Nkoranza and existing records 
indicate that, for example, in the successive financial years of February 1998 to 
January 1999 and of February 1999 to January 2000, nearby locations such as 
Nkoranza township and Yefri exceeded their revenue from premiums over 
expenditure through admission costs.5 Adverse selection and patient moral 
hazard are also quite widespread (examples of these are provided in Chapter 
Six). Provider moral hazard is, however, not a problem in Nkoranza since staff 
salaries do not depend upon revenue from patient attendance. The scheme “has 
not been able” to integrate health centre services into its benefits package yet. 
One of the scheme’s perennial challenges has been how to inculcate the sense of 
ownership within the community. According to its managers most associate it 
more with the hospital or the Catholic Church sometimes symbolised as the 
Bishop. They sometimes hold the view that subscribing to the scheme means 
providing revenue for the upkeep of the diocese, if one does not fall ill. 
These problems obviously lead to a number of questions. What are the 
underlying reasons for the so-called misconceptions about the scheme? Given 
that adverse selection and moral hazard are high in the scheme, how does the 
community perceive the scheme? Do they understand and accept the concept of 
risk sharing underlying the scheme? Why or why not? These are the issues that 
the subsequent chapters in this study will examine. 
 
 
The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) pilot project 
in the Eastern Region 
 
The government of Ghana’s attempts to implement a health insurance scheme in 
the country dates back to the mid-eighties with the commissioning of several 
research projects and consultancies to assist the formulation of its policy in that 
direction6. However it was not until 1997 that an attempt by the government to 
pilot a health insurance scheme was initiated. The Ministry of Health selected 
four districts in the Eastern Region for a pilot initiative. Speculative reasoning7 
                                                 
5 For February 1998 to December 1999, income over expenditure in Nkoranza 
registered a deficit of 10,486,944 cedis, while that of Yefri was also a deficit of 
1,771,379 cedis.  Similarly, for February 1999 to December 2000, income over 
expenditure in Nkoranza registered a deficit of 14,941,562 cedis while that of Yefri was 
also a deficit of 2,946,034 cedis. Source: Annual reports of the Nkoranzaman Commu-
nity Financing Health Insurance Scheme, 1998 and 1999. 
6 Addo et al. (1995) mentions one of the earliest citations as pre-feasibility report 
prepared by Joseph Amenyah in August 1985. 
7 These were reasons suggested by the Eastern region national coordinator of the 
scheme during a conversation.  
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for selecting the Eastern Region is that as one of the largest regions in the 
country, it has a lot of health facilities (143 health centres and about 18 
hospitals) and health workers to test the initiative. These facilities are catego-
rized in a way that cuts across mission, government and private facilities, which 
reflect different situations of health care. The population structure also appears 
to be quite representative of the socio economic background of people from all 
sources and cultural groupings in the country. It is also believed that the 
region’s proximity to the national headquarters in Accra might have influenced 
the decision. The Suhum Kraboa Coaltar District, which was selected as the 
case study in this research, was one of those that were chosen in the Eastern 
Region by MOH Ghana to implement the pilot national health insurance 
scheme. The remaining three districts are New Juabeng (Koforidua), Birim 
South District (Akim Oda) and Kwahu South (Mpraeso). 
 
Brief profile of Suhum Kraboa Coaltar District 
Suhum-Kraboa-Coaltar District (hereinafter called Suhum District) is one of the 
fifteen administrative districts in the Eastern Region of Ghana. It is located in 
the southern part of the region to the east of the New Juaben district in which 
the regional capital, Koforidua is situated. It has a total number of 415 settle-
ments and the official 2000 population census put the existing population at 
166,472 of which 82,244 are males and 84,228 are females. About 78% of the 
district is categorized under rural. Climatic conditions in the district are similar 
to those of the forest zone of Ghana, with high temperatures ranging between 75 
to 80 degrees Fahrenheit. The bedrock of economic activity in the district is 
agriculture, providing income for about 70% of the population. Major cash 
crops cultivated are cocoa, palm oil, cassava and plantains. Land is mostly 
individually owned through outright acquisition. It is noted for its vibrant 
commercial farming activities and serviced by three banking institutions.  
The district has a relatively good road network which boosts trade and 
commerce in the area. It is connected to the national electricity grid, which 
ensures constant electricity supply for both domestic and industrial purposes, 
but the main sources of water supply are boreholes, rivers, ponds, wells and 
rainwater. It has one government hospital located in Suhum, 10 health centres, 
three private clinics and one maternity home. Prevalent diseases in the area 
include malaria, diarrhoea, onchocerciasis, yaws and schistosomiasis.  
 
Why a pilot project? 
This NHIS pilot project was planned to be a trial scheme to assist MoH–Ghana 
to formulate a policy on “rural-based community-financed schemes meant to 
cover all the members of the rural community” in Ghana (Addo et al. 1995: 
viii). The purpose was to ensure that suitable systems were developed for the 
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various aspects of the scheme, including premium levels, premium collection 
systems, provider payment systems and the type of benefit package. In order to 
implement the project, a national health insurance secretariat was set up in the 
national capital, Accra, to lead the implementation activities. A regional secre-
tariat was also established under the regional director of health services at the 
regional capital, Koforidua, to co-ordinate the activities in the region.  
In preparation for the pilot, various consultancies were also engaged to carry 
out a number of key activities, which included the following:  
 
Baseline Studies (Affordability and Willingness to Pay) carried out by the Insti-
tute of Social, Statistical and Economic Research (ISSER) in 1995; 
A study on implementation of National Health Insurance Scheme — Eastern 
Regional Project, conducted by W.K. Siaw of SSNIT in September 1997;  
Accreditation Exercise in the four Pilot Districts in October 1997; 
Cost and utilization study for the determination of premiums, conducted by Tri-
star Actuarial and Management Consultants in February 1998; 
Development of benefit package and provider guidelines by the National Secre-
tariat; and 
Seminars and Workshops for providers with different stakeholders to obtain their 
input for the design of the scheme.  
 
Design features 
Proposed policy package. The initial position of the NHIS Secretariat was that a 
central agency, a National Insurance Company would be set up to run the 
scheme. It was proposed that the scheme was to be operated on the principles of 
solidarity, equity and non-profitability. Its basic tenets were to share cost of 
health services, share care for the sick and thereby make health care affordable 
to all the people of Ghana in the event of illness. These services were expected 
to “be possible for a small premium to be paid either on a monthly, quarterly, 
half yearly or yearly basis”.8 Clients joining the scheme were to be entitled to a 
benefit package of outpatient and in-patient services including ancillary services 
at the district level. Providers were to be selected through accreditation and 
were to include hospitals, private clinics, polyclinics, health centres, clinics and 
maternity homes as well as pharmacies, medical laboratories and X-ray units in 
the private sector. 
 
Public education programme. The most elaborate activity that was carried out as 
part of the implementation of the scheme was a public education programme in 
the four pilot districts. As was characteristic of most of the activities in connec-
tion with the implementation of the scheme, this (educational) component was 
                                                 
8 Eastern Health News, Dr. Brookman-Amissah on health insurance, pp. 8-10. 
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also contracted to a private consultant, the Centre for Development and Inter-
cultural Communication (CEDIC)9 based on a proposal submitted to and 
accepted by the Ministry of Health. The project began in August 1997.10 The so-
called communication objectives of the pilot project upon which CEDIC 
embarked are provided in Figure 3.1 below. 
CEDIC developed a plan using national service personnel who were trained 
for three days and sent to three districts11 to work. Fieldworkers were expected 
to work closely with existing district structures like District Health Management 
Teams (DHMT), District Assemblies, National Commission for Civic Educa-
tion (NCCE) and the Non-Formal Education Division (NFED) of the Ministry 
of Education. Communication strategies that were used to create public aware-
ness and sensitisation in the districts included posters, handbills, billboards, 
audiocassettes messages, newsletters and radio programmes. 
As fate would have it the public education programme was the furthest the 
pilot scheme could go. The project stalled in 1998 although this was not 
officially admitted.12 Rather, the state maintained a deceptive public image that 
the scheme was progressing well and results were being studied, when in fact 
there was no intention of actual implementation taking place. It took a change in 
government for the MOH to publicly announce the failure of the pilot scheme. 
In one such public admission, the official reasons for the failure were attributed 
to already known challenges of rural informal schemes such as devising appro-
priate scheme designs, determining premium levels, developing a collection 
mechanism and setting up a company appropriate to manage the scheme that 
was suitable for the informal sector.13  
A number of other reasons could also be assigned as explanations for the 
failure. One of these is the over-ambitious decision to set up a centralised 
national insurance scheme based in Accra to manage the operations in various 
districts in another region. Again most of the predictions upon which the 
 
                                                 
9 CEDIC later changed its name to Strategic Communication Limited (StratComm). 
10 The original consultancy period for this activity was supposed to be from July to 
December 1997, but actual work only began in August. Before the term was over, 
CEDIC informed the ministry about the need and its intention to extend the period to 
April 1998.    
11 Originally eight field staff were trained for the four districts involved in the pilot 
scheme but two did not return for posting when they were asked.  
12 In 1999, when the first phase exploratory fieldwork was carried out, a pilot scheme 
was officially on going. In reality there was nothing to show for it. 
13 Reasons attributed to Dr. Aaron Offei, Regional Director of Health Services, Eastern 
region, reported in The Ghanaian Chronicle on the Web “We’re no longer each other’s 
keeper due to harsh economic trends” written by Eric Boateng Sampon, Koforidua, 
Volume 10, No 13, Monday, October 1, 2001. 
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a) Create general awareness about the health insurance scheme. 
b) Educate the general public about how health care could be improved through 
the health insurance scheme by persuading people to join the scheme, motivate 
the non-formal sector to join the scheme, educate the public about how to join 
the scheme and pay premiums and educating the public about how to ease the 
burden of paying premiums. 
c) Create a sense of national as well as traditional pride in those who join the 
scheme. 
d) Explain the scheme to the public. 
e) Create the sensitivity, support and excitement about the scheme so that policy 
makers will make available the necessary facilities and logistics for imple-
menting the scheme. 
f) Help the public to see the links between the scheme and traditional social sup-
port systems. 
g) Change the widespread attitude, belief and expectation that health care is solely 
the responsibility of the government. 
Figure 3.2: Communication objectives of the NHIS pilot project implemented by 
CEDIC 
 
 
feasibility of the NHIS was made were quid pro quo economic assumptions that 
ignored the socio economic and cultural realities of the economy and society. 
For example, it was projected that the economic measures introduced in the 
early 1990s such as trade liberalisation, incentives to attract private investment 
and measures aimed at encouraging domestic production were going to increase 
job opportunities and incomes, thereby creating an enabling environment for the 
NHIS (Addo et al. 1995: 102-103). Furthermore, despite the limited technical 
knowledge on rural health insurance, the planned pilot scheme descended on the 
communities with very inadequate preparation and typically ended up as 
another unsuccessful government programme.16 Indeed the education pro-
                                                 
14 In 1999, when the first phase exploratory fieldwork was carried out, a pilot scheme 
was officially on going. In reality there was nothing to show for it. 
15 Reasons attributed to Dr. Aaron Offei, Regional Director of Health Services, Eastern 
region, reported in The Ghanaian Chronicle on the Web “We’re no longer each other’s 
keeper due to harsh economic trends” written by Eric Boateng Sampon, Koforidua, 
Volume 10, No 13, Monday, October 1, 2001. 
16 Various examples abound of state initiated programmes that soon became defunct 
after take off due to the approach and attitude of state officials. In health care these 
include the community clinic attendant initiative and the Bamako initiative, which were 
targeted at improving primary health care at the community level.   
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gramme was not effective because it was hastily implemented, handled by 
unskilled field personnel and in most cases prior notice was not given before 
community visits.  
 
How do various parties involved look upon insurance? 
One issue that became a subject of concern during my data collection in Suhum 
was trust in the implementers. There was scepticism based on previous bad 
experiences with community credit and savings schemes. Many believed that 
such ventures are only a means of exploitation by “smart officials” to take 
advantage of “innocent and ignorant poor rural folks”. Many people therefore, 
do not trust or are very sceptical of officials or any group of people who come 
with pen and paper to collect money from them.  
Notwithstanding the failure of the NHIS pilot scheme, the need for the 
government to provide accessible health care has never been so strong. This is a 
result of increasing economic hardships and the consequent difficulties in 
paying for health care at the point of use. It is against this background that the 
desire, search and attempt to implement a feasible health insurance scheme in 
Ghana that is particularly suited to its unique socio- economic environment 
presents a problem of great social scientific importance and of interest to health 
policy and planning.  
 
 
The Dangme West District Health Insurance Project  
 
The Dangme West District Health Insurance Project (hereafter called Dodowa) 
is the fruitful culmination of the community based insurance vision of a former 
director of medical services and later deputy minister of health, Dr. Moses 
Adibo. It is the end result of Dr. Dyna Arhin’s PhD research work in health 
economics. In principle, however, it was implemented as a MoH operational 
research activity that partially fulfilled the government’s desire to test the 
feasibility of rural health insurance schemes in Ghana. The primary goal was to 
make modern health care accessible to the rural poor through prepayment 
community health insurance schemes. In May 1993 the first fieldwork was 
conducted to examine the demand and financial feasibility; the scheme was 
finally launched in October 2000.17 
                                                 
17 I was encouraged and motivated to cover the district extensively by the district 
director of health services. He had expressed demand for such a study as a means of 
understanding the experiences, problems and challenges the district was facing in its 
implementation. 
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Brief profile of Dodowa District 
The Dangme West District is one of forty-five districts created in 1988 as part 
of the government’s decentralisation reforms. It is also one of two rural districts 
among the five in the Greater Accra Region that is yet to experience the rapid 
urbanization that has besieged the peripheral areas surrounding Accra city. 
Dodowa is the district capital. 
It has the largest surface land area (about 1,700 square kilometres) in the 
Greater Accra region, constituting about 41.5% of the entire regional land area. 
The land is flat and at sea level with isolated hills. It is bounded on the east by 
the Volta River in the Osudoku sub-district, to the west by Ga District, to the 
north by the Akwapim Ranges of the Eastern region and to the south by 
Prampram and Tema in the Greater Accra region. It is home to the ancient Shai 
Hills tourist site. The vegetation is predominantly coastal savannah but dense 
forest commonly known as the “Dodowa Forest” exists in the Dodowa sub-
district part.  
The 2000 population census put the number of people in the district at 
96,809, 46,550 males and 50,259 females. The district has a slightly lower 
population density than the average for the country (55.3 persons per square 
kilometre against the national average of 63) and far lower than the regional 
average (which is 441 persons per square kilometre) mainly as a result of 
migration to Accra and Tema, which fall within the region. The population is 
concentrated along coastal settlements mainly in Prampram, Old Ningo and 
Lekponunor due to fishing activities, and in the western parts at Dodowa and 
Asutuare, due to farming and commercial activities. The large, central portion, 
which is inhabited by pastoralists is very sparsely populated. The population 
structure of the district reflects a typical developing country rural region with a 
predominant youthful population with an average of 21.5 years. This implies a 
high dependency rate. 
In spite of the presence of the wide ocean mass and the Volta River, farming, 
rather than fishing, is the main occupation of the majority (about 60%) of 
households in the district. This is due to the fact that fishing (only 6.4%) in the 
area still uses old and rather crude labour intensive methods. Trading (about 
22%) is the next major occupation after farming and it is significant to note that 
some of the main towns in the district such as Dodowa, Prampram, Old Ningo 
and Osuwem used to be dynamic trading and commercial centres in the region 
but this has declined over the years due to shifts to Accra and Tema.  
 
Health indicators  
For purposes of health administration, the district is divided into four sub-
districts: Dodowa (Shai), Prampram, Great Ningo (previously called Old Ningo) 
and Osudoku. Each sub-district is served by one main health centre headed by a 
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medical assistant and in addition has one or two community clinics. They are 
supported by two private clinics in Prampram and Dawhenya as well as two 
private maternity homes also in Prampram and Dodowa. There are several 
licensed chemical sellers shops in the larger communities. In addition, there 
exist a number of untrained, unlicensed and unregistered providers of biomedi-
cal care who practice their trade in the markets and on tabletops in front of their 
homes. There are also drug peddlers, injectionsists and other varieties of 
quacks. Public health care delivery system in the district is hampered by poor 
infrastructure, lack of staff accommodation as well as transport facilities and 
motorable roads. At the moment, the district has no in-patient facility, but -
expansion work is on going to upgrade the Dodowa health centre to a hospital.  
The prevalent diseases in the district include malaria, diarrhoeal diseases, 
anaemia and upper respiratory tract infections. In 1999 for example, malarial 
diseases made up about 47% of all reported conditions. Other commonly 
reported diseases included accidents including fractures and burns, and diseases 
of the skin and ulcers. 
Supply of potable water is inadequate, and nearly half of the 124 settlements 
are without access to clean water. Only a small proportion (20) has regular 
supply of pipe- borne water. The majority of the people depend upon surface 
ponds, rainwater, rivers and shallow wells fro water. This has implications for 
health in the spread of water borne diseases such as guinea worm, bilharzias and 
river blindness as well as typhoid and cholera, particularly in communities 
situated along the river. Sanitation facilities are also poor. In the urban areas of 
the district there are no designated sewage and refuse disposal systems; only 
26% of houses have toilet facilities. 
 
Who took the initiative? 
The background of the Dodowa scheme was recounted to me by the district 
director of health services, Dr. Irene Agyepong, and corroborated by other 
sources including Dr. Moses Adibo, the man whose vision led to the location of 
the scheme in that district is as follows: 
 
If you go back it does not really come from the district. Somewhere in the eighties 
Dr. Adibo had this idea that community based health insurance might be a possibil-
ity to help solve the acute health care payment problems of the rural poor. So he 
actually looked for someone who was interested in the issue. And that was Dinah. 
She got a scholarship to study health economics in Leeds and went further on to do a 
PhD in the London School for Hygiene and Tropical Medicine focussing on Health 
Insurance. Dinah’s PhD thesis looked at the willingness to pay for health insurance 
in rural communities and whether the ideas of health insurance already existed and 
how people would react to it. And when she was deciding where to work, I was 
doing my Masters in Liverpool and people suggested she talk to me to find out the 
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possibility of starting her work in Dangme West. In short she ended up doing the 
fieldwork in this district in 1993. When she finished her PhD and published one or 
two papers there was interest in following it up.  
 
The EU, through the University of Heidelberg, decided to fund a collaborative 
research between the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) 
and MoH-Ghana on one hand and then Heidelberg and MoH-Burkina Faso on the 
other hand. Heidelberg was actually not interested in insurance but prepayment in 
Burkina Faso but the EU felt it would be good if, apart from the north-south coop-
eration, there is also a south-south cooperation so they linked these issues and a 
proposal was developed in which Heidelberg was made the coordinator. The funds 
went to Heidelberg then they passed some to the London School, then to Burkina 
and Ghana. The entire project was thus actually bigger than the Dangme West 
scheme. There were however, problems somewhere along the line with the 
coordination issue. The links between Ghana and Burkina Faso hardly worked as 
envisaged while the relationship with Heidelberg almost became a matter of just 
transferring money.  
 
The other issue is that there were delays. For such a huge project there are always 
problems when it comes to translating the theory into practice. In our case I think the 
original thing was that all kinds of things changed in the MoH. Dr. Adibo retired, 
and then his successor Dr. Adamafio who came in also retired shortly. Then Dr. 
Otoo, who followed also stayed in office for a short time so we changed directors 
about three times in a year. The Minister of Health also changed several times and 
they all affected the project. In short there were delays so we took off finally in 1996 
with discussions and planning but the funds were transferred in 1997. On the other 
hand, the long planning phase was not an entirely bad thing because it helped us to 
identify a lot of issues although many of these issues were quite obvious to us from 
the start. For example, quality of care is a problem that we have always known but 
how to get the funds to bring it under par is still problematic.  
 
Again when the project took off, instead of having a short planning period we had a 
long planning session. Part of the problem was that when the project was originally 
conceived, the EU was going to fund research and evaluation while the MoH was 
supposed to fund intervention. So basically all the issues to do with design and 
implementation was going to be funded by MoH. However, because of the changes 
in the MoH top hierarchy, that part from the MoH did not materialise and we ended 
up with further problems. We had money to evaluate the project but did not have 
money to implement it. So what did we do? We looked at several issues and decided 
to implement something from the little money that the district had. But then we were 
not very happy with that because as we planned the scheme the things that we felt 
were very necessary to have a viable insurance project we could not do just because 
of funding difficulties. We could not carry out certain things such as capitation and 
community sensitisation.  
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So we spent the whole of 1996 and part of 1997 looking and begging for money to 
implement the project. The irony with that was sometimes the issues were not under-
standable for some of the people and donors we approached, because to them we 
had EU funds so why were we asking for more money? In the end we had to take a 
second look at the EU budget to see how flexible it was and if it was possible to 
reinterpret evaluation into implementation. We did manage to reinterpret some of 
the things. For instance the budget included equipment for research and evaluation 
but you could use the same equipment for implementation activities so we just used 
the same equipment. Then we got some help along the line. The district poverty 
reduction programme helped a bit, MoH helped a bit and we also got little bit from 
our donor funding and then our financial emoluments (FE) and that is the history of 
the scheme. And then because the project officially ended, part of the salary for 
principal investigator that was being paid by the EU fund also went to finance the 
project directly.  
 
Prior to the actual implementation, a number of elaborate activities were carried 
out including the following:18 
Social mobilisation and the raising of awareness. The channels through 
which this was effected included house to house education using community 
volunteers, information vans and community drama. Public address systems 
were mounted on seven vans as part of the education campaign. This was 
reinforced by community drama using a mix of health workers and community 
members. 
Information booklets and flipcharts. These were produced jointly by the 
DHMT and the planning unit of the district assembly in consultation with 
people at various levels in the community to educate people in the district as 
well as those in other regions (and eventually the entire nation) about the 
scheme. The content of the books was based on frequently asked questions 
during the sensitisation and awareness campaigns; other issues in it dealt with 
what people needed to know about the scheme in order to be prepared. The 
distribution was targeted at entire communities. A nine-page flip chart was 
designed for the use of trained community volunteers in the communities.  
Community health educator training and home visits. These were done 
jointly with the planning unit of the district assembly. The initiative brought 
together existing groups of men and women including chiefs, community 
development officers, opinion leaders and teachers who had received extensive 
training in community education on various issues. Forty selected volunteers 
were oriented in various aspects of the scheme, in order for them to carry out 
                                                 
18 Excerpts from 2000 Annual Report of the Dangme West District compiled by the 
DHMT, January 2001. 
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house-to-house education and the organisation of radio listenership groups in 
the community. The listenership group listened to educational programmes on 
the radio and discussed the issues that arose from them. Each volunteer signed a 
promise to endeavour to reach every person in communities assigned to him/her 
after the training. 
Health worker orientation meetings. This involved a two-day orientation to 
educate and outline the role of health workers in the scheme. Community health 
educators and field staff were trained to educate the community while clinical 
staff were also trained to educate their clients in the consulting room.  
The scheme was formally launched on October 10, 2000 at Dodowa by the 
Deputy Minister of Health at the time, Dr. Moses Adibo. Several MoH officials 
in the region, the donor community, local leaders and organisations and the 
community at large attended the launching. A pilot registration was organised in 
Dodowa one week prior to the actual launching. Actual registration of the 
scheme started a day after the official launching in Dodowa. A registration team 
made up of a photographer, a registrar and a community mobiliser toured the 
various communities. They were armed with notebooks, registration forms, 
receipt books, a wooden money box, a census listing all people in area councils 
and a wooden photo frame. Families had an option to pay in full or in instal-
ments within a period of three months. Pictures of subscribers were taken only 
after families had fulfilled their premium obligations in full for ID card to be 
issued to them.  
Although the first registration was scheduled to end in December 31, 2000, 
this was extended for about three weeks into January 2001 “due to several 
holidays in December and other health activities” (Dangme West Annual 
Report 2001).  
 
Design features 
Membership and benefit package. Membership is voluntary and open to all 
residents of the Dangme West district. Residents of adjoining districts who are 
interested and desire to join are accepted on the condition that they agree to use 
one of the primary health care clinics in the district as their first point of service 
use. Benefits cover the use of health services in the public sector. Presently, the 
following benefit package is offered: 
 
a. All primary outpatient clinical care. 
b. Basic laboratory tests requested as part of primary outpatient clinical care 
namely: haemoglobin, sickling, full blood count, stool R/E, urine R/E, 
widal test and blood grouping. 
c. Antenatal care. 
d. Delivery and postnatal care. 
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e. Family planning. 
f. Child welfare and immunization. This is in theory free currently, but in 
practice in most clinics mothers pay a “voluntary contribution” to cover 
costs for items such as cotton wool and transportation for nurses.  
g. Referral to a participating hospital provided the patient consulted a 
primary outpatient clinical care providing facility first and was referred 
by the prescriber there. Clients who self refer to hospital are not reim-
bursed. This system of gate keeping is intended to prevent the administra-
tive and financial complications that are likely to be associated with 
allowing patients to self refer to hospitals outside the district. 
 
If a client is so referred (as in (g) above), all fees are paid up to a maximum of 
two hundred thousand cedis. Any additional fees are the responsibility of the 
client. Cases that are referred as acute emergencies, e.g., convulsions; ruptured 
ectopic pregnancy and other obstetric emergencies are provided transport under 
the scheme if an ambulance is available. If not, private transport such as taxis 
and buses has to be hired by relatives. Currently only Dodowa and Prampram 
have ambulances.   
 
Management and financial administration. In theory, registered households who 
collectively form the Dangme Hewanminami Kpee (DHK) (translated as 
Dangme Good Health Group or District Health Maintenance Association), are 
considered the actual owners of the scheme. In practice, however, a District 
Health Insurance Management Team (DHIMT) administers the scheme on 
behalf of its members. The District Health Management Team (DHMT) and 
appointed staff from the office of the District Director of Health Services 
(DDHS) are members. District assembly representatives, including the head and 
a member of staff of the District Planning Coordinating Office, make up the rest 
of the membership of the DHIMT.  
Responsibilities of the DHIMT include the monitoring of performance to 
ensure that paid up members of the association have access to good quality 
health care at hospitals and clinics. It also reimburses health centres and hospi-
tals for services based on an approved formula and/or agreed rates. It is also 
charged with the compilation and analysis of routine health management 
information system data related to the scheme.  
The administration of the scheme also incorporates a District Advisory 
Board (DAB) that is yet to be set up. It is planned to be composed of representa-
tives of traditional, political, religious and administrative leaders in the commu-
nity and district. Regional health leaders (MoH, NGO) and other persons 
considered to have expertise as well as the interest in the welfare of the scheme 
are also planned to be incorporated. The board is expected to meet twice yearly 
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to offer advice in policy related issues such as contribution schedules, exemp-
tions, credit facilities, assuring equity and disciplinary matters. 
The premium for the first insurance year was 12,000 cedis (or about US$ 2) 
per adult and 6,000 cedis per child or elderly person (70 years and above) per 
annum if the whole family registered as required by the scheme. At the initial 
stage, monies collected were acknowledged with MOH general counterfoil 
receipt books and then deposited in the District Director of Health Services 
(DDHS) account for convenience. Subsequently a separate specific account for 
the scheme was opened with Standard Chartered Bank, Legon branch and all 
monies transferred there. A total of thirty five million and seventy five thousand 
cedis (35,075,000 cedis) from 775 households was collected in premiums 
during the registration of the first insurance year.  
 
How do the various actors view the scheme? 
In all fairness, the time span within which Dodowa has been in existence is too 
short to make a constructive assessment. One unique feature of the Dangme 
West district health insurance scheme that poses a critical challenge is the 
absence of hospital in the district. Accordingly, in-patient care for insured 
patients is presently provided by hospitals in adjacent districts. While this might 
be a source of concern, the scheme’s implementers perceive it as a challenge 
that may end up to be one of its strengths if it works out successfully. Within 
the district, both health service staff and community people acknowledge the 
scheme for what it is intended to do, particularly its potential “to do away with 
the distressed ‘cash and carry’ system”. Virtually every health service worker in 
the district considers health insurance as the panacea to the accessibility 
problems that the majority of the people in the district face. Most subscribers 
find the scheme helpful because it is cheaper and treatment is accessible. Some 
of those who have already benefited from it testified that medical care is 
literally free under the scheme.  
There are, however, several complaints against aspects and operations of the 
scheme by the community. One common complaint is staff attitude at the 
clinics. Complaints about staff rudeness are very common and some claim that 
it is a disincentive for them to register. Indeed, some think that even in the era 
when they were holding money the staff did not treat them well and therefore 
harbour the fear that things could get worse if they only have to attend clinic 
with just a card in hand. There are already allegations that health service staff 
treat those with cash in hand first.  
Poor physical access to the nearest clinic is also a disincentive for some 
communities to register. Some are also of the view that the services they are 
receiving still fall short of what was promised them. Most are uncertain about it 
and have therefore adopted a wait and see attitude to monitor how it would fare 
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before committing their resources. For a scheme in its first year of practical 
implementation, this situation is not surprising, but raises doubts about the open 
enthusiasm people express about it. On the other hand, hospital staff involved in 
the scheme also complain of increasing workload as a result of the additional 
services insurance has added to their clinical routines.  
 
 
Brief appraisal of the three schemes in terms of their  
socio-cultural challenges 
 
What relevant socio-cultural challenges emerge from the foregoing background 
knowledge about the three initiatives? The following are worthy of note. 
Historically, the ideas emerged as a social reaction to the consequences of 
cost recovery measures introduced by the state as part of structural adjustment 
policies. Characteristically, they are voluntary health insurance initiatives or 
ideas with a public or social objective: to make health care accessible to all, 
particularly the poor and vulnerable. Significantly, the two functional schemes 
are predominantly provider-driven schemes19; the health care provider is also 
the insurer (for a detailed discussion of the two models, see Chapter 1 of Criel 
2000). Socially this has the effect of limiting administrative costs and checking 
excesses such as overuse through provider moral hazard. Theoretically, its 
technocratic feature also has the potential of keeping premiums low and within 
affordable limits for the barely subsisting poor.  
On the other hand, the technocratic feature of the schemes theoretically 
make them external to the community in the sense that they represent innova-
tive ideas that originated from policy makers and implementers rather than the 
community itself. Practically, although this feature does not always create an 
acceptability problem, the situation has created a lack of sense of ownership in 
Nkoranza. The Dangme West district scheme is still too early in its existence to 
make an objective assessment in this regard. Indeed, one of the present chal-
lenges of Dangme West is how to foster communication links and understand-
ing of the principles underlying the scheme in order to make it socially and 
culturally acceptable to the communities.  
                                                 
19 Regarding voluntary health insurance pursuing a public or social objective, Criel 
(2000) makes a distinction between mutualistic or participatory model and “provider 
driven” or technocratic model.  The mutualistic model often involves a “larger social 
dynamic where solidarity or self-governance is important concerns”.  There is usually 
an intermediary structure between the source (households) and the destination (health 
care providers) of funds.  In the provider driven or technocratic model, the health care 
provider is also the insurer.   
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Another issue of social significance is the underlying risk sharing solidarity 
upon which the schemes are based. The initiatives represent an attempt to 
institutionalise solidarity between the healthy and sick in the communities. It is 
important to emphasise, however, that although risk sharing may not be a new 
concept (since it has been part of traditional support arrangements), the mode of 
organisation and the total context in which it worked varied. For instance, in the 
traditional system the features of the group in which solidarity and risk sharing 
mainly took place were homogenous, small and varied with the type of situation 
i.e. sickness, old age or death. Health insurance, on the other hand, thrives better 
on a wider level of solidarity in the sense that the more people that are involved 
on a broader scale the better. Schemes therefore face the important social 
challenge of how to secure culturally appropriate ways of creating or attaining 
larger risk pools beyond familial and other small homogenous groups among 
community members to cover entire districts. 
Furthermore, from a rather narrow health economics point of view, the key 
issues in insurance are willingness and ability to pay. It is, however, important 
to recognise on the basis of the above that a community’s preparedness and 
individual preference (and for that matter decision to participate in a health 
insurance) go beyond economic considerations to include the total social 
context. Issues about quality of care, for example, are a major social challenge 
since they constitute an item upon which people base their decisions to partici-
pate or not. As a matter of fact, people will not participate when quality of care 
is below their expectation. Complaints about and dissatisfaction with poor staff 
attitudes and low quality of service in general on the part of health care 
consumers on one hand, and counter-charges of health staff that such com-
plaints are based on community members misconceptions of the service reflect 
a social problem relating to varied perceptions of providers and consumers. It is 
therefore necessary to have a good appreciation of the type of quality of care 
people expect from insurance and health care service in general. This would 
involve the need for constant dialogue and negotiation of implementers with the 
community to appreciate each other’s needs and difficulties in relation to the 
total socio economic context of the service.  
By way of comparison, the distinguishing features of the three cases in Table 
3.1 below present notable challenges for performance and sustainability. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In dealing with the subject of social and cultural feasibility of rural health 
insurance in Ghana, it is important to keep in mind the official cultural propa 
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Table 3.1 
Comparison of distinct features of three initiatives  
Feature Cases 
 Nkoranza Dodowa NHIS 
Initiator/Owner Mission oriented/ 
non-profit 
provider 
Public/ DHMT  
provider  
Public / RHA  
provider  
Purpose Improve access/  
revenue 
Improve access/  
revenue 
Improve  
access/ revenue 
Type  Provider driven Provider driven Provider driven 
Subscription basis Voluntary  Voluntary  Voluntary 
Scale District District Region 
Benefit package In-patient In-and out-
patient 
-  
Coverage Single facility  
based  
District wide  
facilities  
-  
Premiums Cash  Cash Cash 
Exemptions None  None -  
Measures to control  
adverse selection 
Household  
mandatory 
benefit 
Household  
mandatory 
benefit 
Household 
Benefit cost ceiling Unlimited Limited  - 
 
 
 
ganda traditional systems of support such as kinship and friendship in Ghanaian 
society that are supportive of people’s willingness to join solidarity insurance 
systems.  
Accordingly, it is important to underscore the fact that any effort or attempt 
at implementing community health insurance initiatives must of necessity deal 
with a number of socially and culturally relevant questions. They include the 
following, which set the agenda for discussions in subsequent chapters. 
  
What are the principles of the existing traditional forms of support and how do 
these operate presently in the family? 
What are the perceptions, values and limitations of a formal and/or state-organ-
ised solidarity risk sharing at the different levels of social organisation: among 
those who plan and implement insurance and among the community for which it 
is intended? Or would communities accept the principles of solidarity in insur-
ance beyond their traditionally known homogenous and small groups?  
How can traditional rules of reciprocity and solidarity be scaled up to or trans-
formed into a modern state-organised insurance system? Would people trust and 
have confidence in health planners and implementers, particularly the state, 
when it is the bursar of their health insurance scheme? Why or why not? 
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How will a state-centred insurance affect the well being of the weakest members 
of the community: women, children and increasingly elderly people? Or would 
solidarity based community schemes really assure access to the poor and vulner-
able in the community? 
 
 
 
 
4 
Traditional social security  
mechanisms in Ghana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
From time immemorial, social and economic insecurity have been endemic to 
human societies. Correspondingly, societies have evolved provisions to guaran-
tee its members certain minimum standards of help or assistance during times 
of insecurity. These mechanisms are products of the historical and cultural 
development of the societies concerned, reflecting their specific cultural values. 
Traditional social security, therefore, has been a simple, collective, indigenous 
social institution whereby members of a society or community afflicted with 
social and economic contingencies such as sickness, disability, old age, famine, 
widowhood or orphanage, are protected, based on customary reciprocity. What 
are the essential features of the social security organisation of traditional 
Ghanaian society and how did they function? This chapter examines that 
question based on the writings of published authors and my own research 
material. Specifically, I focus on what the forms and principles of traditional 
social security support in Ghanaian society were, how they operated in the past 
and how they still function at present in the family and welfare groups. The 
underlying theme of the discussion is that as a result of social and economic 
changes in the Ghanaian society, aspects of traditional social security arrange-
ments are disintegrating.  
Factors that are contributory to the disintegration of traditional social 
security include modernising factors such as increasing education, aspirations 
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for better economic conditions, higher standards of living, increased urbanisa-
tion, westernisation, globalisation, changes in attitudes, different patterns of 
consumption and radical changes in work roles and social stratification. I begin 
the discussion by tracing the patterns and important principles upon which 
traditional social security was based. This will be followed by a description of 
how support was given during times of insecurity in the past and the present 
based on three examples: sickness, death and old age. This is done in order to 
show how the principle of reciprocity worked and is still working. I then follow 
it up with a discussion of the limits of past support against the background of 
their common romanticism and conclude with a reflection on the effectiveness 
of traditional support within its historical perspective. Where necessary, 
examples focus on the Akan1 of Southern Ghana, because of their predomi-
nance in terms of population and the fact that they constitute the bulk of my 
targeted population in this study. Indeed, their rich culture and traditions of 
social security may bear semblance to other societies in Africa south of the 
Sahara.  
 
 
Social framework of traditional social security in Ghana 
 
Kinship based family system 
The basic unit of social organisation around which traditional social security 
revolves is the family, based on kinship. According to Rattray (1956: 62), “the 
family unit was a corporation; action and even thought were corporate affairs”. 
The kinship organisation, particularly in the past, constituted the basis for 
formal political and religious organisation and influenced the social stratifica-
tion in many Ghanaian ethnic groups. Social relations, defined by the kinship 
system, served among other purposes to determine in advance the rights and 
duties of members in case of emergencies. Others rules relating to property, 
inheritance, ownership of land and collection of family contributions became 
the customary laws governing the larger group. Thus, the group bore the moral 
                                                           
1 The Akan ethnic group is the largest in Ghana and constitutes 49.1% of the entire 
population (2000 Population and Housing Census, GSS, 2000: 5). They occupy most of 
the southern half of the country namely Western, Central, Eastern, Asante and Brong 
Ahafo regions as well as the northern parts of the Volta region. They can also be found 
in various occupations in the remaining five regions of Ghana. The sub-groups who 
speak variants of a common language of Fanti/Twi are the Asante, Ahanta, Akuapim, 
Akyem, Aowin, Brong, Fanti, Kwahu, Nzema, Sefwi, Twifo and Wassa. Although they 
were never politically united until they came under the rule of the British colonial 
government, they have a common culture (Arhin 1994: 307-308, Okali 1987). 
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and social responsibility for the welfare of its members such as maintenance, 
housing, health and other problems when they emerged.  
Most ethnic groups in Ghana limit kinship decent through a single line of 
male or female ancestry (unilineal decent). The typical family thus consists of a 
group of people related by blood who trace their past to a common past 
ancestor or ancestress. Among the Akan, the principle of matrilineal descent is 
followed and forms the foundation for social order. Every person is by birth a 
member of his mother’s lineage and a member of the chiefdom in which this 
lineage is located. The localised lineage, referred to as the abusua, is general-
ised throughout the society by an organisation of dispersed clans. Dispersal of 
members of a (matri) lineage through marriage or migration does not deprive 
them of their lineage rights and status since they still find their real home in 
their natal homes.  
Every lineage or extended family has a leader, whom the Akan refer to as 
the abusuapanyin (family head). Leadership usually falls to an elderly male 
member (from the mother’s side) of the extended family who is selected 
because of his superior wisdom, personal qualities and experience. The 
abusuapanyin is ordinarily responsible for the general well being of the group. 
He is also the administrator of the family property, the custodian of its 
traditions, the arbitrator of disputes among lineage members and their repre-
sentative to the chief’s council. Such authority is supported by the spiritual 
order; the abusuapanyin is seen as the intermediary between the living and the 
lineage ancestors. He undertakes his functions with the support and advice of 
the ‘elders’ who are accorded honour in Ghanaian society as the transmitters of 
myth and custom and arbiters of proper conduct. The respect accorded to the 
aged, as with that due to those in authority and the mysterious, is conceived out 
of a belief that they are in close proximity to the ancestors and for that matter 
the sacred. Thus, there is an expectation that something evil will result from its 
negation (Sarpong 1974, Twumasi 1975). 
 
The marriage institution 
Marriage is the fundamental building block of the society. The practices that 
are followed are patterned to sustain and foster kinship or lineage alliance and 
internal integration. In its ideal form, marriage was not left in the hands of the 
boy and girl who desired to get married but brokered as a social contract 
between the two families. Potential in-laws or representatives of the potential 
couple first investigate each other and come to an agreement to establish new 
obligations of mutual respect and aid between the two families. Both families 
are active counsellors during the courting and their wholehearted endorsement 
is essential for the success of the marriage. One underlying reason for the 
interest of potential in-laws in the marriage of their children is to ensure that  
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the future social security of both families is guaranteed. They thus probe the 
background of the potential bride to know whether she “came from a good, 
prided and wealthy home; free from indebtedness; will work hard and; be able 
to bear and raise her children well” (Twumasi 1975: 18, emphasis mine). 
Marriage was thus an integral part of the extended family or kinship structure, 
and marriage between two people imposes new reciprocal obligations and 
duties on the families.  
 
Economic institution  
In the economic sphere, the traditional system of production was mainly 
subsistence and the important pre-condition through which the traditional family 
fulfilled its obligatory social security responsibilities was through land assets. 
Land was held as property for the use of an entire family and was not for sale. 
Members were entitled to a small portion of family land for their own support. 
The subsistence system of farming ensured that all adults had a small piece for 
farming and an inherent right to settlement on it if needed be. Members of the 
family therefore enjoyed the profits and advantages of such property without 
altering or damaging the substance. In situations where a member was not able to 
undertake his own farming due to incapacity such as illness, the social network 
provided a safety net through the principle of reciprocal obligation. Food and 
economic security was therefore guaranteed for every member if they worked 
with reasonable diligence on family lands and conformed to the expectations of 
the group.  
The individual’s economic interest in that traditional system was, however, 
subordinate to the demands for the welfare of the entire group of which he or 
she was a part. The obligation to provide assistance for the needy did not 
depend on the altruistic feelings and inclinations of individuals, but was fixed 
by definite social norms determining who was responsible for the care of 
whom. To check abuses, norms for proper conduct were designed to protect the 
social order by acceding custodianship of the land to the ancestors through the 
abusuapanyin whose orders they are obliged to obey. The ancestors were 
believed to watch the living to monitor their conduct and insure the land was used 
in a manner that benefits the entire lineage. Violation of those rules of conduct 
laid down to govern property was said to bring illness or accident to the 
individual or disaster to the lineage members (Twumasi 1975: 20).  
As a consequence, the traditional system of production and distribution was 
based on reciprocities, which were derived from the complex web of ties that link 
kin. This was fostered by the interrelations between the kinship, marriage and 
economic institutions. The reciprocal obligation enjoined both the family and 
the individual to work together and cooperate to ensure the welfare of the 
family and its members. The ideal set before him was that of mutual helpful-
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ness and co-operation within the group of kinsfolk. Each member therefore 
helped the others, in health or sickness, in success or failure, and in poverty or 
plenty. How these worked in the past and how they have changed through time 
is discussed in the subsequent sections. 
 
 
How did the traditional support system function in the past? 
 
In order to appreciate the practice by which the lineage group provided assis-
tance to a needy member in the ideal sense, I shall illustrate it with three 
common insecure situations: old age, sickness and death. The main objective 
here is not so much to give a description of a society’s methods of caring for the 
aged or curing disease or burying the dead, but to illustrate how the traditional 
social security system worked based on the principle of reciprocity. I use the past 
tense to emphasise the past ideal situation. 
 
Old age support 
In Ghana, the aged were traditionally perceived as an integral part of the family 
unit, holding definite and high ranking position. The aged were the people of 
wisdom whose advice the young sought eagerly. He or she was the repository 
of knowledge who settled social disputes, officiated at marriages, births and 
funeral ceremonies. He or she was a Nana an elder to the young and youth, both 
inside and outside his compound. An affront to him or her was considered 
displeasure to the ancestral gods. Sarpong (1974: 65) describes this ideal 
position as follows: 
 
Old age is sacred as the person is thought to be in closer proximity to the ancestors. 
He is likely to die before the others — than the young... Hence it is in relation to the 
sacred that a respectful attitude should be shown towards authority, old, the mysteri-
ous and the spiritual. 
 
The aged, both female and male, resided with their families, and played very 
important roles in the kinship and social affairs of the communities.  
Old women were regarded as endowed with great wisdom; successful rulers 
consulted and depended upon their astuteness and experience. For example, the 
wisdom of old women was depicted in difficult dispute settlements when the 
council of elders would retire to consult with the remark that “we are going to 
consult with the Old Woman” (yε rek susu ho akyerε Nana Aberewa). When an 
elderly woman was widowed, she usually returned to reside with her family 
where she played an active role in their social affairs. This role usually included 
counselling of young women and girls about their moral and social development. 
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Old men or elders were also generally responsible for the administration of the 
affairs of the family. They met often to deliberate and make decisions about 
diverse matters that affected the entire family or just individual members. They 
administered the family property under the leadership of the abusuapanyin. The 
elders also settled many disputes affecting members of the family and other 
relations. Old people, therefore, played the roles of priests, teachers, disci-
plinarians, marriage counsellors, psychiatrists, legal experts, administrators and 
more. The Akan, for example, capture this sentiment with the saying that a family 
is accursed if it has no old person (abusua bne na panyin nni mu). 
In the light of their importance to society, there was an informal support for 
the aged. Members of the family assumed collective responsibility through 
children and grandchildren. Accommodation was provided in a family or 
relative’s house, if the old person did not have his or her own house. Socially, the 
bond between parents and children did not weaken after the marriage of the 
“child”. Instead, there was a continuity of relationship with the extended family 
throughout life, which guaranteed some form of security in old age. One 
important benefit derived from links with the extended family was that, apart 
from actual material assistance to the aged, it provided social support through 
replacement for intimate members of the family lost by death or migration so 
that the old person did not have to stay alone. When the system worked normally 
and perfectly, it was not a burden on any particular individual. Each person 
contributed his or her bit freely, knowing that in his own old age, he or she could 
depend on similar support from the younger family members and relations. 
Through this process, traditional social security was maintained for older 
members of society. 
 
Help during sickness 
Before the advent of colonial rule, indigenous health care systems provided the 
main means of remedy and relief when health care was needed. Significantly, in 
traditional Akan society, most elders were expected to know what herbs might be 
used for the cure of certain common ailments. Typically, the first action that the 
family took when a member fell ill was to try one of those known remedies. 
Consultation with a professional healer was sought only if the self-remedy failed. 
Traditional healers held consultations, treated ailments and offered protective 
charms to people who sought their assistance. Four main types of traditional 
healers are identified: traditional birth attendants, faith healers, spiritualists 
(diviners or traditional priests) and herbalists.2 Herbalists, who constitute the 
largest group of traditional healers, approach healing through the use of herbal 
medicine and had knowledge of plants, their roots and leaves and the diseases 
                                                           
2 For more information on this, see Twumasi 1989. 
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they are expected to cure. Traditional birth attendants specialised in pregnancy 
and pregnancy related problems, while faith healers were mainly leaders and 
representatives of sectarian religious movements. Spiritualists included fetish 
priests and priestesses, diviners and ritual leaders. Analytically, faith healers 
operate as a religious movement while spiritualists operate as intermediaries of a 
god or spirit. Healers usually had an attendant who ran errands for them, collected 
herbs and other remedies or assisted the healer in various aspects of the healing 
ritual. 
A disease was the concern of the entire family, which took responsibility and 
supported the person throughout it, both financially and emotionally. In the past, 
if and when a healer decided to treat a patient, the sick person’s kinsfolk would 
appoint one from among their number as the okyigyinafo or supporter or 
representative. This representative discussed the details of the treatment with the 
healer and took responsibility for any fees to be paid or for procuring any supplies 
the healer would require. Of this Busia (1962: 14) notes: 
 
The appointment of such a representative was enjoined by custom. Everyone looked to 
his kinsfolk for support and security; their failure to name an Okyigyinafo would 
amount to disowning the patient. No Akan family would fail a relative in this way, for it 
would be a standing reproach to the family 
 
If the illness was a serious and protracted one, there would be a blood relation 
attending to him as well. If it were a married man, his wife or wives would nurse 
him. Field (1961: 127) has noted in her study of ethno-psychiatry among the 
Akan that the number of clients who sought assistance at shrines of traditional 
healers included “other vicarious supplicants who appeared to be well-disposed 
people, wishing to leave no stone unturned to help a sick parent, uncle, sister, 
husband or wife but not possessing any authority to bring the patient away from 
home”. 
Before the healer prescribed any medicine to the patient, he discussed the 
ntoase or deposit that ought to be paid with the representative. This usually 
consisted of a fowl, alcohol (usually a bottle or half of a bottle of local rum) or 
money. When medicines were handed out, the family representative and 
attendants were given detailed instructions regarding their usage with the 
accompanying taboos and observances. Similarly, when food taboos were 
prescribed, those attending to the patient also observed them, for by eating what 
was forbidden to the patient, they might defile the medicines and so destroy their 
potency. The healers’ fee was sometimes settled after the commencement of the 
treatment. More often, the patient himself or his family promised in advance what 
they would give if the patient got better. A rite of purification, which was 
believed to wash away any ‘uncleanliness’ that may have caused the illness, 
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marked recovery from serious illness. The members of his family also joined that 
ceremony. The peak of the celebration is the presentation of gifts such as eggs, 
money, fowls and other food items, some of which is sent to friends to inform 
them of the recovery and sanctification. 
 
Support during death  
In spite of all efforts to heal a patient, he or she may die. According to an old 
Akan belief, death is a return to the world of the spirits or asaman. Once death 
has occurred, the subsequent funeral rites passed through elaborate phases in 
which the family’s role was outstanding. This involved preparation of the body 
for its journey to the spirit world, mourning before the burial, putting the body 
into the coffin and committing it into the grave (burial), and continued mourning 
after the burial. 
Death was a separation and to those who were closest to the deceased, it was 
a painful one. The sense of loss and the value placed on group solidarity was 
given expression in various phases of the funeral rites. Frantic outbursts of 
wailing publicly announced the death and drew neighbours to the scene to join 
in a stunning pandemonium of wailing and lamentation. Those attending the 
burial also gave drinks, donations of money or cloth, pillows, or mats for 
burying the dead to the bereaved relatives. These gifts were publicly announced 
and shown to all present. Another aspect that indicated that the death of a 
member was the concern of an entire community was symbolised in their 
participation. People stopped their usual activities and joined the mourning in 
spite of the immense cost in time. More importantly, death was a matter of great 
concern to the abusua, such that they would go to great lengths to pay their last 
respects and give a decent burial to their departed. They adorn the body with as 
much jewellery as possible, depending upon the status and economic position 
of the deceased and his close relations.  
Furthermore, before the body was put into a coffin for burial, rites were 
performed at which burial things were presented by close lineage members of 
the deceased. This (called the adesiedeε) may include pieces of cloth, rings, 
sums of money tied in handkerchiefs, mats, pillows and toiletries. While it is 
believed that such paraphernalia are required by the deceased for the journey 
to, and residence in, the land of the dead, and the living are morally obliged to 
provide them, the quality and quantity of the gifts enhanced or diminished the 
social standing of the lineage. During the funeral, the whole community and the 
abusua in particular gather to sympathise with the bereaved and give donations, 
which might be in the form of money or drinks to help with the funeral 
expenses. Arhin (1974: 312) has beautifully captured the entire attention and 
public display by the family as follows:  
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The duty of performing the funeral rites enjoined the family to spare no pains in 
making the performance ‘a memorable event’, so that it could be said that it was well 
attended, εbae, and exciting, εsoe. 
 
To sum up, the enthusiasm and dedication with which funeral rites were 
conceived and carried out depicted an important mechanism of traditional 
social security. The burial gifts and exchange of gifts, drinks and money were 
both obligatory and reciprocal. In the past these were performed with economy 
but varied according to the political rank of the deceased. 
 
Welfare groups support 
As with all human institutions, traditional family support mechanisms based on 
family was not always functional. Accordingly, society evolved other welfare 
or cooperative mechanisms through which the individual obtained or sought 
assistance, as it was needed. These included both small and bigger welfare 
groups such as community and neighbourhood groups. The most common of 
this was the labour partnership system, which the Akan refer to as nnoboa. 
Essentially it was a collective self-help group that may be comprised of age-
mates and friends who assisted each other for a number of days in farming 
activities such as clearing bush, planting or harvesting crops, hunting (referred 
to as atwee), building a house or some marketing venture. At an opportune 
time, the individual who had received help reciprocated the support he received 
from others by offering a similar form of assistance to a group effort. Indeed, 
the nature of the arrangement ensured that the need for money to hire labour 
did not become necessary or problematic. 
Like all indigenous support systems, nnoboa was purely based on reciproc-
ity and a moral obligation to help one another. Tradition imposed a restraining 
influence on members not to default on their honour and obligation. A member 
would lose membership of the group if he did not live up to expectation. Since 
that would mean living outside the society, each member tried to fulfil his 
responsibility in a creditable manner. 
Another old indigenous practice involved the mutual financing assistance 
called Susu by the Akan. As with nnoboa or ROSCAs (rotating credit savings 
and credit associations or tontines in francophone Africa) it is an arrangement 
by which a limited number of people, friends or professionals, contribute money 
daily, weekly or monthly for the use of one of the group members. Each member 
of the group is entitled in turn to the entire collection of the week or month. In 
areas where Susu are popular, someone collects the money everyday or weekly, 
depending on the agreement the members had entered into with the collector. 
Money was paid out to members less a day’s savings, which was considered an 
allowance for the person who collects the money daily.  
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Present-day changes in the traditional system of social security 
 
In the course of time, changes have occurred. In present times the traditional 
social security system has been limited in several respects by the socio-
economic transformations of society. Evidence of this change is very visible in 
the way and magnitude the system provides its traditional social support 
functions both within the family and welfare groups. 
 
Aged support at present 
Although most Ghanaians would want to believe that their family ties are still 
very strong and doubt that there are citizens without a home to go to, the 
neglect of parents by their children is becoming common. As far back as the 
mid 1960s annual hospital services reports in Ghana raised concerns over the 
number of old people (aged between 60 and 90 years) who had difficulty in 
going home after they had been discharged. This was because their relatives 
were reluctant to take home an aged patient who condition had not much 
improved or was not going to improve in health. Even in rural district capitals 
like Nkoranza, a pastor of a local church indicated that “for some old people, 
what to put on is a problem and what to eat is a problem”. A typical case is the 
story of an 80-year-old woman, which was narrated to me. It was indicated that 
although all her children were living outside the town and she was surrounded 
by several of her grandchildren, she was being fed by church members who 
lived near her. Some opinions in the community suggested that “some people 
felt there is no need bothering about those who are already old and getting near 
to their graves”. Other writers have also noted the situation of the aged in 
present day Ghanaian society. Some have reported increasing abandonment or 
“dumping” of old sick relatives in hospitals due to difficult home situations 
(Apt 1975: 178). Others have also noted that the loneliness, marginalisation, the 
dire poverty and lack of adequate help that the elderly suffer in rural communi-
ties. The situation is partly attributed to reciprocity and sometimes “blaming the 
elderly for having neglected their children when they were young” (Van der 
Geest 1997: 24). 
 
Help in sickness at present 
A critical examination of the traditional support system also reveals a similar 
stressful situation concerning sickness in present times. Indeed the role of the 
family in providing emotional support during illness is still quite prevalent, but 
nowadays where the support involves herbal treatment, members with knowl-
edge of particular remedies may provide this only if it means getting them free 
or at very minimal cost. For most treatments that require hospitalisation or high 
cost, the trend is that responsibility for health care has shifted more and more 
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towards the nuclear family. In exceptional cases, some individual members of 
the family (if they have the means), would assume the responsibility for the 
cure of sick relatives. But in general the help that one receives from family 
members has predominantly become “merely visiting the person at his or her 
sick bed or in the hospital” (fa w’ani khwε no w baabi a da w  
ayaresabea). The following contribution of a participant in a male focus group 
discussion in Suhum clearly summarised the present day scenario regarding 
family help towards sickness as was commonly described to me in most 
conversations. 
 
The way the family used to help its members through nephews and uncles, as was the 
case in the past, has changed. In modern times what is happening is that help in the 
family when it is needed is offered within the nuclear family. I can testify with my 
own experience. My father fell ill but the family looked up to me as the son to look 
after him. I actually struggled financially and took him to several places until my 
resources ran out. In fact it was only when my father died that the family came in to 
help. 
 
In summary, the section of the family that nowadays carry the tangible respon-
sibility of a member is typically the immediate family members.  
 
Help during death 
Although the essential aspects of funerals are still carried out, much has 
changed in present times to what they used to be. At present, the responsibility 
for organising funeral is increasingly falling on the immediate family members. 
However, contrary to the situation with old age and sickness, extravagant 
funerals have become more fashionable among Ghanaians in general and the 
Akan in particular, with expenditure having in most cases no relation to the 
deceased’s estate. During a male FGD session at Dawa in the Dangme West 
district, a participant emphasised this point as follows: 
 
In the olden days it was not so expensive to organise funerals. Now, in times of 
bereavement, a lot of debt is incurred. Now, when there is a funeral unlike the past 
when they used just the cultural groups that were available locally, they go in for 
bands men and spinners, which are very expensive. Others expenditures involve 
refreshments, ‘take-aways’ [packed meals] and a whole lot of things. These things 
add up to make the cost of funerals very high these days.  
 
The items that require the most expenditure nowadays include mortuary 
charges (because people keep the body of the deceased for longer periods), 
invitation cards, and advertisements on radio, newspapers and public places, 
with details of all the close relatives of the deceased at home and abroad. Of 
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course these serve the purpose of emphasising the social status of the deceased 
and informing the world at large of the programme, and at the same time 
inviting them to support the family in kind and cash. To obtain the money to 
undertake these activities, families now go to the extent of obtaining a loan 
from a bank or individuals to cover the cost of the funeral. Significantly, 
funerals add an interesting dimension to the operations of rural banks in Ghana. 
They are the only insecure situation that they grant families loans to undertake, 
which seems to suggest the notion that funerals are, after all, viable activities 
worthy of loans. The expenditure is later defrayed through the nsawa, donations 
that sympathisers provide based on reciprocity. A person’s contributions at 
other people’s death will determine how much he or she gets when he or she is 
bereaved. It may also depend on the social status and prestige in society of the 
person who is contributing. In some communities, there is a fixed sum that 
every adult ought to pay at the death of a resident of a town, but the tendency is 
for people to exceed that in expectation of reciprocity. Indeed, in Nkoranza 
district, attempts to keep the amount small were flouted and have become 
unenforceable. Receipts are given when donations are made and individuals 
and families faithfully keep records in a notebook for reference purposes. The 
system ensures that those who do not contribute to other people’s funeral 
expenses do not get any donations when they are bereaved. 
 
Welfare groups nowadays 
The striking thing about the origin and/or major function of most existing help 
and welfare groups in several Ghanaian communities is the importance of the 
provision of mutual aid during the death of a family member or an immediate 
relative of a member. My interactions with leaders of some of these community 
groups indicated that quite a number actually came into being through circum-
stances related to death; some become dormant for most of the time and are 
resuscitated only when a member dies. The composition or membership criteria 
are diverse and include ethnic origin, common town, village or community, 
tribal occupation and age groups. Significantly, most of them have written rules 
and regulations and their main objectives include fostering unity among its 
members; but in practice, funeral benefits take precedence over all of their 
other activities. Monetary assistance other than help during funerals is 
strikingly rare. They usually have a funeral sub-committee that sees to the 
organisation of funerals in the group. Sickness benefit, on the other hand, is 
often handled in footnotes and the typical pattern is a token support from the 
group or what members provide individually from their own free will when 
they visit the sick.  
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During my conversations with leaders of some of these organisations, one 
reason given for the undue attention placed on death was the emotional senti-
ments attached to it and its public dimensions. 
 
Help during death is the foundation of our group. Our culture places more emphasis 
on death or funerals and you see this in the number of visitors one receives when 
someone is dead compared to when the person was sick. The essence is to help the 
person overcome the pain and grief and, since it is a public affair, to assist him/her 
entertain the visitors who would attend the funeral. If we start providing assistance 
for other things like sickness then we would have to increase the dues. That would be 
difficult for us because it means that people would turn to the group when they have 
any difficulty, some genuine, some not. Death, however, comes unexpectedly and 
there is no argument about it when it happens. Financially, many people experience 
difficulty. When that happens and you receive support, it strengthens you to meet the 
burden and that is why funerals are the centre of our activities. That does not mean 
that we are placing emphasis on death. It is part of our history.  
 
To date, Susu groups are quite common but their primary function involves 
savings and/or rotating credit financing for its members. 
Based on the foregoing information, it seems the current pattern regarding 
traditional social security support in Ghana appears to be that while the help 
offered by the extended family is increasingly diminishing, one thing that the 
family never ignores is death. The issue becomes more interesting considering 
that more is spent on funerals with each successive one. People commonly refer 
to this as “cultural and part of our history” but why an aspect of a culture that 
seemingly serves a similar end is disintegrating (care for the aging) while an 
aspect of it is gaining strength (expenditure on funerals) is a problem of great 
social scientific importance. It appears that the return in investment from 
funeral expenditure through donations and the social prestige from extravagant 
public display are factors that have strengthened the social patronage and 
support of funerals as compared to support during sickness and old age. The 
remaining section takes a look at the factors that have contributed to the general 
disintegration of traditional support mechanism nowadays. 
 
 
Appraisal of traditional support in historical perspective 
 
Without asserting that traditional social security arrangements were perfect 
ways of supporting one another, they were nevertheless relatively effective 
ways of assisting members in the society. However, there is a tendency to 
romanticise the effectiveness of the old system when it is being discussed 
relative to the situation at present. Thus in reference to its moral obligatory role 
 
 89
of supporting its members, it is common for people to describe the family 
symbolically not only as effective and very good, but as loving (onuad) and 
compassionate (te-ma) in the past, but nowadays selfish (pεsεmenkomenya) and 
wicked (atrimoden). The view of a participant in a female FGD at Dodowa 
captures this sentiment: 
 
In the past there was brotherly love and as a result when your child or sister’s child is 
sick, others in the family did not mind looking after the person but now they pretend 
they have not seen what is going on. The only help they may give you is to ask 
whether you have taken the sick person to hospital. In the past however, the entire 
family felt responsible. There is no brotherly/sisterly love (onua d).  
 
Another participant at the same discussion group reinforced the point with the 
following observation: 
 
The love we are talking about was such that when someone bought a piece of land to 
build a house and another brother also later decided to do a similar thing, the former 
would encourage the latter to build the house next to his on the same plot. But nowa-
days people put up bungalows for only their wives and children and they fence it and 
put a dog there to protect their property and separate themselves from the rest of the 
family. The underlying reason is that, nowadays, people look after their personal 
interests. There is no love. People have become “too wise” and selfish and that is 
what has led to the present situation. 
 
Although a family’s generosity might have been much better, in terms of the 
solidarity and its capacity and ability to help, it is an overstatement to assume 
that society in the past was much more generously gratuitous in the manner in 
which it dished out support to those who needed it than what it is now. My 
findings from the field indicate that within traditional memory the magnitude 
and quality of traditional support is commonly romanticized when people 
compare it to the past.  
As one opinion leader at Nkoranza, who has been effectively involved in the 
scheme from the beginning told me, past support usually originated from the 
nuclear unit of the family of the sick person. Accordingly he disagreed with the 
view that the extended family always had a ready-made solution to people’s 
problems:  
 
It’s never true. If they were helping, I think it would not be difficult for them to help 
in the insurance if somebody could not pay the premium. When there was a problem 
in the family, the solution started from the tso tso mu tso, the inner circle (but more 
appropriately the nuclear family), which comprises the father, mother and children. 
Then it moved to uncles and nephews and grandchildren. So when there was a 
problem, the family looked up first and foremost to the immediate family. When the 
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immediate family could not provide the support alone then they turned to other 
members of the family till it got to the head of the family. It sometimes even went 
beyond the abusuapanyin (family head) to the chief of the town. In all this, one thing 
that the family never ignored was death. 
 
In effect, it can be said that in the past, it was only if and when the resources of 
the nuclear family were not enough to meet the problem at hand that the family 
head or the extended family members were approached for assistance. What the 
head of the family would do under such circumstances would be to convene a 
family meeting of elders to solicit their support. The effectiveness of the family 
in providing support at any given situation and at any given time depended on 
the resources of the family, the status of the person in the family and above all, 
the type of contingency. Sometimes the presence of ‘resourceful’ and ‘kind’ 
individuals in the family was very helpful in many respects.  
Again, when people commonly speak about traditional support in the past 
they say nothing or at least very little about its exclusions and checks and 
balances that ensured that the family was not helped in every case. People who 
were perceived as not conducting themselves well were denied support. Those 
who engaged in sanctioned behaviour such as adultery, murder or stealing, fro 
example, did not receive help but those who suffered from ‘natural ailments’ 
like leprosy did receive help. A contributor at a male FGD at Nkoranza 
explained it as follows:  
 
They (meaning the family) were selective. For example, the society abhorred taking 
or going after other people’s wives and those who ventured into such a thing were 
usually warned. If they did not heed the warning and they contracted any disease 
from the relationship they were not helped. But where the illness involved an 
accident or some natural communicable disease unrelated to any social offence, the 
family was quite supportive. For example, the family was supportive when a member 
was affected by leprosy. They would go to every extent to find a cure for the victim. 
 
Reciprocity was also very important in that system of support. Another partici-
pant in the same male FGD group gave his view: 
 
Before the family provided help, they considered what the person has offered to the 
family in the past. If he was someone capable but who did not provide any assistance 
to the family himself, they may also not help him. As the saying goes, one only reaps 
where one has sown. It is when you cast your bread upon the waters that it multi-
plies. I know someone who was rich in the past but because he neither respected the 
family nor offered any help to the family in the past, the family also refused to help 
him when he fell ill and needed help. It was only when he died that the family buried 
him.  
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In the opinion of a health staff member at Dodowa, the family’s attitude 
towards health care has always been inadequate relative to that towards 
funerals: 
 
Since time immemorial what and how I have known it is that we support funerals 
more than death. Only a few people provide assistance when a relative is sick. It is 
considered that people are capable of making all the money when they are healthy 
and alive so when they become ill they are not helped.  
 
As a last resort, when the needed money was not available, family property 
such as a cocoa farm or land might be offered as a guarantee for a loan to 
finance the funeral. The property was not sold but merely used as a collateral 
for a loan. In extreme cases, however, such property may be sold outright. 
Indeed in older times, if the family did not have property, human beings were 
sometimes used as collateral security (awowa) to work for the creditor for a 
period of time agreed upon to defray the cost.  
From a rational perspective, two hypotheses support the greater assistance 
funerals attract relative to that which sickness and aging attract. One of these 
relates to the asymmetry of information in relation to the two. Whereas feeling 
unwell is deductively non-objective or relative to the person reporting the 
condition, when death happens, it is an objective, undisputed phenomenon. 
Secondly, except in situations of disasters, the incidence of sickness is 
statistically and phenomenally more common, so there is a tendency for people 
to take it for granted or feel too taxed to commit their resources to it unless it 
involves people closely related to them. 
On the basis of the forgoing it is possible to give a few general characteris-
tics of traditional Ghanaian social support: 
 
It was organised on a family basis and operated within the extended family. 
Members of the extended family considered themselves as ‘one people’ because 
they traced their origin to a common unknown ancestor. 
The extended family members are enjoined by a strong feeling of solidarity. 
Being essentially a ‘solidarity group’, there was a shared feeling and conse-
quently a moral obligation to help one another for their common good.  
Help was offered during stressful situations such as funerals, sickness and old 
age, but also during secure and happy occasions such as the naming ceremonies 
of children and marriage. Help was also offered for future security in terms of 
education and trading (setting up a business). 
The organisation of help or assistance is based on values and governed by norms 
imposed by tradition that the entire group respects. 
Such values and norms were validated by magico-religious beliefs and practices; it 
was believed that the ancestors punished those who violated them. 
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Help, when it was needed, originated from the nuclear unit of the extended 
family. 
Typically, it was the head of family, abusuapanyin, who was ideally responsible 
for making sure that help was organised and provided when it was needed. 
Help or support was however not automatic. Exceptions were made when the 
situation involved a person who had engaged in a socially sanctioned or deviant 
behaviour such as sexual offence or stealing.  
Provision of support at any given time depended on resources of the family and 
the “standing” of the person in the family. 
 
Context of socio economic changes 
In spite of the romanticism that is commonly associated with traditional support 
mechanisms, their effectiveness nowadays seems to be diminishing. In order to 
appreciate this near disintegration however, it is important to place the changes 
within their proper historical perspective. My view is that to a great extent the 
present day ineffectiveness is attributable to social changes, which have led to 
the adoption of new values. It is deducible from statements of ordinary people 
that the family nowadays has sacrificed its unity of purpose for ‘personal 
interest’. Logically that seems plausible, considering the emphasis that people 
now place on themselves and their individual interests. What is happening must 
be understood in terms of the fact that people are merely behaving rationally by 
placing their prime sense of moral obligation where they can best optimise their 
socio economic needs.  
Compared to the present, family solidarity was strong in the past because at 
that time members in a given social system needed one another for their 
economic survival. The important unit of that solidarity support mechanism 
was the extended family because of the need for interdependence in the system. 
The need for one another also guaranteed a strong bond of love and unity which 
in consequence morally enjoined members to help or assist one another when 
the need arose. Each person became one another’s keeper. That kinship or 
extended family unity was also facilitated by the close pattern of settlements 
and living arrangements. Support, when it was needed, was therefore easier to 
find in the past since the close living arrangements ensured that other family 
members were already aware of what was happening without necessarily 
having to be informed. 
The most important precondition for the functioning of that economic unit 
and its survival in the traditional subsistence economy, land, was readily 
available. That land belonged to the entire family, and ownership was vested in 
the family head. Such land for farming or other economic activities was virtu-
ally free when it was needed. Family members who needed a piece of land for 
farming or any other economic activity had to approach the head of the family 
to make their request. All things being well, such requests were honoured. 
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Indeed within the framework of the prevailing arrangements regarding family 
lands and property such as cocoa farms, individual members had no individual 
rights to the resources except with the consent of the family head and elders. 
When situations demanded it, the family could negotiate some of its assets or 
property as collateral or sell them outright in order to help provide assistance 
for a member in a stressful situation. As I have already indicated, family 
members were sometimes even used as sureties to redeem the problems of 
others.  
However in the course of time, population increases led to increased 
pressure on land resources. Excessive use caused the depletion of the economic 
viability of the land, due to the continued dependence on the indigenous means 
of cultivation. This has been in spite of the fact that people have adopted 
modern ways of living in other areas of social life. Growing individualism also 
created division of family lands and an era of sale to private hands began. More 
people also meant scarcity of the limited land and less economic opportunities 
at home. It did not take long for some of the active population to look for 
favourable opportunities for existence elsewhere. Land therefore virtually lost 
its importance as the main source of sustainable economic activity on which 
most families depended for total economic and social security. With this 
change, the family’s position as an effective traditional social security mecha-
nism dwindled in importance. 
Closely related to land ownership and acquisition is the issue of inheritance 
systems and succession to property and positions in the traditional kinship 
system. This was primarily based on family decent and was well accepted, 
respected and followed. In the old system, there was no discrimination. (Saa 
bre no, εye a na nyiyi mu nni mu.) In the Akan matrilineal system for example, 
nephews (sisters’-sons) inherited their uncles’ (mothers’ brothers) property. 
The inheritance system and the existence of family property therefore ensured 
that family assets and privileges were maintained within the extended family. In 
effect, that bolstered family solidarity. At present, however inheritance has 
shifted in favour of children. State legislation on interstate succession has 
shifted succession to spouse and children, that is, the nuclear family, as 
opposed to the extended family.  
The unique characteristic of traditional political authority in Ghanaian 
society was its sacred origin and basic commitment to the past. What was 
legitimate and the best way to act in society was conceived as “the way our 
fathers have ordained” (Apter 1972: 83). Accordingly, anything that threatened 
the sacred sources threatened the continuity and legitimacy of traditional 
authority. Nowadays, modernisation and education and new faiths such as 
Christianity have provided people with values outside the traditional organisa-
tion of society. For example, education has now replaced the knowledge that 
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the elderly provided and, together with money, offered new ways of defining 
the acquisition of social status. Indeed, many elderly people in present times 
would be quick to complain that the youth are no longer ready to listen to them 
and take their advice. They refuse to take part in certain traditional practices 
and rituals. Interestingly, although Christianity is supposed to have inculcated 
into society the principles of love, compassion and sharing, many adherents 
tend to pay only lip service to such values. One participant in a female focus 
group discussion in Dodowa explained the moral context of this ambiguity to 
me as follows: 
 
Yes, our forefather’s worshipped gods but they also cared for one another more than 
the present generation. We now worship and make a lot of noise about God but we 
do not practice love for one another. Rather we love money more than our fellow 
human beings. 
 
On the other hand, Christian values have also equipped society to defy ancestral 
beliefs on which respect for the aged in the past thrived. A consequence of this 
change is the weakened traditional belief in the sanctions meted out by super-
natural agencies such as the ancestors and the gods, against those who violated 
the norms of society.  
Furthermore, a sine qua non of the seemingly weakened traditional support 
at present is the modern economic order which has put money at the centre 
stage of survival and the reality that cost of living has become very high and 
difficult for many ordinary people to obtain. More than ever before, people 
need and use money to do almost everything rather than family members or 
family lands. That makes it seem as if people in the family now love money 
than their own kin relations which some informants perceive and describe as 
“fetish love for money” (wdo sika kyεn wnho). This contrasts with the 
situation in the past where there was limited need and use of money. As one 
traditional ruler explained:  
 
Those days, there was nothing like sending someone to the hospital to see the doctor, 
but there was a way to help them against diseases. They were helping each other by 
way of communal labour, keeping their environments clean and free of disease. In 
times of sickness, they used their herbal medicine and the family helped one another 
in this aspect. At times, we3 asked for sheep and fowl to be used to treat the person. 
In the end if the person recovered, we paid the one who provided the things either in 
cash or kind. The help we are talking about was our own manpower and not money. 
Nowadays money is the problem. 
 
                                                           
3 The speaker here uses “we” to emphasise what was traditional or “our culture”. 
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Money is the problem. Due to the difficult economic conditions people have 
become thrifty and are selective about those they spend  on. As most informants 
describe it, it is as if there is no onuad ne tema (love and compassion) in the 
family anymore or the family has become ‘too wise’ or ‘too civilised’ (anibue) 
or selfish (pεsεmenkomeya).  
Together, these factors have de-emphasised the principles of solidarity and 
reciprocity that were so important for survival in the past and the social logic 
upon which the traditional system was based. From a social analytical point of 
view, the present changes can be situated within the general idea in develop-
ment literature that as society develops from a traditional society toward a more 
modern economy, extended families develop towards nuclear families (Murray 
1981; UN 1986). When that happens, there is less need for interdependence 
because there is no need to rely on land as the economic backbone of the 
society. Indeed the creation of new economic opportunities and new forms of 
social stratification and reward systems other than those based on kinship have 
provided alternatives that have enabled people to gain a livelihood outside the 
traditional system. That does not presuppose that people have lost their sense of 
moral obligation; but in the context of such social changes, the fulfilment of 
those social obligations is likely to be placed where the individual’s, rather than 
the groups’ self-interest are optimised. 
One of the key themes of the official propaganda for the implementation 
plans of health insurance in Ghana is that Ghanaian social and cultural system 
has a built in social insurance system through the extended family system 
whereby family members have collective responsibility for the welfare of 
members of the family.  
The discussion so far, suggests a very important dilemma to the Ghana 
programme. How can the disintegrating system of traditional social support 
mechanisms serve as a social foundation or even facilitate a new system of 
social insurance involving a more heterogeneous membership? Although 
indigenous mutual aid systems exist, they tend to have a strong focus on the 
dead rather than the living. That partly explains why the organisation of 
funerals on the basis of traditional principles still commands a lot of support in 
Ghanaian society. The important question to address is: How Ghana can then 
transform some of the principles of funeral organisations into a sickness 
support risk sharing mechanism. What are the opportunities for grafting the 
scale of solidarity in the organisation of funerals into health insurance activi-
ties? These are issues that subsequent chapters will help to unravel on the basis 
of data from the field. 
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Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the question of how consumers or potential subscribers, 
the people for whom insurance is planned, perceive health insurance in the 
context of their particular socio-economic and socio-cultural circumstances. 
Specifically, the chapter attempts to tease out popular perceptions that “the 
people” hold about social or mutual health insurance and how those affect or 
could affect their attitudes and behaviour in the scheme. An insight into what 
health insurance means to those it is planned for in relation to how the planners 
conceptualised it is essential for determining potential areas of difficulty and 
misunderstanding and strategies for minimising, avoiding or rectifying those 
problems.  
 The presentation is organised in two main parts. In order to put the discus-
sion in its proper analytical framework, the first part begins with policy and the 
implementers’ perspectives followed by lay or popular notions or perceptions of 
the people, both positive and negative, about health insurance. This will set the 
scene for the second part which analyses how both policy implementers and the 
people who would be affected by said policies perceive relationships between 
health insurance and traditional family support mechanisms in order to identify 
generalisations that explain those relationships.  
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Perceptions about health insurance 
 
Policy perspectives  
Although the idea to implement health insurance was conceived in the mid-
nineteen eighties, an official policy framework is still being developed. There is 
therefore no published official policy document on health insurance in Ghana as 
of yet. Nevertheless, several research efforts on health insurance have been 
carried out and documented including background papers, feasibility studies 
and reports, and several official and ministerial statements. Some of these have 
been on political platforms that underscore the Ghanaian government’s belief in 
health insurance as a preferred alternative to the existing fee for service regime, 
which is popularly dubbed a “cash and carry” system.  
This official policy commitment to health insurance is motivated by 
concerns that many Ghanaians, particularly people in the large informal rural 
sector where incomes are marginal and occupations are seasonal, are not able to 
access health care when they need it because of problems with cash. Policy 
makers therefore perceive health insurance as a potentially efficient health care 
option that will make health care delivery more accessible to the people of 
Ghana. The potential efficiency of health insurance is derived from the 
principles of prepayment and risk sharing that underlies it. A solidarity based 
prepayment scheme is thought to be able to bring together the resources of 
several poor people who are individually unable to afford it, but can share the 
cost of health care when one of them needs it. A second main short-term goal of 
the policy is to use insurance to mobilise funds from communities to improve 
health care delivery in the country (Assenso-Okyereh et al. 1997; Arhin 1995; 
Addo et al. 1995). 
The government’s original key health insurance policy plan, as adopted by 
the Ministry of Health and based on the recommendations of feasibility studies, 
was to set up a centralized or generic national health insurance for the entire 
country under a statutory body with the responsibility for the development and 
operation of the following: 
 
i. A mainstream Social Health Insurance Scheme whose membership is compul-
sory for (a) all contributors to the Social Security and National Insurance Trust 
(SSNIT) and (b) all registered cocoa farmers; 
ii. A family of rural-based community-financed schemes meant to ultimately cover 
all members of the rural community. Membership would be voluntary. This can 
be developed on a pilot basis; and to serve as a catalyst for the creation of an 
enabling environment; 
iii. Profit or non-profit private schemes for the urban self-employed. Membership 
will be voluntary. 
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The first efforts to give meaning to the above led to the initiation of the pilot 
NHIS in the Eastern region by the then government of the National Democratic 
Congress (NDC). 
Significantly, however, at the time of my fieldwork in 2000, the official 
policy framework had shifted from the idea of centralised national health 
insurance scheme to multi-scheme systems. The new government of the New 
Patriotic Party (NPP) that came into power in January 2001 also had health 
insurance strongly enshrined in its party manifesto and was very determined to 
get rid of the existing “cash and carry system” and replace it with health 
insurance. Surprisingly, however, the period during which this shift in policy 
thinking occurred, pre-dated the new government that assumed political power 
in January 2001, as I discovered during my fieldwork.  
Dr. E.K. Adibo was the immediate past Deputy Minister of Health in the 
previous NDC government and also a former Director of Medical Services. He 
was also one of the instrumental proponents of the health insurance concept in 
Ghana. When I sought an opportunity to have a conversation about health 
insurance with him, he promptly agreed. We met during one Friday afternoon in 
an office within the Ministry of Health, which incidentally happened to be very 
familiar to the two of us. At the time I spoke to him, the reasons for the official 
shift in policy from generic to multi-schemes were common knowledge, but 
what he said about the timing of the conceptualisation of the multi-scheme idea 
within the ministry came as a surprise to me. In his words, “From the very 
outset the policy of the ministry was that multi-schemes should be encouraged 
and that the ministry would work with communities to establish community 
based schemes”. In spite of this, when the ministry decided to pilot a scheme for 
the informal sector, it chose a centralised approach and as he himself described 
it, “The whole experiment became a fiasco”. This subject, which is more related 
to the role of the nation state in health insurance, belongs to another chapter, 
and is discussed in Chapter 8. 
The Brong Ahafo region of Ghana is the pace setter in community health 
financing scheme in the country because of the Nkoranza experience. Although 
Nkoranza itself is a mission facility and therefore administered as a non-
governmental scheme, it had had a demonstrable effect on ideas and policy 
thinking regarding health insurance at the regional health administration. At the 
time of my first fieldwork in the latter part of 1999, the regional director of 
health services had assembled a regional health insurance team whose 
objectives were to study and encourage the formation of insurance schemes in 
all the districts in the region. I actually got the opportunity to sit in one of their 
meetings. It became very obvious to me that the Regional Director of Health 
Services, who was the ministry’s highest ranking policy person at that level, had 
become a committed apostle of community health insurance.  
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During my second phase of fieldwork in Nkoranza, I arranged a formal 
interview with him, but when I made the two-hour or so long journey to 
Sunyani on the appointed day and time, he was not in his office. Tracking him 
was frustrating, especially in the midst of a gathering rainstorm in an unfamiliar 
territory; but when I did locate him on his mobile phone, I was not disap-
pointed. He had travelled to another district under his administration to join 
district MoH officials and various stakeholders in that community to dialogue 
on community health insurance scheme that was in its final preparatory stage. 
During our conversation, I asked him about reasons behind the “shift” (so to 
speak) in policy by the ministry to multi-schemes in the policy of the ministry. 
His response was: 
 
Experiences with the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) and 
such other big bodies do not encourage us to go for a universal national scheme. My 
belief is in community and small schemes, which can later on be amalgamated when 
they are properly set up. The reason is that the population under formal employment 
is about 23% and that may be the only group that can meaningfully make their 
monthly contribution. When we go that way, we leave out those who are most 
vulnerable to sickness and do not have the financial access. And once we start a 
national scheme it will be very difficult to organise these informal sectors and 
villages that are the most disadvantaged.  
 
In summary, the policy conception of the MoH regarding health insurance in 
Ghana is driven by the assumption that a prepayment health insurance scheme 
appears to be a better and more humane option of health care financing, 
particularly for the vast numbers of rural poor. There is also an assumption that 
implicit demand for it exists as some economic feasibility studies suggest. For 
example, Asenso-Okyere et al. (1997: 236), in a pilot study of the willingness to 
pay for health insurance in the informal sector of Ghana covering three districts 
in the Eastern Region and using contingent valuation reported that an over-
whelming 98.7% of respondents were prepared to participate in the scheme 
while 63.6% were willing to contribute 5000 cedis ($3.03) a month for a house-
hold of five persons. Prior to that, Arhin also reported in a feasibility study of 
rural schemes in Dangme West based on contingent valuations that 98% of 
household heads were willing to pay a premium to obtain health insurance 
coverage for all persons in their households (Arhin 1995: 104-105). These 
views are central issues of discussion in later sections of this chapter. 
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Implementers’ perceptions 
 
Implementers are the group of officials who are responsible for implementing 
desired policies. This gives them a very unique position. Among other factors, 
both technical and social, their perception of issues and principles have a 
bearing on their motivations and ability to bring about the expected policy 
change. I therefore had a series of interviews and conversations with a cross 
section of health implementers in the various districts that I visited to ascertain 
how they also perceive health insurance within the framework of the official 
policy perspective. The general view conveyed to me indicated that virtually 
every health staff has a strong sense of attachment and responsibility towards 
health insurance. Consistent with the policy ideals, implementers perceived 
health insurance as the potential alternative solution to the problem of financial 
access to health care for the rural poor. In Suhum for example, the Principal 
Nursing Officer in charge of nursing administration conveyed this view to me: 
 
I think it would be of great help to all of us because at times when patients come 
here they encounter so many problems. I feel insurance is a laudable idea. People 
who come on admission sometimes claim that their relatives have gone home to 
bring money to pay their bills and medical cost. But those relatives never come back 
to pay the bills. The reality is that they do not have the money to pay. Sometimes we 
have five to six patients in the wards who cannot afford paying the bills. On some 
occasions we even have to follow them to their homes. All this makes the work 
difficult and it does not give a good impression about the institution of health care. It 
looks as if we are not considerate but that is not the case. And it also causes delay in 
the sense that chasing them takes some of the time away from nursing care.  
 
The potential benefits of community schemes to both service provision and 
community, as put across in the above is well demonstrated in Nkoranza. The 
district director of health services who also practiced as a clinician at the 
Nkoranza hospital endorsed the view to me during a conversation. 
  
It has made a lot of difference to the service and the community. To us, the service 
providers, it has offered an easier way of getting paid for the service because it 
assures us that the returns are already available so it makes it possible for the service 
run smoothly. The people also benefit a lot in the sense that when they are sick, they 
do not have to look for money to pay for the service. Subscribers can just walk in 
and get the service they need without bothering about how to pay for it. 
 
In Dodowa the health implementers I spoke to were also supportive of 
insurance because of what one female nursing officer aptly described as ‘money 
famine and people’s inability to pay for health care’. But there were deep-seated 
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concerns about the attitudes people are likely to develop towards insurance. The 
medical assistant of the Dodowa health centre expressed his views in the 
following comment when I spoke with him: 
 
I think there should be something like this. We know that eventually it is going to 
assist them. Even today somebody came to me with a child and she was to pay only 
2,000 cedis for the service. She went up and came down to say that he cannot afford 
it and the child was suffering. So she asked me if I could help in any way and the 
only thing I could do was to pull out 2,000 cedis from my pocket for her to pay. The 
situation is a bit complicated. If there is no emergency people feel they are healthy 
so they spend their monies on other things. Yet the same people are saying that the 
insurance is good. The future means very little to them. Some may also say what 
will be the outcome if I deposit 50,000 cedis for my family and I do not fall ill the 
whole year? Eventually they may be having negative thoughts and this is the area I 
know our policy would run into difficulty.  
 
In summary, most health implementers were also quite enthusiastic about the 
potential benefits of community health insurance to enhance access and 
improve service provision. Many were also pessimistic about the centralised 
approach the ministry of health originally planned to implement a nationwide 
insurance scheme as well as the decision to start from the informal sector. In 
Suhum the District Director of Health Services observed the following in 
relation to this pessimism: 
 
Well, in my opinion, the idea to start from the informal sector is wrong because 
most of these people are not organised. They have some form of arrangements like 
clubs and they contribute money weekly. When somebody dies they help the family, 
but I do not think that is what they want to do. Look at the poor farmer. If you ask 
him to pay some money every month it’s going to be a problem because he doesn’t 
see himself as likely to fall ill. We even hear such things from our staff here some-
times. I think they should rather start from the formal sector because they are 
already organised, and we can learn from that experience and then move to the 
informal sector. 
 
Certainly there are several concerns about community health that are related to 
the context of their implementation. Before I venture into any discussion how-
ever, I will first examine how the people also perceive health insurance.  
 
 
Community perceptions 
 
Lay or popular notions, both positive and negative about health insurance are 
highly pervasive in all studied communities but prevailing ideas vary in 
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accuracy and detail in relation to the level of contact communities have had 
with health insurance initiatives. Basically, people conceive health insurance as 
an arrangement in which they contribute towards sickness in advance, some-
thing similar to vehicle insurance. In general, however, popular notions and 
reception to health insurance are shaped and coloured by several identifiable 
social factors or patterns which include: 
 
Ideas floating around about other forms of insurance such as vehicle accident 
and fire insurance; 
Past experiences with local credit and mutual schemes; 
Perceived level of credibility and confidence in ownership of health 
scheme/proposed initiative; 
Prevailing quality of health care services/care provided at the facility; 
General economic hardships and level of poverty in society; 
Distressed traditional social support mechanism in Ghanaian society; and 
Expectations and nuances about community initiatives based on past experience. 
 
I now examine these patterns in detail as people relate to them in day-to-day 
conversations. 
Prevailing ideas about conventional insurance feed into how people perceive 
and/or what they expect from community social health insurance. Perceptions in 
general tend to be positive or negative depending upon the nature or experience 
people have had with insurance. Commonly, however, what stands out is that 
most informants appreciate community health insurance on the basis of its 
potential to solve their financial problems when they need health care. A 
seventy-year-old opinion leader and the owner of a successful retail pharmacy 
at Suhum captured this positive image and people’s common expectations of 
health insurance as follows: 
 
It is good because not all people are financially sound; they cannot make ends meet 
[expressed figuratively as wn nsa nhyia wn ho]. Some cannot even pay ¢2000 
and others run away from the hospital when they are admitted. Insurance will take 
care of them. 
 
Positive perceptions 
Economic difficulties and the ever-increasing cost of medical care are funda-
mental reasons why people are favourably disposed to an initiative that 
promises to take away the burden of medical care cost. In the practical case of 
Nkoranza, where the community had had experience with a community scheme 
for nearly a decade, the perception of the overwhelming number of them 
focussed on the idea that insurance has made health care accessible to the 
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otherwise financially poor in the community. A female FGD participant at 
Dodowa had this to say: 
 
What we like so much about it is that when you are a member and you are admitted, 
it pays for all your medications. Even when the drugs prescribed for you are not 
available, the insurance reimburses you the cost for prescribed drugs that you 
purchase from other pharmacy/drug stores. 
 
In most focus group discussions, participants enthusiastically conveyed the 
view that possessing an insurance card (as the community commonly referred to 
it) provides both financial and psychological benefits to the holder. The 
following set of comments at a discussion involving six male subscribers from 
Nkoranza who were aged between 43 and 72 years typifies the observation. In 
particular, they stressed that psychologically, it reduces the anxiety people have 
about being sick and how to deal with the sick role. 
 
Since I joined the scheme from its inception, I have never fallen ill. I have used the 
seven thousand to buy off my illness. Mentally, our health is better than the non-
insured because we are not afraid to go the hospital. A 43-year-old farmer and sawn 
miller from Nkoranza, with six years basic primary education, married with five 
children and a Christian. 
 
If you are a member, even if you fall ill you are still mentally sound unlike the one 
who has no insurance. When the non-insured is admitted, he is worried about the 
cost of the drugs and the money to pay for the number of days he is kept there. But if 
you are insured, you are not bothered about these things. Even if you are admitted 
for two months you are a happy person despite being sick. A 53-year-old farmer 
with 10 years of elementary education, married with seven children and a Christian.  
Anyone who has insurance does not think about when he is going to fall ill. As soon 
as you begin to get symptoms of illness you are eager to go to hospital because you 
know that when the sickness becomes serious there is no financial problem. You 
report early and the sickness does not get out of hand so you maintain good health. A 
45-year-old professional teacher, married with 3 children and a Christian.  
 
When you are insured, sickness avoids you and has no power over you. So gentle-
man, the insurance is a very good thing. The last time I was admitted, my bill was 
550,000 cedis; my family could not have paid that money if I were not a subscriber. 
A 62-year-old male of Nkoranza, with eight years elementary education, married 
with six children and a follower of indigenous religion. 
 
Significantly, the non-insured also attested to the benefits of health insurance as 
a group of them indicated at a mixed (male and female as well as subscribers 
and non-subscribers) focus group discussion at Kranka, a distant rural villages 
within Nkoranza district noted for a low rate of subscription to the scheme. 
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It is good because when you are a member it takes care of your medical expenses 
when you are admitted. A 29-year-old female petty trader of Kranka with 10 years 
elementary education, married with 2 children and a Christian.  
 
It is good in the sense that if I join and I do not fall sick, at least a member of my 
family may fall sick and the money will be used to look after him or her. That is 
helpful to all of us. The problem I have with it is the timing of the collection of the 
premium. If they leave it open throughout the year it will enable me to pay. A 54-
year-old female farmer of Kranka, no formal education, with eight children, 
widowed and a Christian. 
 
Those who are insured are better than us because anytime they fall sick and need 
admission they are assured of health care. A 45-year-old male physical education 
instructor, married with seven children and a Moslem.  
 
Obviously without the benefit of a functional scheme, community people in 
Suhum and Dodowa did not have much to say by way of positive perceptions. 
Indeed they had more concerns and questions about how health insurance would 
operate based on previous experience and perceptions of public initiatives. In 
general, positive impressions about insurance in terms of its potential to make 
health care accessible when needed were not lost on people in those two 
districts. The general view was that because of poverty and high hospital fees, 
people have difficulty paying so “it is better to pay something small now to 
cover you in future”. Again there was particular stress on the fact that the 
weakening traditional family support system makes community health 
insurance a favourable idea to encourage. At rural Dawa in the Dangme West 
district, one female FGD participant emphasised this point: 
 
Now the family is not able to help very well. If you fall sick you can see that you 
need to seek medical treatment but you may not have the money. Looking around, 
you might not find help from anywhere. You may easily die from preventable 
conditions because of the inability to pay. So by the grace of God, if we join this 
scheme, it would make it easier for us to seek treatment. When we are sick, the only 
thing you need to think of will be your transportation. So I think it will be of help to 
us. 
 
People thus evaluate health insurance as being very beneficial, particularly for 
the rural poor who are unable to save towards health contingencies in view of 
their marginal subsistence. They recognise the economic, social and psycho-
logical benefits of health insurance. 
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Negative perceptions  
There were some negative perceptions; some based on ‘rumours’, some on 
misunderstandings, and others on misgivings and ‘ignorance’. Particular 
perceptions depended upon the community in which one finds oneself, the stage 
of actual implementation of the insurance program, the experience the commu-
nity has had with insurance and the type or group of persons one was speaking 
to. Thus negative perceptions in Nkoranza tended to be complaints, misrepre-
sentation or what some blame on ignorance. In Dodowa and Suhum, negative 
perceptions were embedded in doubts, misgivings and misapprehension. In 
some respect, part of the negative feelings that people from Suhum and Dodowa 
district harboured about health insurance stemmed from previous bad experi-
ences with other forms of community mutual arrangements, in most cases 
savings and credit schemes. People who had previously suffered a loss of 
savings or income through local savings and credit schemes (as a result of 
financial misappropriation) were completely unenthusiastic and doubtful about 
community financing initiatives in general. One of those that I spoke to was 
Madame Adepam (not her real name) of Suhum, a 57-year-old dressmaker, 
divorced with five children. She had a dressmaking business with twelve 
trainees. She lamented a local credit scheme that went bankrupt after a few 
years of operation. Many of its clients sustained heavy losses. Her comments: 
 
About ten years ago, something came to this town called BAMAX1 to which people 
contributed all their life savings because of a promise of fifty percent interest per 
annum. It received a high patronage but after a while it became bankrupt and people 
lost everything. Some even developed heart and mental problems. Yet the man 
behind it is still walking round without any punishment. Such an incidents make me 
and I suppose others who have gone through similar experience, quite apprehensive 
about anything that involves the payment of money with a promise of future benefits 
a difficult thing to accept. 
 
She was not alone. Just across the street from where I spoke to Madame 
Adepam was a 63-year-old retailer of alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks. When 
I called on him for a similar conversation he stated that he would not have 
                                                 
1 Around 1993 a number of non-bank financial institutions started operating savings and 
loan schemes without authorization from the central bank. These included R5, Pyram 
and Bamax. These phoney institutions succeeded in luring unsuspecting members of the 
public to deposit millions of cedis with them. In return, depositors were promised 
interest rates above the prevailing market rate offered by commercial banks. Huge 
interest rates of 30-40% attracted many people to the point that some investors 
withdrew their money from the recognised commercial banks and deposited them with 
these institutions. Before long they became bankrupt and many lost their entire lifetime 
savings. 
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anything to do with insurance because of the loss of cash he suffered through 
BAMAX. Memories of such situations were common in virtually any commu-
nity, as I discovered when I moved into the Dangme West district. There were 
genuine fears that ‘things’ like insurance “might turn out to be a trick by which 
some individuals use to rob poor people” of their hard earned money. This was 
the consensus at a female focus group discussion in rural Dawa. A twenty-five-
year-old participant’s comment captured this sentiment:  
 
Some time ago, some people came to this town and claimed they were going to 
establish a bank here. Our elders gathered all their monies and opened an account 
with them but we have since not seen any of them. So although I like the idea behind 
the new scheme, because of what happened I am entertaining some fears about it.  
 
Part of the negative perceptions were traced to misgivings about official 
bureaucracy based on experience with conventional insurance schemes, such as 
car accident and pension insurance. A 38-year-old male photographer at Suhum 
explained it in the following words: 
 
When you are going into it they bring a sheet of paper. When you are entitled to a 
benefit they bring twenty sheets. We do our things in such a way that those who do 
not invest rather benefit and those who suffer don’t benefit. When you invest your 
money into insurance it is the staff of the company that rather benefit. Look at 
SSNIT.2 
 
Indeed, mistrust of officialdom was also cited at the district and local levels, for 
the way they sometimes collect fees or dues from communities in return for 
promises for improved social amenities, but nothing happens. One participant in 
a female focus group discussion at Dokrochiwa, a distant rural village in Suhum 
district, made the point emphatically clear citing a local example.  
 
There are several cases where we have paid monies and nothing came out of them. 
One case is the road to this town. There is also the case of water. They promised us a 
borehole and we all paid; but that never happened. The most recent one was street-
lights. I vowed I’ll never pay and I lived up to my word. It all boils down to our 
leaders in this town. I will still say it even if they are here because it bothers me. 
Similarly if you take the Eastern Regional Minister, she has never set foot in this 
                                                 
2 SSNIT is the acronym for the Social Security and National Insurance Trust. It is the 
official social security system in Ghana, but is limited to only the formal sector 
employees. Among others benefits, it provides cash payments to contributors after 
retirement or to their dependents in the event of death, but the manner in which the 
contributions and payments are conducted have attracted a lot of criticism, especially in 
recent years. 
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town. How can she say anything about this town in parliament or cabinet? I remem-
ber our road, we heard that they came and took a picture of the Owirem road (a 
nearby village) and presented it that they have constructed the entire road to 
Dokrochiwa. These are the reasons why people might be reluctant to embrace the 
insurance scheme.  
Some negative perceptions are also against the government for its inability to 
deliver on some or most of its promises (the subject of another chapter). In 
theory, the idea that a community pays a premium to entitle them to free 
treatment during illness sounds nice and good. However, many are sceptical 
about it because of “such sweet official promises that were never fulfilled”. A 
participant, at a female FGD at Dodowa explained it this way: 
 
Some time ago it was announced that pensioners would be treated free when they 
went to hospital but when I sent my father to the health centre they asked me to pay 
2,500 cedis. So I feel that they are telling us lies. At some time they might even tell 
us not only to pay for drugs but for thermometer and speedometer readings… I do 
not believe what they say. In Ghana things move sideways and backwards too often.  
 
The credibility of the health care system in relation to quality of care factors and 
ownership of schemes were also decisive factors in the way people perceive 
insurance. Concerns about poor staff attitude towards patients, favouritism, 
cheating and other misconduct and malpractice by health staff and/or 
implementers and/or administrators were often voiced. These tended to cloud 
any merits that people perceive health insurance to have, as these two views 
from Suhum district indicate. First, a 39-year-old professional photographer’s 
contribution during a male focus group discussion at Suhum: 
 
It is an open secret that nurses collect “under the table fees” from patients. When the 
insurance becomes operational, the chances are that people may no more pay such 
monies if they know they are fully covered and entitled to treatment. But the non-
insured may still pay such bribes and get preferential treatment from the nurses. If 
you do not take care you may sit in the wheel chair and die.  
 
A 34-year-old single mother of one and a petty trader also from Suhum 
expressed her view on the issue during a female FGD as follows: 
 
The only concern about it is trustworthiness on the part of those who will be in 
charge. Would they faithfully give equal treatment to clients when they report ill? 
Sometimes those in charge of such schemes live fat on the money and ride in big 
cars. The money is there but instead of using it for good purpose they would buy big 
cars and ride in them.  
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In Nkoranza the most common misrepresentation of the insurance scheme was 
symbolised in “gossip” about the casualty ward. The gossip began when the 
casualty ward was created for the purpose of observation and emergency, just as 
all other casualty wards are. Detention at the casualty ward is technically not 
considered as in-patient admission. However, since it became the transit point 
for admitting patients onto the ward where they could then benefit from the 
scheme if they were insured, some in the community started associating it with 
cheating. The common claim therefore is that doctors are often reluctant to 
admit those who are insured to the main ward but rather prefer to put them on 
observation at the casualty ward. In the view of those community members, the 
casualty ward has been created as a watershed to deprive people from benefiting 
from the scheme and a way to cheat them by the hospital authorities. This 
misrepresentation even goes beyond the casualty ward to another mispercep-
tion: that the insured do not receive good quality drugs when they are admitted 
because the hospital wants to economise on the premiums paid in order to break 
even or make profits. However, one participant at a male subscriber’s FGD at 
Nkoranza disagreed with this negative perception. He gave this vivid descrip-
tive assessment of the issue as follows: 
 
Some claim that when you are a member of the scheme and you go on admission, 
you are discharged early, or the doctor does not take good care of you or even when 
your condition is serious the hospital does not want to admit you. But some people 
are sometimes rushed to the hospital on emergency during odd times such as the 
night. You see in such situations, the appropriate thing for the hospital to do is to 
admit them at the casualty ward to study the situation. But when such people are 
discharged after observation because they do not require admission, they begin to 
grumble that they were not admitted to the ward because the hospital did not want 
them to benefit from their insurance. For that reason they think it is useless to have 
health insurance. This is an erroneous impression and such utterances come from 
illiteracy; it is lack of education. 
 
Significantly, during a conversation with the Omanhene of Nkoranza, he also 
dismissed the charge of ‘cheating’ against the scheme as “rumours” that ought 
not to be taken seriously. However, he advised about the need for sustained 
education to disabuse the minds of those who harbour such notions. 
 
Some people claim that when you pay and you are admitted they don’t look after 
you well. They give you inferior medication and they discharge you early. But this is 
not true. There is no doctor who will discharge a patient if the patient has not fully 
recovered. There is also no doctor who will keep away a good drug that will make 
his patient well. It does not happen because that doctor will lose the confidence of 
his or her patients so it is never true. In every community, sεbe (excuse me to say), 
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where the literacy rate is low, or where too much superstition thrives, rumours and 
misconceptions are very high. What we need is education to change those attitudes. 
 
In summary, the views from the community indicate that the encounters that 
people experience with the health care service and its financing leads to diverse 
reactions. Some are favourable while others are prejudiced. Altogether, these 
perceptions are therefore a function of contextually deep-seated social, cultural 
and economic factors.  
One general observation from the foregoing is that apart from the problems 
of economic poverty, historical and social factors play a dominant role in 
shaping people’s ideas about health insurance. Concerns about weakening 
traditional social security arrangements, credibility of local and state officials in 
relation to ownership, prevailing notions about the health care service and 
previous experiences with local micro finance initiatives are all factors that 
make the problem of mutual health insurance both important and difficult for 
social analysis. Since my purpose in this thesis is to help understand how to 
translate some of the social features of traditional support into insurance 
systems, I turn to examine how implementers and other people further perceive 
some of the relationships between the two i.e. insurance and traditional support 
mechanisms. 
 
 
How do implementers and ‘the people’ perceive the relationship 
between insurance and traditional family support? 
 
One basic assumption of the official policy of Ghana’s health insurance plans is 
that the underlying principles of risk sharing and ‘resource pooling’ or solidarity 
in insurance are synonymous with traditional Ghanaian mechanisms of social 
support. Planners view the Ghanaian socio-cultural system as already having in-
built sophisticated and time-tested support mechanisms that can accommodate 
elements of a solidarity based health insurance scheme. The policy perspective 
therefore is that designing a scheme with “a rich blend of the traditional and 
modern” would appeal to people, for they would already understand what the 
scheme is about and the role they have to play to access its benefits. The 
ministry of health thus conceptualised health insurance as a means to formalise 
traditional risk management mechanisms by “pooling of resources from friends 
and family to take care of our health” as is traditionally done “in times of 
trouble and ill health” (NHIS 1998). Because of this perceived parallel, in this 
study it was important to ascertain how implementers and the community at 
large actually perceive the relationship between health insurance and traditional 
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social support arrangements in order to understand how both groups draw social 
lines or levels between traditional family support and health insurance. 
 
Implementers’ perspective 
Health implementers hold the view that traditional social security mechanisms 
and mutual health insurance based on the principle of solidarity are synony-
mous. The coordinator of the abortive NHIS in the Eastern region succinctly 
conveyed the view during one of our meetings: 
 
In the old traditional system, we supported one another on the basis of solidarity. 
Family members went to the assistance of one another in times of difficulty and 
sometimes in times of joy, such as marriage celebrations. It took different forms, but 
food was shared and the sick and bereaved were supported based on reciprocity. So 
this culture of assistance already exists and people help one another already. This 
thing has been there and people think about each other so that we will bear one 
another’s burden. We are picking on this to build the insurance programme. It is just 
another way of conscientising the people about reciprocity so that we will bear one 
another’s burden.  
 
The difference however is that instead of waiting for the family member to fall dead 
before we assist, we want to get organised and provide support as soon as the need 
arises. We want to give a new dimension to social support. It is the same solidarity 
principle but I do not want to compare the strength of this solidarity with what used 
to prevail some time back because things are changing.  
 
Apart from citing solidarity as being common to both, the prepayment feature 
and the wider scope of insurance were also emphasised by implementers. A 
health manager of Nkoranza emphasised the level of social inclusiveness in 
particular in insurance. He made this remark during one of our conversations:  
 
The concept of solidarity is common to both but the difference is just a matter of 
degree. The difference is that the whole community or other communities are 
involved in insurance. Traditional family support for sickness was never on such a 
large scale. Rather, it was and still is during funerals that the whole community 
become involved. 
 
Despite the common view about solidarity among implementers, some were 
unsure about how it was going to work in the new scheme, in view of the 
increasing social differentiation in society. In particular, there were doubts 
about the sincerity of community members when accepting the basic underlying 
risk sharing mechanism. The principal medical officer in charge of Suhum 
Government Hospital hinted at this when he made the following (excerpted) 
remarks about the program’s feasibility as conceptualised by the ministry.  
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It will be very difficult to achieve what they [the policy makers and planners in the 
ministry] are talking about. By solidarity I think planners mean that everybody will 
act as his/her brother’s keeper, so if you do not fall sick and your brother falls sick 
your money will be used in treating him. You see, this kind of thing, before you can 
ask people to contribute willingly you must make them see the need and this is 
where the difficulty lies. Some people feel that they do not fall sick so how can they 
feel that need? They will feel that they are being cheated. You may have a system 
where people will feel that at the end of the year, if they do not fall sick, you should 
pay them some money.  
 
Community perspectives 
The community also shared the general view that solidarity is the building block 
of both traditional support and insurance. However, the concept of risk sharing 
was hardly used by the community who tended to describe it simply as sharing 
or helping one another. One community member illustrated the perceived 
similarity of solidarity underlying the two support systems at a focus group 
discussion as follows: 
 
In traditional support, which was quite effective in the past, when something 
happened to a family member, other members would come together to assist. For 
example, if someone becomes seriously ill and needed assistance, the family will 
mobilise resources and either send the person to hospital or call on someone who 
could cure him. At present, as insured people, we all contribute and if someone falls 
ill, the money contributed takes care of the admission at the Nkoranza hospital. The 
two are therefore the same because they are both based on unity. Since the scheme 
started, I have been paying every year together with my wife and children but none 
of us has ever been on admission. However, I think that the small money I have paid 
is helping somebody. Participant in male FGD, Kranka, Nkoranza district 
 
In addition, there was agreement among community people that mutual 
insurance is literally wider in terms of scale of social participation. Two views 
from different locations illustrate this point. First, a female informant at Dawa 
in Dodowa district: 
 
The big difference I see is that, in the new insurance scheme, so many people are 
involved so the support base is bigger than the traditional family support.  
 
Then at a male FGD participant at Nkoranza expressed his view on the issue: 
 
In the past if someone was sick in the family, the family pooled resources together to 
look after the person. The present Nkoranza scheme is a larger family in the sense 
that the whole district is pooling resources together. We are all pooling resources 
together so that if one person is in difficulty we help to pay the debt, if another 
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person gets ill, we pool resources to assist him and so on and so on. This is the sense 
in which the insurance has become a bigger family, pooling resource together to 
assist in time of sickness. 
 
In addition, the common view that in sickness the level of social participation in 
mutual insurance is wider than the situation in the traditional support system 
(since it goes beyond the family), they also cited distinctions in two functional 
dimensions between insurance and traditional support. The first was recognition 
of the prepayment feature of mutual insurance compared to the traditional 
system and its associative consequential security potential when there is a need 
for assistance. Again two contributions from focus group discussions summa-
rise the viewpoints. A female FGD participant from Kranka in Nkoranza 
district: 
 
In insurance you prepare for the problem but in the traditional support you look for 
help after the problem has occurred. Sometimes, the expected help might come too 
late or may not come at all. This makes insurance better. 
 
Another view from a male participant during a male FGD at Dodowa: 
 
The security in family support is not always guaranteed because sometimes the 
family has to borrow money, which has to be refunded anyway, and this may 
become a burden on the family or the sick person after treatment. That does not 
happen in insurance and the entire community shares the risk so if it is one million it 
is spread across.  
 
The fact that the community recognises that health insurance is relatively more 
secure in terms of its promptness and reliability when there is need for assis-
tance is quite reassuring. At the same time, the point about traditional support 
that it was (and still is) organised after the event has happened and only when 
the need was critical and the evidence for the assistance was without doubt, is 
quite revealing. The latter situation in fact could partly explain the unenthusias-
tic or lackadaisical attitude of people when it comes to fulfilling prepayment 
premium obligations in insurance. They are used to waiting for events to happen 
before they react.  
Another distinction perceived by the community was that insurance is more 
proactive since it avoids the problems of occasional conflict among family 
members and the social stigma that sometimes accompanies traditional support. 
A participant in a male FGD in Suhum illustrated this disadvantage to tradi-
tional support as follows: 
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They are almost the same but there is one “cross” [negative aspect] about the 
traditional support system. The cross is that when the entire family comes together 
and looks after me, they could cast insinuations at me when for instance a quarrel 
breaks out later in the family. But in the insurance it is like buying my own food to 
eat so no one can remind and/or insult me about it at a later time under any 
circumstance. It is like using my own money to buy land. I have not cultivated 
family land, its rather buying my own land and cultivating to feed myself from the 
harvest; that is insurance. On the other hand the former [traditional support] is like 
farming on family land, the family head [Abusuapanyin] can take it back or say 
something about it against me. 
 
Despite the common view in all communities that social participation in mutual 
health insurance is wider and for that matter “better” in terms of risk pooling, 
one point that was also frequently brought to my attention was the unique 
situation of funerals. Some even compared the solidarity logic behind insurance 
to ‘the way Ghanaians organise their funerals’. In view of the interest and 
concern the issue attracts, I enquired with the Omanhene of Nkoranza, Nana 
Okatakyie Agyeman Kodom IV, when I had the opportunity to interview him. I 
asked whether the popular support that funerals receive was a recent phenome-
non or “culturally Ghanaian” from the past. Indeed, such an enquiry was 
necessary and relevant, since the case of funerals is sometimes cited by health 
policy officials as an example of how Ghanaian society share risks beyond the 
family. One news report cites a former minister of health as saying that, 
“Ghanaians are familiar with the principles of pooling community resources for 
funerals, for example, and that could be applied to a health insurance scheme” 
(Adu-Asare 2001). In responding to my enquiry the Omanhene of Nkoranza 
provided a brief historical view of traditional sickness and funeral support: 
 
In the past, when a member of the family fell ill, it was the responsibility of the 
family to either send the person for treatment or bring someone to treat the person. 
The cost involved was basically borne by just the family. Assistance outside the 
family may be sought only when it became necessary. Family support during 
funerals followed a similar pattern. When there was death in the family, everything 
in connection with it was the responsibility of the family but there was a little but 
significant variation with sickness support. The difference was that, although the 
family was responsible for the cost involved, during the funeral the family would 
invite the entire community through the palace or chief. The community would offer 
donations to the bereaved family. The fundamental difference of community partici-
pation between sickness and funerals is therefore an old phenomenon although there 
are wide variations in modern times. Traditional support for sick relatives has 
diminished while support for funerals has been taken to uncontrollable limits.  
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For analytical purposes, two general remarks could be drawn from the 
foregoing observations of implementers and the community regarding the 
relationship between traditional family support and health insurance. Both make 
the point that traditional family support for sickness, when it was provided was 
confined to the family. Secondly, the principle of solidarity or pooling of 
resources from the whole community was well associated with the organisation 
of funerals in traditional support system. One obvious question can be posed in 
relation to the two remarks. Why did (and still does) the whole community get 
involved only in funerals and not in sickness? The same question could be 
asked in another way to find out why traditional support for sickness did not 
transcend the family to become a community activity, as has been the case with 
funerals. An attempt to find answers to the question is a fruitful way of 
explaining beyond economic factors, the cultural antecedents to people’s 
attitudes and behaviour towards health insurance. 
  
 
Is it possible to transform ‘family solidarity’ exhibited during 
funerals to community health insurance? 
 
This question is important for two reasons. In the attempt to implement risk-
sharing schemes in the sub-Saharan African context, any risk sharing mecha-
nisms beyond the family are useful for providing lessons. Secondly, in the 
attempt to implement community health insurance in Ghana, funeral support, as 
I have already pointed out, is sometimes cited as an example by proponents of 
community health schemes to show that people’s willingness to share risk 
beyond the family was socially and culturally acceptable and feasible. However, 
when I posed the above question to informants in the community, it often 
evoked vague or elusive responses. Some found it a difficult question to answer.  
Indeed when I seized the opportunity during my meeting with the Omanhene 
of Nkoranza to ask for his opinion, his immediate reaction was a smile followed 
by a remark that “this question of yours is a difficult one”. He then rendered a 
comprehensive response that did not only reinforce the delicate nature of the 
matter and the Ghanaian sentiment towards funerals but also explained previous 
unsuccessful attempts by his traditional council to regulate and scale down the 
organisation of funerals in areas under his jurisdiction. Moved by a great 
concern about expensive funerals in the community, the traditional council 
made bylaws to stipulate how much people could contribute, both in terms of 
donations during funerals and on the type of alcoholic drinks served during such 
occasions. The rules were abused repeatedly, and after just two years it soon 
became ineffective because, as Nana explained it, “we do not have state 
enforcement power to punish offenders”. He ended a long discourse by pointing 
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out that society’s uncompromising attitudes towards expenditure during 
funerals weighed against their citing poverty as a reason for ignoring the 
payment of insurance premiums as “an attitudinal problem that requires a long 
sustained education and attitudinal change on the part of people”.  
Considering that the Nkoranza scheme had run for eight years at the time 
this conversation was held, the observations were a sad reflection on the 
society’s double standards towards health care and funerals. Indeed, observa-
tions about Ghanaian funerals never miss the large-scale social participation and 
financial expenditure involved. If it is ever possible to learn and transfer some 
of funerals’ organisational principles into mutual health insurance, we need to 
understand why the desire to spend and support them is so compelling. In a 
number of FGDs when the issue came up, the dominant explanation was 
emotional sentiments. In Dodowa, one participant echoed such a view: 
 
No one likes death but we need to help one another. Even if an animal dies, it has to 
be disposed of. How much more a human being created in the image of God! No 
matter the character or nature of the person, God created him. People sympathise 
because they will not see the dead person any more and they feel the pain. When I 
attend someone’s funeral, therefore, I use it to reflect on my own funeral one day.  
 
What the above remarks suggest is that death generates an elevated degree of 
emotional sentiment that compels people to respond the way they do at funerals. 
Apart from that economic appropriation and affirmation of family prestige in 
the public sphere through funerals greatly contribute to its relatively unique 
scope of support in contemporary Ghanaian society. This view was succinctly 
brought home during a conversation between Paul (not his real name) and I. 
Paul is a native of Nkoranza, and one of the coordinators at the insurance office. 
Excerpts: 
 
Paul Everybody knows that a lot of friends and well wishers will attend a funeral. If 
they attend the funeral of someone related to me and I don't perform well, I 
disgrace myself. Besides when you need a loan to pay medical bills and you 
approach people they will not help you, but if the person dies, and you need a 
loan of one million cedis for the funeral, you will get it in five minutes because 
they know that one you can repay. 
Dan: How? 
Paul: Because those who attend the funeral give cash donations which you can use to 
pay off the loan. On the other hand, how do you go and explain to someone 
that you need money to pay your mother's hospital bill when there is no 
guarantee that you can pay it within a reasonable time? If you tell them that 
you are going to pay such monies after you have harvested and sold your maize 
they won't give it to you. Nobody will give you the loan. In fact, in the case of 
funerals, even if the donations are not sufficient to cover the loan, any remain-
  
 119
ing debt will be shared among the family members and they will pay. So there 
is increased security for the person to get his money back. 
Dan: You are saying that the family members will be willing to pay the debt in this 
case? 
Paul:  Yes, because it’s a disgrace to them if they do not pay the debt. Supposing I 
lose my mother and after the funeral there is a debt of 200,000 cedis to be paid 
to somebody who gave me a loan. If I am not able to fulfil the loan obligation 
the whole town will hear about it and all sorts of insinuations will be cast 
against the family. So to protect the public image the family, we will do 
everything to pay off any remaining debt. There is a proverb that says Abusua 
d funu [the family loves the dead]; it is true. 
Dan: What does that mean? 
Paul: That means that every family or clan wants to maintain a certain level of 
respect or protect its name and maintain some fame. One way they achieve that 
is through funerals. It sounds great for people to acknowledge which musical 
band they brought to town to play at their funeral. When that happens people 
will comment that the funeral was grand but nobody will commend you for 
sending your mother to Korle Bu (Ghana’s number one teaching hospital in 
Accra) when she was sick before her death. The family will buy the big and 
expensive shroud to dress the body in and get the most popular band in town to 
come and perform. That is death; but never when the person is sick. 
 
In summary, the views conveyed in this brief excerpt reinforces a point that 
economic appropriation and affirmation of social prestige or capital is at the 
centre of Ghanaian’s willingness to spend extravagantly during funerals. People 
are able to afford heavy expenditure because they look to donations to recoup 
what they spend. Donations offered at someone’s funeral are an investment that 
will be reciprocated in the future when they become bereaved. A very revealing 
aspect of this economic appropriation in the organisation of support for funerals 
is that when the need arises, expected donations also provide a form of security 
to obtain a loan from potential lenders to pre-finance funerals. In Nkoranza, for 
example, I learnt that it was very easy for people to obtain loans from rural 
banks to organise funerals but difficult for farmers to get loans to improve their 
farms due to lack of the collateral.  
I need to point out that any economic considerations in support of funerals 
cannot be divorced from their social dimensions. During a debriefing session, 
one of my field assistants summarised the nature of the public manifestation of 
the social aspects of funerals: 
 
People use the donations to show off their magnanimity to the gathering. When this 
happens, they receive public acknowledgement for what and how much they have 
given. But when someone is sick there is no gathering for people to show off.  
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In other words, funerals are occasions that offer opportunities for collective 
action to strengthen social identities and prestige through generalised reciproc-
ity in the public sphere. The adaptive function of this is that those who donate 
will also receive donations themselves when they are bereaved.  
On the other hand, social insurance involves some aspects that are more akin 
to balanced reciprocity. It involves a clear obligation to make a premium 
contribution usually within a specified time or be counted out for any future 
benefit. The concept of risk sharing emphasises its social purpose but it is the 
payment of premiums that establishes an alliance of equality between subscrib-
ers. The benefit is, however, conditioned only on being sick, which is the aspect 
that underscores its social importance. The fact that the opportunities for “social 
rewards” such as prestige and public acknowledgement, when premium obliga-
tions are fulfilled do not exist, as they do for funerals probably impacts the 
tendency of people to participate in them. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The foregoing analysis of perceptions about health insurance and its relation-
ship with traditional social support provides useful social cultural insights. In 
general, popular perceptions in the community about social or mutual health 
insurance are influenced by factors that include prevailing ideas about other 
forms of insurance, past experiences with similar and often local savings and 
credit schemes, perceived credibility of the ownership, prevailing context of 
health care services, general level of poverty and the nature of traditional 
support mechanisms.  
Both health implementers and community people perceive health insurance 
as a useful option and solution to the problem of financial access to health care 
for the rural poor. Community people conceptualise the value of health 
insurance in terms of its economic, psychological and social support attributes. 
Its prepayment feature and regulation through a set of written rules and bylaws 
are perceived as socially appropriate. On the other hand, implementers harbour 
the fear that achieving solidarity through insurance is going to be difficult. 
Indeed the concerns of community people about insurance schemes attest to 
such a fear of the difficulty of getting people to participate in schemes. People’s 
legitimate concerns about what happens to their monies are based on a 
catalogue of complaints, including but not limited to: previous experience with 
similar micro finance schemes, lack of confidence in public and local officials, 
perceived favouritism on the part of health staff and dissatisfaction with quality 
of health care services in general. 
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There is a common assumption made by health planners in Ghana that 
existing traditions of social support in the rural context ought to make the 
implementation of community insurance schemes readily achievable. I wish to 
emphasise that although resource pooling or risk sharing traditions abound, the 
data here also indicate that people’s willingness to participate in insurance is 
also influenced by a complex mix of socio economic and cultural factors that 
make the past or traditional affinity argument pale in insignificance. My 
analysis of how implementers and particularly community people perceive 
social relationships between health insurance and traditional social security 
arrangements has revealed some of the underlying social and economic factors 
that explain the differential social attitudes towards social support in the 
Ghanaian society. In particular, I have cited the wider level of social inclusive-
ness in support of funerals compared to the lack of such support in times of 
sickness in Ghanaian society. I have explained the difference in terms of 
economic appropriation and social affirmation or accumulation as well as their 
emotional aspects.  
The effect of economic appropriation involved in the organisation of 
funerals does not escape any observer of Ghana. Apart from donations, which 
are meticulously recorded in notebooks with a view to cross checking and a 
pointer to the family’s future obligations towards others, there are other items of 
economic appropriation, as noted by Arhin (1994: 318): 
 
The increase in the quality and scale of the funeral rites has stimulated the carpentry 
(coffin and seats), brewing, distilling and paint trades, and has promoted such 
service industries as those of the mortician (a Ghanaian version of the undertaker), 
the suppliers of canopies and seats, and music and dance or cultural groups. 
 
In the final analysis, the heavy expenditure would usually be recouped through 
donations from well wishers and friends as a demonstration of sympathy and 
affection on the basis of generalised reciprocity. Funerals therefore serve an 
economic purpose.  
The economic appropriation of the heavy economic investment involved in 
funerals also serves an important social purpose. The scale and quality of the 
funeral is first and foremost an exercise in self-glorification that enhances the 
prestige of the bereaved family in the public sphere. At the same time, well 
wishers and friends who demonstrate their sympathy and affection through high 
donations receive acknowledgement and gain prestige and reputation in the 
public sphere through announcements on loud speakers and through intangible 
rewards such as where they are seated, the drinks they are served and even the 
glasses in which they are served. Such social accumulation opportunities that 
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keep funerals on the economic pedestal of traditional social support do not exist 
in the mutual insurance setting. 
Other writers have also made observations about the wider scale of funerals 
in Ghanaian society when compared to other forms of assistance. According to 
Manuh, who analysed the changes in marriage and funeral exchanges among 
the Asante, funerals are occasions where “the fullest expression is given to the 
reciprocal relationships and obligations established between kinfolk of a man 
and a woman” (Manuh 1995: 188). Van der Geest interprets a similar situation 
in which social pressure effectively insures proper family care in the organisa-
tion of funerals while it was often defective in the provision of moral and 
material support to the elderly in the small town of Kwahu Tafo in Southern 
Ghana. He explains that “they saw the responsibility of looking after the elderly 
people as a house affair that is not seen by many. Funerals however are public 
celebrations and participation — by attendance and financial contribution — is 
visible to the entire community” (Van der Geest 2000: 120). Witte (2001: 69-
70) has also made observations about the relationship of funerals and sickness 
to marriage, in her study of the changing funeral celebration of the Ashantis. 
She reports that marriage ceremonies are small compared to funerals because 
“marriage is considered more a private matter, whereas death is regarded as a 
matter of public concern”.  
It has been noted in the existing literature on mutual health organizations in 
Africa that the reason promoters attribute to the lack of interest in such schemes 
or organizations is related to the notion of a lesser degree of risk beyond the 
family (Criel & Walkins: forthcoming). I have pointed out that the example of 
funeral support as an indication of risk sharing beyond the family has indeed 
existed for a very long time. I have used the case of funerals here because it is a 
common reference point for planners when they refer to the use of solidarity as 
an organising principle in insurance. I wish to stress that in any analysis of the 
capacity to appropriate some of the social and cultural ethics of traditional 
support, particularly funerals, into a mutual health insurance, the following 
observations ought to be taken into account. In the Ghanaian context: 
 
 The levels or expanse of family or group involvement at which support 
was offered has always differed by situation in the traditional support 
system.  
 The differences reflect cultural meanings or importance that society 
attaches to various situations. 
 Accordingly, generalisations that put the capacity of risk sharing at par 
with different situations are culturally illogical and socially inaccurate. 
 Furthermore, cultural traditions are constantly changing and such changes 
influence traditional systems and their effectiveness. 
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In developing or planning community schemes, imaginations about the existing 
culture do not provide a sufficient guarantee of success. Developing a deeper 
understanding of the perceptions of the social group or people and their cultural 
preferences and meanings more than anything else would potentially yield new 
insights and clues about dealing with potential misunderstandings and miscon-
ceptions between planners and the community. Practically, what it means is that 
in designing community schemes, assumptions that people will join because of 
altruistic risk sharing or solidarity reasons are not enough. A complex mix of 
social factors influences the ultimate motivation to join or not to join. These are 
the subject of the next chapter. 
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The picture shows how subscribers are put together for registration photo-
graphs in the Nkoranza scheme. The objective of this photographing arrange-
ment is to minimize cost. The picture however, portrays the principle of 
solidarity of self-interest. The unity of members make risk-sharing possible 
but invariably, individual identity of subscribers in good standing counts when 
it comes to benefits. Policy makers conceptualize health insurance on the 
principle of solidarity. The primary motive of these seated here to participate 
is however, the self-interest to cater for themselves and their immediate 
relatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
Solidarity, self-interest and social  
health insurance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
What leads a community to participate in a voluntary health insurance scheme? 
The previous chapter highlighted various factors that influence lay perceptions 
about community health insurance. Perceptions ultimately play a determining 
role in people’s readiness to participate. In this chapter I focus on the driving 
force behind the concrete decisions people make to join or not to join health 
insurance; decisions that to a far extent determine how successful or unsuccess-
ful a scheme could become. In discussing the factors that drive people’s 
decisions, my analysis looks beyond economic determinants in which the prime 
focus is on latent demand. I look beyond people’s assertions or contingent 
declarations of willingness to join and ability to pay when there is no scheme, to 
interpret how they actually behave when there is a scheme. I therefore examine 
the relationships that explain people’s underlying motivations to join or not join 
community financing or insurance schemes. In particular, I stress the dynamic 
effects of social and cultural factors and the part they play on the collective or 
solidarity motive underlying schemes in the context of present realities. These 
issues are often not given adequate attention in the existing literature on social 
health insurance, which is dominated by economics and health economics 
literature. 
The chapter begins with a brief explanation of the concepts of solidarity and 
self interest as they apply to social health insurance and how and why policy 
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makers in Ghana conceptualise solidarity as an organising principle of health 
insurance in the country. This introduction provides a useful background to the 
analysis of why people join or do not join health insurance, based on assertions 
when there is no scheme followed by the situation where a scheme exists. Data 
from various locations is used. The material on which these are based is derived 
from the first exploratory fieldwork in Suhum and Dodowa districts. I continue 
by showing what happens in practice and how people actually behave towards 
risk sharing solidarity arrangements when there is a functional scheme. This is 
based mainly on qualitative data from Nkoranza but also includes a little 
supporting data from a quantitative survey from Nkoranza and Dodowa 
districts1. I use case studies to illustrate the fact that instead of the underlying 
solidarity principle that planners conceptualise, self-interest is rather the strong 
motive of people for joining voluntary insurance. In the discussion that follows 
I use the theoretical notions of social capital to explain the dilemma between 
solidarity and self interest in health insurance. I pursue my argument from the 
previous chapter and explain further that the strong self-interest serves to give 
credence to the absence or low opportunities for social capital in the voluntary 
context of health insurance.  
 
Solidarity  
Community health financing and/or social insurance schemes aim to protect or 
improve health through the concept of risk sharing by pooling resources 
together. Through the payment of contributions, those who are very healthy and 
rarely become ill help those who are less healthy and/or frequently fall ill. This 
is the concept of solidarity. Dunning et al. (1992: 56) have described it as “an 
awareness of unity and a willingness to bear its consequences”. Solidarity there-
fore implies that people accept that the size of the return may not match the 
resources (financial or others) they have put ex ante in the system (Criel 1998: 
60)  
Characteristically, health insurance is linked to the principles of group 
solidarity because it is a group activity. In the history of health insurance in 
Europe, which began in the 19th century, group solidarity played a prominent 
role and many schemes originated from it. Solidarity in health insurance may 
come in the form of risk solidarity or income solidarity2. Income solidarity is 
when the financially able pay for the less financially or incapable or when the 
                                                 
1 The data for Nkoranza was collected at both the exploratory and follow-up evaluation 
stages, while that of Dodowa was collected at the second evaluation study. 
2 Dunning et al (1992) also distinguish humanitarian solidarity, which is based on the 
intrinsic value of human life. Those who need protection because of disease or handicap 
must be offered it. It does not leave these other people to their fate but gives them the 
chance to participate in society. 
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rich pay more and the poor pay less for equal care. Risk solidarity is when the 
healthy pay for the ill or the good risks pay for the bad risks. It is therefore right 
to say that evolving schemes in Africa are characterised by risk solidarity and 
based on the payment of a fixed premium for unequal care. 
From policy perspectives, solidarity-based risk sharing mechanisms poten-
tially facilitate the harnessing of private funds for health care, thereby reducing 
the financial barriers faced by poor rural individuals, particularly the vulnerable 
groups, to obtain care when they need it (Arhin 1995: 2-3). On the part of 
consumers, payment of contributions in times of good health guarantees that 
they receive health care when ill. In order for a scheme to be viable, it requires a 
reasonably large membership of a cross section of the targeted community or 
group. Solidarity is therefore of critical importance to the design of a social 
health insurance scheme, in as much as it can impact how people in a society 
accept and join this type of mutual support.  
 
Self-interest 
Enlightened self-interest, to paraphrase Tocqueville (1840) who popularised the 
concept3 as “self-interest rightly understood”, simply implies that it is in the best 
interest of the individual to attend to the interests of the group at large because 
the needs of the group serve those of the individual. In other words, by securing 
the interest of the group, the individual protects his or her own interest. 
According to Sheridan (1996), that works in two ways. First, people are less 
likely to get caught up in individual pursuits when they contribute to society at 
large. Secondly, when people see (my emphasis) that their own interests are 
better achieved by meeting the interest of the community, they are more likely 
to promote and perpetuate the practice. Self-interest, like solidarity, thus 
requires people to sacrifice a little of their own resources to the benefit of the 
whole which in turn benefits them. The principle is a natural way of achieving 
individual and societal goals. However, in contrast to solidarity where the 
motive is what someone does for the group, the motive of self-interest is what 
someone gets from the group. It has to do more with the greater benefit that 
individuals get from being part of a solidarity group as a result of the little they 
themselves have also contributed to the group. In this sense, at the core of 
giving or being part of solidarity is personal motive.  
In voluntary insurance, people come together to insure themselves against 
certain risks on the basis of reciprocity because of an underlying rationale of 
self-interest. Voluntary health insurance thus builds on self-interest (Criel 1999: 
                                                 
3 Tocqueville (1840) suggested the term “self interest rightly understood” or enlightened 
self interest as an alternative to individualism described as too much concern for one’s 
own agenda or interest. 
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60). The desire to avert risk is motivated by self-interest. Dunning et al. (1992) 
depict this phenomenon at the bottom of most voluntary insurance schemes as 
solidarity of interest. The voluntary character however, often constitutes a major 
limitation in the sense that those who perceive the potential return to be too low 
may decide to opt out or not engage in it at all. From the individual point of 
view, such a decision might be rational but in societal terms it is counter 
productive since it limits the financial base of the scheme. In view of this, some 
authors have argued that in order to be effective and successful, mutual aid 
schemes must of necessity be rooted in both solidarity (based on broader 
cultural and emotional grounds) and in self-interest (see Elchardus 1994). 
 
Solidarity in Ghana’s health insurance plans 
In the attempts to implement health insurance in Ghana, one of the basic 
assumptions that planners have emphasised is that a solidarity-based scheme is 
a suitable option because the Ghanaian social and cultural system has a built in 
social insurance or solidarity mechanism conventionally centred around the 
extended family. The family, it is conceived, has collective responsibility for 
the welfare of its members. A national health insurance scheme based “on the 
principles of solidarity, equity and non-profitability” is therefore officially 
perceived as “very much like our [Ghanaian] traditional support system in 
which resources of a family, clan, business, etc. are pooled together for the 
support of the group.”4 Health planners conceive the philosophy behind such an 
idea to be “a rich blend of tradition and modern”.5  
This conception of Ghana’s health insurance plans, raises a number of 
pertinent questions. The primary one, which will be dealt with in this chapter, is 
whether the motive of the people or community for joining an insurance scheme 
in the social context nowadays is based on the collective principle of solidarity 
or on an individualistic purpose. Granted that solidarity was/is effective in the 
traditional support system would people then accept or embrace the concept of 
risk sharing in a new social insurance dispensation because of historical or 
cultural affinity? And if so under what circumstances will they accept it in the 
present socio economic and cultural context? The discussion highlights the 
importance of social dynamics in the decision-making to join or not to join an 
insurance scheme.  
 
 
                                                 
4 National Health Insurance Scheme: Handbill (Undated) All About the NHIS. 
5 National Health Insurance Scheme: Handbill (Undated) Questions and Answers, 
Accra. 
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Why people do or do not join insurance: A case of self-interest? 
 
Why people join 
In order to answer the above question I first turn to examine how people are 
likely to participate in a health insurance scheme based on their declarations of 
what they imagine and expect from it when the scheme does not yet exist. This 
is a credible and useful way of examining the subject in view of the fact that 
evidence to justify health insurance in Africa by several authors of predomi-
nantly health economics orientation is usually derived from household or 
aggregate expenditure surveys using contingent valuations (Yoder 1989). 
Similar studies have been reported from Ghana. Arhin (1995), who studied 
households in the Dangme West district using contingent valuation to ascertain 
their willingness to participate in solidarity based schemes, concluded that 98% 
were willing to join such a scheme. Asenso-Okyere et al. (1997), in a study of 
three districts in the Eastern region using a similar approach, also reported very 
high willingness rates of 98.7%. For my present purpose I focus on Suhum and 
Dodowa districts6 at the first stage of my fieldwork when the community’s 
experience with health insurance was merely at the level of sensitised stages.  
As an introductory remark, it is worth recalling that at the onset of my field-
work in those two districts, one of the striking observations I made was the 
strong desire for and high expectations that people generally had for health 
insurance. In one sense, this was surprising considering the fact that at the time 
people knew little about the details of health insurance. Indeed, as the previous 
chapter indicated, people’s concerns and worries about health insurance at the 
time far outweighed their positive perceptions. So why were they so enthusias-
tic about it and indicated they would join?  
One reason is that due to the problems of poor and seasonal income coupled 
with the burden of unforeseen health expenditures, many in the community 
have difficulty coping with fee for service at the point of use. People are there-
fore enthusiastic about any new or alternate plan that promises to mitigate their 
financial difficulties in access to health care. And so, despite concerns about 
what monster health insurance would look like, people yearned for it in the 
hope that its introduction would change their existing precarious health care 
financing situation. In one of my interactions with a community leader, a 73-
year-old divisional chief and retired educationist of Dodowa, explained this 
community desire to me as follows:  
 
                                                 
6 Arhin’s study was also carried out in Dangme West District, while Assenso-Okyereh 
et al.’s was also undertaken in the Eastern region. 
  
 130
Health insurance is a new thing but we look up to it. I think it will help because in 
the villages the people don’t have money, they are poor and many times it is finance 
or poverty that kills them. I say so because somebody may be sick with simple 
malaria and because he has no money to attend the hospital he would die. So I think 
they just have to be educated for them to grasp it. When each person pays a little 
money, it will help everybody in the community.  
 
The dominant health care problem of rural folks as the above statement stresses 
is financial accessibility. Access to health care is difficult because money is a 
problem. Due to poor earnings, welfare needs and contingencies become 
problematic for most rural dwellers. It was therefore not surprisingly that the 
dominant reasons for joining were presented in terms of economic or financial 
advantage. A participant at a male FGD session in Dodowa explained it this 
way:  
 
It is not always that man has money in his pocket. But sickness does not wait for one 
to have money in one’s pocket, so if I join it will help me. Another teacher who used 
to work at the same place where I work had a surgical operation sometime ago. His 
condition did not improve so his family wanted to send him to the hospital again. 
But they needed 100,000 cedis for that. Because they could not raise the money he 
died. If there were something like the health association at the time, the insurance 
would have taken care of him. Sickness has no timetable. It comes anytime. 
Insurance is something good so I will join.  
 
Indeed the uncertainty about illness vividly conveys to many informants the 
need for a safety valve. Many therefore value joining a health insurance scheme 
for the health security it provides. A female FGD participant at Dokrochiwa 
said: 
 
I will join due to the present hardships in life and my future health security. No one 
knows tomorrow. (Obi nnim kyena asεm). You may think you do not fall ill but 
tomorrow may be different. Even if you do not fall ill your wife or child may fall ill. 
 
Financial accessibility and a desire for health security constitute the most 
commonly cited reasons. In addition, some informants also conceive the moti-
vation to join insurance in terms of social and/or cultural appeals. One of these 
was related to the failing traditional support system. Some perceived insurance 
as a way of reviving family support to achieve reciprocity. At an FGD discus-
sion at Dawa involving female participants one of them observed:  
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Since the old family [support] system is no longer effective, this group7 when estab-
lished will bring us together. We will be our brothers’ keepers so that we will come 
together again as a family. 
 
At rural Dokrochiwa, a participant in a female FGD session indicated to me that 
having an insurance scheme in their village would help enhance the image of 
their community.  
 
I have to help because it is good to have something like that here so that we can also 
claim credit for having such a new thing in this town. 
 
Insurance was therefore sometimes conceptualised as an object for community 
improvement. One observation was that, in situations in which the reasons for 
joining insurance schemes were related to social and cultural factors, the 
sources were mainly traced to the relatively remote parts of the districts. This 
might partially be explained by the fact that the average rural dweller has 
perceived a formal health insurance as a means by which their locality could 
become part of the “modern society”. Another explanation could be that it is in 
the more remote rural areas where family and other mutual traditional solidarity 
based support mechanisms were stronger and so that is where the desire for 
similar mechanisms is also more likely to be felt. One would expect that where 
people know each other better in the “rural-rural” setting compared to the 
“rural-urban”, it enhances the sense of belonging and for that matter, heightens 
the desire for a similar institution in the remotely rural. People also mentioned 
health security and financial access frequently in conversations. When listening 
to people explain their desire for health insurance, it was tempting not to 
disagree with what health economists hurriedly concluded based on latent 
demand. In virtually every case, the underlying stated motive for joining often 
pointed to the speakers themselves.  
Not everyone was enthusiastic about insurance. Why? I discuss the reasons 
in the next section. 
 
Why people are not willing to join 
In the imaginary situation where the views of informants must be considered as 
contemplations because the insurance scheme did not yet exist, one striking 
observation I made was that there was a tendency for most informants to portray 
themselves as potential subscribers and conceive of “others” as the non-
subscribers. In other words, individuals in principle almost always try to cast 
                                                 
7 In the case above, the speaker’s reference to health insurance as “this group” reflects 
the conception of how the scheme was marketed to the community as a “health welfare 
group”.  
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their own relationship to health insurance in a favourable light while associating 
negative attitudes towards insurance with others. In a way this attitude was not 
surprising. I understood it as logically consistent with their lay expectations and 
cognitions about insurance, particularly in relation to the existing fee for service 
system.8 But in a way that attitude also had the effect of biasing their self-
appraisal of insurance.  
Accordingly, in order to deal with the preconceived bias when discussing 
attitudes towards health insurance, I had to frame my inquiry in order to have 
them talk about why others would not want to join insurance. In that context, 
people freely opened up and showed a depth of knowledge that made it seem 
like they had already experienced health insurance. During a FGD with females 
in Dodowa, for example, all seven participants present indicated that they would 
join. When I asked them why others might not join one quickly gave a brief 
catalogue of reasons.  
 
Money problems. Lack of understanding; if education is inadequate and anibue 
[literally meaning civilisation but apparent reference to social change or modernisa-
tion]; some may also feel they have been deceived for so long in the past.  
 
I will elaborate further on these factors alongside the analysis. As expected, 
financial incapability or non-affordability was cited as the most likely reason 
why some may not join. The problem was variously described as “money 
problem” or “poverty” or “hardships”. The common meaning attributed to non-
affordability was lack of cash but when people talk about it in this context, they 
relate it not only to poor incomes but also to large family or household size. A 
female informant at Dokrochiwa added: 
 
Well many people in this community are poor. Some will like it but they do not have 
a good job that generates enough income to enable them to join such a scheme. 
People here usually have six children or more. This is one reason why it may be 
difficult to do it here. 
 
How much people will get for their money also tends to occupy a central 
position in their contemplation to join or not to join. They wonder about what 
will happen to the money they will pay and whether it will really be used to 
provide the health care they need or whether the quality of care will meet their 
expectations. This comes out very distinctly in a few cases where informants 
                                                 
8 According to the theory of cognitive dissonance by Festinger, human beings have a 
tendency to seek consistency among their cognitions (Festinger 1962). 
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did declare that they would not join. For example at a male FGD in Suhum, the 
only participant out of eight who dissented stated his concern about what could 
become of the investment in insurance: 
 
As of now, we do not know the benefit package and until I have seen the full 
benefits and the policy and become convinced about it, I cannot make up my mind. 
Quite recently some people came here and started campaigning for people to grow 
sunflowers. Many people responded but when the sunflowers were harvested there 
was no buyer and some even burnt their harvest. So for something that you do not 
know the head and tail of it how do you do it? As for me, I have to wait and see to 
make my decision (patuo gye sε m’ani)9.  
 
Behind the uncertainty of some people there was the fear that if something went 
wrong, they would lose their investment. Incidentally, there was always some 
negative reference event in their recent past that informed that notion. Indeed, 
based on previous experience with community savings and credit schemes 
(susu), there was also some suspicion and fears that those into whose custody 
the finances of the scheme would be entrusted could embezzle the funds. There 
was conjecture that those who harbour such fears might not commit their 
resources to the scheme. A male participant in a FGD at Dawa shared these 
thoughts:  
 
 Some officials came to this village and informed the community that they were 
setting up a savings and credit scheme. People responded, but after a few months 
they bolted away with the money and we never saw them again. Some people might 
think that this is just another means to cheat them. It will be difficult to convince 
such people to join anything that involve money. Because of the previous experience 
they take such things very personal and will see it as another ploy to cheat them. For 
this reason they will not join until it takes off. In fact because of such suspicions 
many will adopt a ‘wait and see’ attitude before they make their decision. So it all 
depends on how it progresses.  
 
For some people, the type and manner of education that they would receive is 
an important determinant of how they make up their mind about insurance. In 
this respect, many informants envisioned poor education as an important 
potential determinant for non-subscribing behaviour. During a male FGD at 
Suhum, for example, not only did the group emphasise the importance of 
education but also they went further to illustrate what was perceived as a good 
example of poor education. In an apparent reference to the NHIS public educa-
                                                 
9 Patuo is an owl, which is known for its big eyes. The speaker therefore implies 
proverbially that unless he observes with big eyes he could not make up his mind. 
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tion campaign in the district a year before, one participant lamented the experi-
ence as follows: 
 
 The way people are educated about new things go a long way to influence accep-
tance. At the time [apparent reference to NHIS education campaign period] I came 
across a batch of leaflets in the GPRTU10 kiosk when I went to the lorry station to 
purchase a ticket. I had no previous knowledge about the scheme but the leaflets 
were just lying in the kiosk for those who wanted to pick them. What was the 
guarantee that people will read them and understand? How could anyone educate 
people on a new programme that way in a community such as ours?  
 
In fairness to the programme implementers and the educators, this way of 
spreading the message and sensitising people about the scheme was just one of 
a number of approaches that was used to reach out to the community. That is 
however, not to absolve a bad dissemination approach involving handbills, 
which was not only potentially limited in scope but also inappropriate for a 
community that had a very low literacy rate. In the same group discussion, some 
suggested that inadequate education also had the potential to become ammuni-
tion in the hands of those who would not understand the concept and that they 
would spread misconceptions about it.  
Another set of reasons for unwillingness was related to systemic problems 
people encounter with the health care services. The complaints related to 
attitudes of nurses, long waiting times at health facilities, the collection of 
dubious fees and poor diagnostic materials. An opinion leader in Dodowa said: 
 
Insurance is good but it will only work if the health staff treat people humanely 
when they go there. Nurses are human beings like all others but it’s about time they 
accepted the challenges of their profession. You see, people are such that even a 
touch can sometimes reassure them; but some nurses reprimand patients just because 
they go to clinic late. The other time someone complained to me that he was referred 
without a referral note. Such attitudes create confidence crises and leads to mistrust 
in the service. And if upon all that people have to buy drugs and do laboratory tests 
outside then we have a problem to deal with. I don’t foresee an enthusiastic response 
if these don’t change in our health service. 
 
Further reasons why, in the view of respondents, many in the community might 
keep away from a health insurance scheme were similar to those for joining: 
mainly out of self-interest. Predominant among them was the perceived ‘risk 
                                                 
10 GPRTU is the acronym for Ghana Private Road Transport Union, and is umbrella 
trade union of most private commercial vehicle operators. In cities, towns and villages 
where they exist, they operate a small office, which sometimes is a kiosk in lorry 
stations.  
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averse’ attitudes towards insurance. This attitude is a feeling commonly held by 
some that they were healthy and therefore underestimating future risks of 
illness. As a female informant at Dodowa briefly explained, “Some people have 
the feeling that they do not fall sick so they may not benefit from joining such a 
group”.  
Related to the risk averse notion is another view: that the relatively well to 
do who might consider themselves capable of paying when they need health 
care might also not join the scheme. Sometimes these people are portrayed as 
being selfish. A participant, in a female FGD in Dawa said:  
 
Some people are rich and they will not need anything from the association. They 
will therefore not want to join. Anytime they are sick, they can just get up and go to 
the hospital because they have the means. They even have private doctors because 
they are financially sound. But someone who is not financially sound will join.  
 
State or governmental support for community insurance is potentially useful 
since it offers opportunities for logistical and technical support and the political 
goodwill necessary to operate it. However, there are also genuine concerns that 
if politicians are allowed to play centre stage in rural insurance initiatives, 
wrong signals may be sent to those in the opposition party, who may reject it. A 
male FGD participant in Dawa said: 
 
Others may not join because of their political alliance. During the recent census, 
someone told me that he was not going to register because he did not like the 
government in power. So, some may feel that it is for the government and therefore 
may not join.  
 
Furthermore, the value and individual preference for traditional or indigenous 
health care, which is quite pervasive in the rural setting, is also recognised as a 
factor that could keep some people away. One male FGD participant in Dodowa 
explained: 
 
In the rural areas people think most sicknesses are the result of a curse, so when they 
fall sick, they prefer to visit native healers and spiritualists. Even when you do not 
believe in such supernatural causes, those around you will tell you to see a healer 
because the condition is a not a clinical but spiritual ailment. People who believe in 
supernatural causes simply ignore the clinic and it might probably take a generation 
to appreciate a health insurance scheme.  
 
It is obvious from the foregoing that people’s drive towards social health 
insurance is highly influenced by social and cultural constructions and 
motivated by enlightened self interest. That assertion immediately leads to one 
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question. Can we merely depend on people’s declarations to join or not to join 
insurance to determine their concrete attitudes towards it or their commitment to 
the solidarity motive behind it? Certainly, any critical assessment cannot be 
made based merely on statements people make about why they will join or not. 
We need to go beyond that in order to get to the bottom of how people 
genuinely feel about the redistribution effect of solidarity.  
 
 
How do people feel about the redistribution effect of solidarity? 
 
In order to dig deeper, I posed a question to ascertain from informants their 
feelings about the redistribution arrangement or effect of solidarity in health 
insurance. The concept relates to how potential subscribers or real subscribers 
feel in a typical situation in health insurance where their fellow insured people, 
who are more prone to illness, benefit more from the scheme as a result of 
frequent illness. Interestingly, the immediate reactions were typically coloured 
to sound socially appealing and convey good impressions about the speakers. 
But in general, the reasons for accepting the consequences of investment 
without return in solidarity were related to uncertainty about what could happen 
to themselves, concern about depressed traditional support mechanism and most 
predominantly moral and religious reasons. Frequent use was not considered a 
problem if sickness was perceived genuine because the essence of insurance, as 
one informant described it is to help one another (εyε mmoa a yεde reboa yεn 
ho). Again, being sick was also not considered a privilege but rather a disad-
vantage. A participant at a male FGD in Suhum explained it this way: 
 
 We understand the situation and it does not bother us. Even in car insurance it is 
only third parties that get the benefit. Calamity does not affect one individual. (εnyε 
baako fo na asεm to no). If it does not benefit me, it may benefit my brother. If 
your contribution is used to look after someone else, others contribution will also be 
used to look after you at another time in the future. After all, we make donations 
when someone dies in the community so it is not a problem. 
 
There was nevertheless some feeling that a wholesale benefit package ought to 
be prevented. For example one view was that the package ought not to cover 
HIV/AIDS because of the long-term implications it may have on the financial 
sustainability of the scheme. In response to a question by another participant 
whether the scheme should cover cases such as HIV/AIDS, a male FGD partici-
pant in Suhum said: 
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 The policy should not cover cases such as AIDS because there is no cure for it and 
so if the money is used on them it will run out. We cannot afford to use the money 
on that because it will be a waste.  
 
Considering the implications of HIV/AIDS for public health, this remark that 
people ought to be responsible for their own problems clearly stretches the issue 
of self- interest to elastic limits. However, the common statements people made 
about their preparedness to participate in any utilitarian co-operation or solidar-
ity arrangement were predominantly gratuitous expressions emphasising 
religious reasons. Most reactions were based on the biblical edict that “those 
who have money should look after the poor”. A 70-year-old Presbyterian 
pharmacist from Suhum explained it this way:  
 
No one knows tomorrow. You may be strong today but you need your heart to carry 
you into the next day. The Bible says it is not within the power of man to map and 
plan his course. [He then referred me to Proverbs 20:2411].  
 
Other reactions to the redistribution effect of solidarity follow a similar trend. 
The following are further remarks made by participants from various FGD 
sessions in the two districts. 
 
 The Bible says we should help our neighbours so if I pay that little money and I do 
not fall ill, God will bless me for helping to cure someone. Female FGD participant, 
Dokrochiwa. 
I will be grateful to God for not getting ill. Female FGD participant, Dokrochiwa. 
 It would not bother us at all. What we need is good health so if my contribution is 
used to look after someone why should I get worried? I should rather be happy 
because it brightens my chances for heaven. Male FGD participant, Suhum. 
Not all people fall ill frequently so if I am not sick and I contribute to help those 
who fall ill then in a way I am performing my Christian duty. The objective for 
joining is not to fall ill but to help those in need of health care who may not have the 
means of their own. Male FGD participant, Suhum 
 
Ascriptions to divine benefits as justification of the unequal redistribution effect 
of solidarity were so pervasive in peoples’ reasoning that even those who 
considered it “cheating and painful”, were still prepared to accept it as the will 
of God. What does that tell us?  
In a Christian dominated and widely religion conscious country like Ghana,12 
such remarks about sacrifices for the benefit of divine rewards are not 
                                                 
11 “A man’s steps are directed by the Lord. How then can anyone understand his own 
way?” NIV  
  
 138
unexpected. Such statements certainly have their social appeal but what is 
important is that even when explaining their solidarity links through religious 
passions, they were laced with expressions of self-interest; they expect personal 
reward in heaven. In any case, the common thread in pious religious sentiments 
about solidarity in the Ghanaian context is that they indicate one potential 
avenue — churches and religious groups — for fostering solidarity about 
insurance schemes in communities.  
The important question to ask here is: Should we take these pious statements 
about people’s attitude towards solidarity seriously or take them with a pinch of 
salt? In essence, talk is cheap or ambitious depending on where you stand; 
people have the tendency to sound socially desirable in a social research 
situation when the actual event has not happened. Indeed, if we have to attach 
any meaning to people’s preparedness to accept risk sharing in insurance, a 
reliable barometer is the widespread evidence of neglect of poor families by 
relatives in the present day Ghanaian society of today, which is easily excused 
by economic hardship. Even if people decide to join, how reliable are their 
assurances that they will overlook the unequal redistribution of benefits in 
insurance and keep their subscription in good standing? Once again the view of 
my 70-year-old Presbyterian informant in Suhum was moralistic but neverthe-
less served as good food for thought: 
 
Our character has changed. In the past when we farmed we did not demarcate 
boundaries but we were honest because we shared and exchanged what we had. We 
needed and loved one another. Now things have changed. Now there is no longer 
love for one another. We don’t fear God, although we worship and make a lot of 
noise about God. But the people in the past were not like that. Unless we change our 
morality, unless we change our moral weakness, it will be difficult. Nevertheless, we 
still have to start from somewhere and we can start gradually with the few people 
who are prepared to start. 
 
Asking people how they feel about the behaviour of others in a hypothetical 
situation provides some indications about what attitudes to expect in the 
practical situation. Imaginary statements or contemplations however, still do not 
give an accurate picture, particularly when they involve informants’ responses 
that are a reflection on themselves. In order to get to the heart of the matter as 
far as attitudes towards risk sharing or solidarity is concerned, we need to look 
elsewhere for a practical illustration. In this study, Nkoranza provided an ideal 
setting for this. 
                                                                                                                       
12 The most current (2000) population census of Ghana indicates that Christians 
constitute approximately 70%. Others comprise 15.9% Islam, 8.5% traditional, 0.7% 
others and 6.1% no religion. 
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People’s motive behind insurance: Concrete lessons from  
Nkoranza District 
 
In order to assess people’s concrete motives for participating in a health 
insurance scheme, the case of Nkoranza and, to some extent, Dodowa, present a 
useful means of validation. For the owners or organisers of the Nkoranza 
scheme, solidarity is important because it is the organising principle for 
bringing the community together in a non-profit risk-sharing scheme to make 
health care accessible to them. Residents and non-resident natives of the district 
are therefore required to invest in a common pool so that those who fall ill will 
be catered for on the basis of pre-determined conditions and benefits. In one of 
my conversations with the manager of the Nkoranza scheme, he elaborately 
explained the mechanism by which solidarity works in the scheme as follows: 
 
We, the initiators of the scheme, want to foster unity through the insurance scheme 
because if you look at it, one person pays a small amount, falls sick and then a 
“huge” amount is paid for his bill. If it were not for the sake of solidarity that person 
would not have had the benefit of getting other people’s money to pay his bill. I 
think that is the solidarity aspect of it in the sense that the monies that are collected 
from the various health zones [within the district] are not kept independent of the 
other zones. They are brought together into a common pool so that anybody who 
falls sick in any of the zones can benefit from that common pool. What we wanted 
people to understand is that it is not a matter of paying the money and falling sick to 
benefit but paying it for a risk tomorrow. That is, you can pay for many years 
without falling sick but there may be a day that you will also fall sick. Meanwhile 
either a family member or a friend or a church member would have benefited from 
the scheme. Without the scheme one of these people would have had come to you to 
solicit funds to pay his hospital bill. But once you are all contributors it, tends to 
foster unity and solidarity. It takes care of the unfortunate ones who fall sick. This is 
our message but I do not think that is what actually people see in it [my emphasis]. 
 
Two main strands are embedded in the long statement above. First, solidarity in 
the scheme is about connecting diverse individuals across the district to share 
health care through a system of reciprocity. The second strand is that this has 
been a difficult task because the expected understanding, cooperation and 
commitment to the risk sharing principle on the part of the community has been 
lacking. Indeed, the benefit of nearly ten years of operation and several evalua-
tions on reasons why people join in Nkoranza indicate that they join because for 
their own sake and that of their closest relatives. Interviews with various stake-
holders in this study, (i.e. implementers, health staff, community opinion 
leaders, subscribers and non-subscribers) attest to this view. One case will 
suffice here.  
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Steve  
Steve is 54 years old, a native of the district and had been part of the accounting 
staff of the Nkoranza hospital for 11 years when we met. He had married twice. 
He had a total of 13 children, 10 of whom were with his present wife. In our 
conversation below, I sought his view about aspects of the scheme by asking 
him what, in his opinion, drives people to join the scheme. Excerpts:  
 
Steve: Some people have foresight about future health security so they are prepared to 
make the present sacrifice. Instead of waiting to be sick before they look for 
assistance from family members, they do their best to join the scheme. Some of 
such people are of the notion that even if they do not fall ill, they are secure or 
others may benefit or they would receive blessings from God. Some have such 
thoughts for their fellows. 
Dan: So is concern for others the motive that people have for joining the scheme? 
Steve: That is the not the primary objective why they join, but rather they join so that 
when they fall ill, it does not become a burden for them or their close family 
members. These days unless it is a matter of death, the family would not help 
you so it is important for individuals to secure their health to avoid access 
problems when they are suddenly taken ill. So people join to avert the burden 
of health insecurity. 
 
The literal interpretation of Steve’s statement indicates that to date, the primary 
motivation of many in the community is not so much the underlying principle of 
solidarity but their enlightened self-interest. In Nkoranza, some even considered 
it cheating if after paying there are no direct benefits for remaining healthy and 
as a result discontinued their subscription after a few years of subscribing. In 
some cases, they made a claim that they found it difficult to raise the needed 
money to remain subscribers of the scheme. Others also maintained they have 
no need to join since they do not fall sick. Actual evidence of such situations 
were not difficult to find in the community. One such example was Opanyin 
Nkrumah, a 56-year-old elder and a non-subscriber at Kranka:  
 
I was a member but when you pay and you do not fall ill for even three or five years 
you do not benefit. Since the benefit covers only selected cases, it is possible that 
some of us will never benefit because by our constitution we are very strong and we 
do not fall ill. This is cheating to me. So they should probably build in a mechanism 
where those of us who do not fall sick can be given say a 30% discount for the 
subsequent year.  
 
It is obvious from the above statement made by Opanyin Nkrumah (and many 
others he represents) that enlightened self-interest is at the core of people’s 
desires and actions to join and leave the scheme. The informant practically 
demonstrates this individualistic value by pulling out after a few years without 
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personal benefit. It is implied in his words and deeds that the motive for joining 
was that by sacrificing a small part of his resources he or probably a close 
relative would benefit. He pulled out when that objective became too remote. It 
appears that people are more likely to continue with the scheme when they are 
able to relate their membership to situations or benefits involving them or 
someone they know. A participant who was certainly a subscriber, conveyed 
this attitude to me during a male FGD discussion at Nkoranza.  
 
Some say it is cheating but it is not. It is not cheating because you pay the money for 
those who get sick. So the motive for paying is to help those who will fall ill. Next 
time when I also fall ill, someone’s contribution will help me. Someone’s father has 
been there while another’s mother has been there so it is the same thing. When I was 
last admitted there, my bill amounted to 398,800 cedis. Where would I have 
obtained this money to pay my bill? So left to me, if it were not because of poverty I 
would have said paying even 50,000 cedis as a premium would have been reason-
able. And even if any of those here or I do not fall ill we have to pay our premiums 
to take care of the poor. The insurance scheme is a very good thing.  
 
Let me explain the situation of the above informant whom I shall call Kwame in 
relation to the argument he raised. I understood Kwame’s point from his 
personal and poor health circumstances. He was sixty-one and a father of six 
when I had the above discussion with him; his main source of income was 
farming. He did not have to fend for his six children who were all adults living 
on their own, but he was not receiving any subsistence support from them 
either. Significantly, his general health had not been good during the three years 
prior to our meeting and he had therefore been a regular client at the Nkoranza 
hospital. Indeed his poor health was manifested by a persistent cough through-
out the duration of the discussion, something he did not waste time to draw my 
attention. In one of his contributions, he clearly pointed out “I wish I could 
exchange my poor health with those who consider frequent use of the scheme 
by people like us as cheating”. Obviously therefore this was someone whose 
belief in risk sharing is inspired to a great extent by his personal circumstances 
and a strong underlying enlightened self interest. 
 
Adverse selection 
In the community, people’s self-interest motives in the solidarity arrangement 
are generally conveyed, in their attitudes towards the payment of premiums and 
where they are insured in their health seeking behaviour. I recall an encounter I 
witnessed in Nkoranza during one of my observational visits to the insurance 
office. It involved someone who was going on admission to the hospital. I will 
call him John. 
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John’s case of adverse selection 
On July 26th, 1999, while sitting and conversing with the coordinators at the 
insurance office, John, who was due for admission for a hernia operation, 
walked into the office. He was personally insured and had already managed to 
collect some medicines from the pharmacy with his insurance identity card 
when he walked into the insurance office to collect his family records card to 
take to the ward. The family card contains updated information about the 
premium payment status of all the household or family members of every 
insured individual. The scheme’s implementers employ that as one way of 
containing adverse selection. When someone is asked to go on admission, 
getting the family card from the insurance office was always the last process to 
confirm that the scheme would cover the cost of the admission. That was why 
John had to walk there to finish his pre-admission ritual. 
When the insurance office coordinator checked the data on John’s family 
card he noticed that the premiums of four members of John’s household had not 
been paid. The coordinator then quoted the relevant portions of the insurance 
policy and informed John that the conditions for benefit enjoined him to pay for 
the four unpaid cases before his hospital charges would be covered. John 
however maintained that he did not have the money to pay for the four members 
and besides he did not see the logic for such a condition since he had paid 
faithfully in previous years without any benefit. The coordinator therefore asked 
John to follow him to the cashier’s office to sort out the problem.  
I followed them to the cashier’s office where the coordinator simply repeated 
to John that he had to pay up for the four defaulters on his family card. But John 
was persistent in his previous arguments. The coordinator then informed the 
cashier that under the circumstances, John was not eligible to be covered by the 
insurance office so the cashier ought to deal privately with him. In short, John 
was declared ineligible to be covered by the scheme in view of his refusal to 
pay for the arrears of four members of his household as required. Someone at 
the cashier’s office then quickly took back the drugs that John had already taken 
from the dispensary and demanded the deposit for his admission. There and 
then, John dipped his hands into his pocket and brought out 28,000 cedis to pay 
for the four family members that was demanded. Money, which he originally 
claimed he did not have suddenly popped out from his pocket and the matter 
ended there. He got back his drugs and the process for his admission and opera-
tion was finalised.  
On reflection, John was not prepared to pay for four members of his house-
hold because as he indicated, he had paid in previous years without any benefit. 
From an analytical perspective, we could explain John’s behaviour and that of 
many others whose attitudes obviates the principle of solidarity underlying the 
scheme to enlightened self interest. The lesson here is that although theoreti-
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cally self-interest is not conceived as being fundamental to planners compared 
to the choice for unity in solidarity, the former is an instrumental influence on 
the latter. 
 
Yaw’s experience about adverse selection 
Another common way by which self-interest manifests itself in the scheme is 
the way the community selects themselves to join as new subscribers or to 
renew their premiums during registration periods. This takes the form of what is 
technically referred to as adverse selection. I will illustrate this with a narrative 
from one of my informants whom I refer to here as Yaw. Yaw was a 34-year-
old schoolteacher, married with two children and a founding fieldworker of the 
insurance scheme at Kranka. He was quite popular in the village as a commu-
nity focal person and became an effective field assistant. During one of the 
several conversations sessions I had with him, he gave me a vivid illustration of 
the depth of the problem of adverse selection that underscores the strong self-
interest motive of people as against the solidarity concept of the planners of the 
scheme does: 
 
At the early stages of the scheme, people were very selective and registered only 
those members in their family who were high risk. Unfortunately our system was not 
tight enough to detect them. Last year, a certain man came to inform me that he has 
not been well for some time but when he sought treatment at Holy Family hospital, 
he was asked to deposit 300,000 cedis against his admission. When he sought 
assistance from his family, no one was prepared to help him so he came to inform 
me that he wanted to register for the insurance. To be honest with you, if he had not 
told me that story, I would have registered him but he started by betraying himself. 
Well, I told him that in that case he had to register 20 people before I would admit 
him. I arrived at that decision because I realised that even if he registered 20 people 
as I requested, it would have still amounted to 140,000 cedis13 which was still less 
than what he was asked to pay at Holy Family. In short I refused to register him so 
he reported me to the Chief of the town. I answered the Chief’s call and explained 
everything to him, which he understood. I did not register him because I felt it was 
not fair for those of us who have been with the scheme for seven years. And I did 
that because of an experience I had with a teacher colleague. He had a hernia so 
when the scheme started he registered and managed to get an operation to remove it. 
After that he did not renew his registration again during the second year. However, 
he brought his sick mother from the North to register her and got treatment for her. 
He never renewed his premium again. Two years ago he came to me with another 
tribesman to register him but by then I had detected his tricks so I told him bluntly 
that I was not going to do it.  
 
                                                 
13 The premium per person at the time was 7,000 per person for new subscribers and 
6,000 for continuing subscribers. 
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You may ask why I am so protective of the scheme. Since the scheme started my 
family and I have faithfully been paying the yearly premium but none of us has ever 
utilised it. It is not in the interest of the scheme to have only people who know they 
are sick and therefore only join to get treatment and walk away. If I allow such 
people to do that then the scheme would collapse and my family and I would have 
toiled in vain. So as a member, it is in my interest to make sure that the scheme is 
sustainable.  
 
This long account shows how self-interest is in people’s motive to join an 
insurance scheme. Interestingly, Yaw ended his narrative by emphasising his 
own self-interest in the scheme as a reason for ensuring that others do not abuse 
it. Those who cheat do so in their self-interest; those who protect or secure also 
do so in their self-interest. When planners estimate people’s sense of solidarity 
and loyalty to health insurance on the basis of historical and cultural assump-
tions, they are oblivious to these intricacies or take them for granted. The 
individuals enter into the solidarity arrangement because of their self-interest. 
Further evidence from Nkoranza underscores the prominence of people’s 
self interest or non-solidarity reasons. These can be gleaned from statements of 
non-subscribers during conversations I had with them. Although affordability, 
and for that matter economic reasons are issues, the common strand in most of 
the reasons why people do not join were socially and culturally determined. 
They were sometimes bothered about how individuals conceptualised the risk to 
their health or that of someone close to them, may be at risk. Sometimes their 
discontent is found in the service offered by the insurance scheme. Two cases 
from Nkoranza district from separate FGDs will suffice here. A female FGD 
participant in Nkoranza relates: 
 
The reason why I did not join is because I have observed that whether you would be 
admitted or not depends on the judgement of the doctor although you are the one 
that is ill. We know that the doctors are professionals but sometimes they also make 
errors because they are human, and not God. There is a case when a friend of mine 
went to the hospital very sick but the doctor felt he was not sick enough to be 
admitted. So he was given out patient (OPD) treatment. When he came home he did 
not recover and so he had to seek treatment elsewhere after three days. When you 
think about these things it makes it difficult for you to join.  
 
A male FGD participant from Kranka: 
 
Recently my grandmother became ill and was very sick. When she was admitted at 
the hospital, she was discharged the next day even though she was not well. In my 
view, they discharged her early because they did not want the insurance to spend too 
much on her. Besides, when my wife delivered, they asked me to pay because they 
said normal delivery was not covered; but that is the main reason why I registered 
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my wife. So when you are insured and you are admitted, they do not want to spend 
so much on you because when they do that the scheme would overspend its 
resources and that is why I am not a member. I feel that they are just using the 
insurance to make money for the hospital.  
 
In Nkoranza, subscription records of the scheme statistically exemplify the 
community’s self-interest. Since it was established nearly a decade ago, low 
patronage has been a chronic problem. Available records indicate that it has 
managed to achieve a 40% mark just once. For all the remaining years that it 
has been in operation, the entire district coverage has been below 30% and most 
of the subscribers have been from the Nkoranza township and its immediate 
surroundings. Indeed, people’s egocentric motives for joining are so strong that 
they sometimes want compensation if they contribute but do not fall ill for some 
years. A public health coordinator of the Regional Catholic Diocesan Health 
Services who is the overseer of the scheme explained it as follows: 
 
After nearly ten years of operation, people have still not grasped or accepted the 
concept of insurance that once you pay you do not necessarily have to benefit 
personally. Previous evaluations indicate that people want compensation if they 
contribute but do not fall ill for some years. There is also a high level of adverse 
selection and this further attests to peoples self interest motive for joining. 
 
Moral hazard 
The depth of people’s strong self-interest does not end with adverse selection. 
The phenomena whereby subscribers abuse an insurance scheme through 
excessive use and moral hazard also looms large in the Nkoranza scheme, as 
insured patients play all sorts of tricks to over-utilize the benefit of the scheme. 
The medical doctor in charge at the time illustrated the situation for me: 
 
Among the funny things that happen in the ward is that insured patients will always 
try to give complaints to stay longer on the ward because they are ‘not paying’. They 
always pretend so that at the end of the day they stay longer than the patients who 
are not insured. For non-insured patients, after 2-3 days when they think that they 
are OK, as soon as they see the doctor enter the ward they will be sitting on the bed 
and smiling. Displaying it on the bed, telling you that they want to go home. Some-
times they even come out to say it that “today I feel fine and I want to go home”. 
The insured on the other hand will tell you that they feel worse and pretend that if 
you do not administer oxygen to them in the next second they would die within one 
minute.  
 
That sounds comic, but moral hazard in the scheme, as another medical doctor 
of the hospital narrated to me, even goes beyond patient behaviour in the ward 
in a more striking manner. Once they are insured, they do not just plead with 
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doctors at consulting rooms to be admitted in order to benefit, they sometimes 
start the lobbying for admission at a doctor’s home. Medical doctor: 
 
People come to knock on my door at home at 6 AM and say that they want to bring 
a sick person to the clinic. They come to see you because they cannot pay at the 
OPD so they want assistance to have the patient admitted to the ward. If you assure 
them of “assistance” in that line of direction, they will then go home and bring the 
patient. As a doctor the reasonable and ethical thing to do when such situations arise 
is to ask them to bring the patient to the consulting room for examination. A few 
times however, when they come with the sick person and you examine him/her, you 
realise that the patient is still fit to go back home. But when you don’t admit them 
then they get pissed off. Occasionally they also keep the patient at home deliberately 
to worsen the condition to the state that all you can do is to keep the patient on the 
ward. Yet that kind of “trick” can have serious health consequences for them. 
 
The outcome of interviews I had with several informants suggests that to the 
community, the ability to go to hospital and be treated for “free”, when they 
have paid their premium is very attractive. Subscribers are willing to register 
with the insurance scheme because they first and foremost know that if they 
register and they fall sick they will be taken care of and that is their prime 
motive for registering with the scheme. To the people who make solidarity in 
social insurance functional through their patronage, the essential risk sharing 
purpose is ‘first unto myself before all others’. And they conceptualise 
insurance in terms of the tangible direct benefits that they obtain from being 
members.  
 
Knowledge about main idea behind insurance: Survey finding 
Peoples’ conception of health insurance comes out clearly in the results of a 
follow up evaluation survey in Nkoranza and Dodowa districts, where I 
employed a short household survey to further explore a few issues in a 
relatively wider spectrum of the community.14 I asked household respondents to 
indicate what in their view they “think is the main idea behind health 
insurance”. The findings affirmed that to the average rural person, it is the 
immediate personal benefits of insurance that preoccupies their thoughts more 
than the solidarity principle. The reasons were mainly related to accessibility 
(78.6% in Nkoranza and 59.8% in Dodowa), health security (8.0% in Nkoranza 
and 25.7% in Dodowa), improvement of health care in the district (8.5% in 
Nkoranza and 8.2% in Dodowa) and replacement of the ‘cash and carry’ system 
(0.4% in Nkoranza and 4.8% in Dodowa).15 Responses relating to solidarity 
                                                 
14 It is important to recall here that by the period of that second study, the Dodowa 
scheme was in its first year of implementation.  
15 Altogether, the response rate was about 98% of the total cases. 
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(conceptualised as help one another) and/or unity constituted a mere fraction of 
the total responses.16  
In summary, when the discussion is situated in the total socio-economic and 
socio-cultural context, the picture that we get is that the motivation to join the 
insurance scheme is not the solidarity concept as portrayed by the implemen-
ters; but their personal benefit. Is solidarity then only a mental construct for 
organising a social health insurance? What is its use then relative to the over-
bearing self-interest motive that people bring into insurance? The Catholic 
diocesan public health coordinator of Sunyani who oversees the Nkoranza 
scheme explained it in the following way during one of my final interview 
sessions:  
 
The way solidarity works in this era in community health insurance is like the ripple 
when a stone is thrown into a pool of water. It is stronger where the stone falls but as 
it gets further it gets weaker. So for instance I have more solidarity to my wife and 
children than my extended family. It gets weaker across the village and might not 
even work when stretched across the district. But there is the need to promote 
solidarity to help people to get health because if you leave it that way then things 
like insurance would never work.  
 
That this is the reality about solidarity support mechanisms is a fact that ought 
not to be surprising in the present social context. There is rarely a society in this 
age where social differentiation has not led to obvious tendencies towards 
decreased interdependence. The effect of decreased interdependence is that 
people now put more emphasis on the self-fulfilment of themselves and their 
immediate relatives. One reason for this is the weakening effectiveness of 
traditional social support institutions, such as the family. Unlike in the past, 
people no longer depend solely on one another and the goodwill of the society; 
they rely more on achieved positions for their daily economic survival. There-
fore, as far as the organisation of solidarity support is concerned, the important 
unit is no longer the extended family or the community, but the individual and 
his or her immediate relatives or nuclear family. What is surprising is that 
planners do not seem to realise that this is the way people behave, that despite 
the latent demand and seeming enthusiasm and anticipation, people pragmati-
cally fancy their self-interest as the primary reason for joining a social insurance 
scheme more than the risk sharing motive that the solidarity principle seeks to 
foster among the group. Where then does this take the analysis? How can we 
explain the progression of self- interest as a primary motivating reason for 
participation in social health insurance?  
 
                                                 
16 See Table A1 in Appendix 2. 
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Discussion: The interplay between solidarity and self-interest 
 
The framework for understanding the relationship between solidarity and self-
interest in social health insurance rests on the concept of social capital — the 
idea that sociability has positive consequences for the individual and the group. 
The origins of the concept lie in 19th century classical sociology of Durkheim, 
but it owes its currency chiefly to the more contemporary works of Pierre 
Bourdieu followed by that of Glen Loury and James Coleman (Portes 1988). In 
the analysis of social capital, these authors and several others following them, 
grounded their theory in relationships between actors or between an individual 
actor and a group. Bourdieu in particular focuses on the benefits that accrue to 
individuals by virtue of participating in groups and on the deliberate construc-
tion of sociability for the purpose of creating this resource. He stresses, “the 
profits which accrue from membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity 
which makes them possible” (Bourdieu 1985: 249).  
In the sense in which I intend to apply the concept here however, I lean more 
on the persuasive twist introduced by Robert Putnam in his classic piece 
Bowling Alone, America’s declining social capital. In it Putman goes beyond 
individual actors to conceptualise social capital as a feature of the “connec-
tivity” of communities and nations. Through an analogy with notions of 
physical and human capital, he explains that social capital means “features of 
social organisations, such as networks, norms and trust, that facilitate action and 
cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995: 67). Putnam notes that when 
conceptualised this way, life is easier in a community blessed with a substantial 
stock of social capital for a number of reason. He lists the benefits of social 
capital as follows: 
 
In the first place, networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized 
reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust. Such networks facilitate 
coordination and communication, amplify reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of 
collective action to be resolved. When economic and political negotiation is 
embedded in dense networks of social interaction, incentives for opportunism are 
reduced. At the same time, networks of civic engagement embody past success at 
collaboration, which can serve as a cultural template for future collaboration. 
Finally, dense networks of interaction probably broaden the participants’ sense of 
self, developing the “I” into the “we,” or (in the language of rational-choice 
theorists) enhancing the participants’ “taste” for collective benefits (Putnam 1995: 
67).  
 
In practice, stocks of social capital account for the level of associational 
involvement and participatory behaviour in a community and constitute the 
basis of their solidarity  
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Based on this sociological argument about the importance of social capital to 
group cohesion and mutual support, several writers with backgrounds predomi-
nantly in economics and health economics have emphasised that community 
prepayment schemes benefit from a community’s willingness to cooperate with 
each other. The common strand in the argument is that a greater degree of social 
capital in a community would enhance people’s preference or desire to prepay. 
Hsiao (2001: 5), for example, explains that social cohesion and mutual concern 
or solidarity shapes people’s preference for prepayment, and hypothesises that 
“the greater the social capital, the more people are willing to prepare”. Preker et 
al. (2001: 7) also refer to the benefit of social capital, citing that “it is not what 
you know but whom you know” that counts. They, however, also point out the 
downside of social capital in situations when communities and networks 
become isolated or parochial and operate for example as gangs and cartels that 
work against the collective interest. Wiesmann et al. (2000: 14) have also noted 
that if solidarity is strong, people will not worry so much if the benefits of the 
premiums will accrue to themselves or other community members. Actual 
studies also support the claim. Based on empirical findings, Criel (1999: 51) 
reported that in Bwamanda, Zaire, members of the insurance scheme expressed 
the opinion that if their premiums would not benefit themselves, they would do 
so for the entire community. 
In Ghana, an implicit assumption of the social feasibility of health insurance 
has also been made in relation to the benefits of social capital in a number of 
statements and background papers. Arhin concluded in the precursor study to 
the Dangme West District health insurance scheme that the reason why 98% of 
household heads were willing to pay a premium to obtain health insurance 
cover for their members was that they conceptualised it as a solidarity associa-
tion to deal with health risk and that they had previous experience of it (Arhin 
1995: 104-105). 
It is without doubt that a high degree of solidarity or social capital in a 
community is likely to influence the quality of cooperation or support for one 
another. I wish to point out here that, it is precisely what social capital is not 
able to achieve, contrary to the popular conventional arguments about it, that 
explains the overbearing self-interest motivation of people’s willingness to join 
an insurance scheme. What do I mean? A careful appraisal will show that the 
conditions that facilitate the building or realisation of social capital scarcely 
exist in the social setting of the emerging top down voluntary insurance 
schemes like those in this study. In other words: They do not provide the 
opportunities for social capital to accumulate.  
In order for social capital to accumulate, social conditions from the point of 
view of social connectedness must exist. These include social trust through 
obligations based on emotional ties and generalised reciprocity accompanied by 
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social benefits such as respect, prestige and reputation. In the emerging mutual 
insurance setting, a contract that asserts payment of a fixed voluntary premium 
is the only social tie that binds members together. For most of these people 
there is no sense of emotional attachment to other members of the group, apart 
from the few that they probably know and live with. The absence of opportuni-
ties for the accumulation of social capital thus diminishes the binding feeling of 
solidarity and for that matter the binding force of reciprocity underlying such 
schemes. 
The analogy of the ripple of the pool of water when a stone is thrown into it 
is a useful illustration for the strong self-interest motive with which people 
participate in the schemes. The vast pool of water depicts the wide community. 
The ripple effect indicates that people have a stronger sense of solidarity to the 
small unit closer to them. Their relationship with the wider community is 
negotiated by rational self-interest. 
People’s motive for participating in an insurance scheme in the present 
social context is therefore based first and foremost on what they believe would 
best advance their own self-interested goal of averting a risk or securing a gain 
for themselves. They are therefore more likely to insure themselves against 
common risks on the basis of clearly perceived self-interest. The motive is 
served by the voluntary nature of schemes, which gives people a discretionary 
choice. In practice, a lot of solidarity in voluntary health insurance is enlight-
ened self-interest in the sense that people come together to insure themselves 
against certain risks on the basis of reciprocity because of clearly perceived self-
interest. This would explain why Dunning et al. (1992) characterise the relation-
ship as solidarity of interest.  
 
 
 
 
7 
Health insurance and “the poor” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
From a policy relevance perspective, the primary goal of social health insurance 
in Africa is to bring together private funds in order to reduce the financial 
barrier faced by poor individuals, particularly vulnerable groups, to obtain care 
when they need it (Arhin 1995: 2). However, as indicated in the previous 
chapter, the benefits of insurance are contingent upon the payment of premiums. 
This raises concerns about the implications for the poor and vulnerable that 
might not have the means to pay the required premium in order to benefit. Does 
social health insurance then make health care accessible to the poor? In other 
words, how effective is health insurance in bridging the access gap faced by the 
poor and vulnerable to health care? This chapter examines this question using 
qualitative data from the three districts in this study but mainly from Nkoranza, 
where it was most practical to explore the issues in-depth in view of the 
relatively long experience with health insurance in the community. In this 
chapter, I examine questions relating to: 
 
i) How people in the community conceptualise “the poor” and express the benefits 
of social health insurance schemes to the poor. 
ii) Whether people generally believe and agree that there are some who are truly 
poor and cannot pay the premiums, and why this is the case. 
iii) How, in the community’s perception, those who are poor and cannot pay can be 
helped. 
iv) What the policy context is and what the views of the district policy implementers 
are on the meaning of being poor in the community. 
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Since the existing policy framework provides a useful context for discussing 
“the poor” in relation to social insurance, I begin the analysis with the policy 
context of access to health care for the poor. I follow that with community 
perspectives on points dealing with how people conceptualise “the poor”, why 
they contest the meaning of being poor, how they perceive benefits to the poor 
and how they think the vulnerable can be helped. I conclude with a discussion 
of the dilemma of access and equity for the poor and vulnerable in voluntary 
health insurance. Here I argue that the effectiveness of voluntary insurance in 
protecting the poor returns to the question of exemption mechanisms, as some 
writers have already noted. In the case of Ghana, administrative bottlenecks that 
have plagued the effective application of exemption policies are compounded 
by problems of identifying who “the poor” are in the community. The exclusion 
of the poor from social insurance reflects the negative side of reciprocity but the 
phenomenon is not unique to Ghana; similar trends occurred in Europe in the 
19th century. 
 
 
Policy framework  
 
As I have already indicated, the policy context is a good starting point for 
discussing what impact social health insurance has on access to health care for 
the poor. This serves as a useful way of placing the discussion in its proper 
policy analytical framework. The issue of financial access to health care for the 
poor has been a perennial problem since the dawn of cost recovery policy in 
Ghana’s health care system from the mid 1980s. Recognizing that some people 
cannot afford health services, the introduction of hospital fee regulations 
policies of 1972 and 1985 by the government was supported with provisions of 
exemptions for various categories of patients. However, as a result of wide-
spread problems with and abuse of the implementation of exemption policies 
for the poor (especially in terms of defining who was poor), the government has 
had to look for alternatives to user fees at the point of service now dubbed “cash 
and carry”. The story of the evolution of health insurance in Ghana is thus a 
story of meeting one of the major challenges of health care financing: ensuring 
access and equity to all Ghanaians in health care, particularly the poor and 
vulnerable. 
In pursuing the issue of “the poor” and health insurance, one of the prelimi-
nary tasks was to understand how “the poor” are defined and what official 
criteria are used to identify those who are poor. During the span of my field-
work I took the opportunity to explore the issue in-depth and first hand with 
policy makers and key ministry of health officials at the national, regional and 
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district levels. At the national level, one of the officials with whom I discussed 
the subject was Dr. Moses Adibo, who had just stepped down as Deputy 
Minister of Health and was at one time the Director of Medical Services. In the 
latter capacity he oversaw the implementation of Ghana’s cost recovery 
measures from the mid eighties to the mid nineties, and was a strong advocate 
of community health insurance in Ghana. The ideas that gave birth to the 
Dodowa health insurance scheme were in fact his brainchild. Our conversation 
touched on several issues, ranging from user fees to state involvement in health 
insurance and the failed Eastern region pilot scheme. He explained the official 
ministry of health policy view in relation to the poor who have difficulty in 
accessing health care as follows: 
 
The poor exist, so in 1985, when we introduced user fees, I made sure that we 
introduced exemption for the poor. But I thought the person in charge of the institu-
tion should be given the prerogative to determine whether indeed the person was a 
pauper [emphasis mine]… In the community there are people who are genuinely 
poor and can be identified so that they could be exempted. But what I have also 
found out is that, and this is a Ghanaian weakness, people are not willing to take 
decisions or responsibility. So you hear quite often that somebody has been 
discharged from the hospital but the person cannot pay the fees so they are keeping 
the person in there. And yet if you go back and see LI [Legislative Instrument] 1313, 
the thing is there that if the person cannot afford [the costs] declare him a pauper and 
let him go, but they wouldn’t do it. So our inability or refusal to take decisions is a 
problem. 
 
A few observations can be made from the above response. First, at the highest 
policy level, the ministry of health, and for that matter the government, recog-
nises that some citizens are too poor to pay for health services and provisions 
have to be made for their exemption. Secondly, the details of that exemption 
policy are well secured by a Legislative Instrument 1313.1 Thirdly, it also 
emerges from Dr. Adibo’s remarks that although the policy theoretically recog-
nises the existence of the poor, it is vague with respect to how a pauper is to be 
determined. Over the years this has been one of the major sources of problems 
plaguing the exemption policy law intended to protect the poor. I will return to 
this later in the chapter but at this stage of this analysis, further insight into the 
problem of the poor from a policy perspective is still useful.  
Continuing our discussion, Dr. Adibo provided a detailed background insight 
into health insurance in Ghana, emphasising that government conceived health 
                                                 
1 The Hospital Fee Act (Act 387) and LI 1313 of 1985 made provisions for exempting 
three categories of people on the grounds of economy, age and gender. Section 2 of the 
Act further identified eight categories of patients for whom “no fee shall be paid” for all 
services obtained at a public health institution in the country. 
  
 154
insurance is a means to mobilise additional funds for the health sector and 
improve access for the poor. He continued: 
 
When I considered the pros and cons of various health financing mechanisms, 
insurance appeared to be the best option. But since less than about ten percent of the 
population are salaried workers, conventional insurance would not be viable. The 
vast majority of our people in the villages are subsistence farmers with seasonal and 
small incomes. For most of these, health care often comes as a difficult expenditure. 
Community based schemes therefore were the next best alternative. It makes it 
easier to get our rural folks to come together and form smaller groups to evolve 
some form of insurance, which is peculiar to our environment.  
 
Considering that mutual health schemes are based on the payment of premiums, 
to what extent can insurance solve the problem of access if the poor still have to 
pay? In the Brong Ahafo region, which has a lead in community insurance 
through Nkoranza, I had the opportunity to seek the views of the regional 
director on the subject. Did he consider health insurance to be a solution to the 
problem of access to the poor? How were the “the poor” going to be deter-
mined? His response: 
 
I think certainly there will be poor people who will not be able to afford whatever 
premium is set. But what makes things easier for the government is that there 
already exists an exemption policy. At the district [assembly] levels, there are 
programmes like the poverty alleviations funds that are targeting and assisting the 
poor in the communities. So once these people have been identified, then it’s easier 
to identify the very poor because we have information on all villages. In all the 
places we know those who have not been able to pay and we go into their back-
ground and find if they are the very poor. When the government gets to know them 
then it can afford to advance payment for these people in their localities. So, I 
foresee the government coming in to pay for such people. 
 
These comments raise two pertinent issues. The first relates to exemptions as a 
solution to the poor who cannot pay. This clearly underscores the fact that 
health insurance might still not be the answer. The second, and very delicate 
matter is the means of defining and/or identifying the poor. How easy is that 
going to be considering what is known from the existing exemption policy for 
the poor?  
At the district level, it was possible to discuss the issue with district health 
implementers. It provided a good opportunity to situate the discussion at the 
service delivery level. I wondered how the problem of access to the poor 
presented to the policy implementers there and how they deal with it. In 
Dodowa, one of my key contacts was the senior District Director of Health 
Services, Dr. Irene Agyepong, who at the time had served in that position for 
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over a decade. At the earliest stage of my fieldwork when I first had a conver-
sation with her, the Dangme West scheme had not yet been implemented but 
extensive work and preparations had taken place. She was therefore very much 
abreast of the problems and had ideas about how the district was going to 
confront them. During our talk, it emerged that the problem of defining the poor 
was not as simple as the upper hierarchy policy officials portrayed it to me. 
Indeed, the picture she portrayed to me about determining who “the poor” in the 
community were when it came to exemptions was a stark contrast to the views 
of her colleagues at the regional and national levels: 
 
Although the community members themselves admit that there are poor people, they 
also say we are all poor and that even if there are poor the gradation is a gentle slope 
and not a steep one. And there seems to be resentment if you try to classify some 
people as so poor and deserving of assistance in health care while others are made to 
pay. But yes, it is an issue we have talked about. What do you do with the poor? On 
one hand how do we define the poor? And on the other hand who is genuinely poor? 
Those are the issues. When there is a subsidy, community leaders feel they are the 
leaders so they should get the subsidy. It’s the same situation with the government 
exemption for those under five, sixty five plus and pregnant women. Most health 
workers resent the exemption. They keep asking why are you [government] giving 
some exemption when you [government] are not giving them [health workers] 
exemption because we are all poor? The idea in the community is that basically we 
are all poor, so no one needs exemption. The poor problem is there but we do not 
have an answer to it yet.  
 
Essentially, the import of Irene’s remarks is that the issue of determining who is 
poor in the community is not as simple as policy makers at the centre tend to 
estimate it to be. The simple message in her remarks is that the way the 
community perceives its poor is based not only on financial want but also 
mediated by social features. An intriguing aspect of that is how various groups 
in the health care cycle express latent self-interest in how the poor are defined 
or determined. Health staff have as much interest in it as community opinion 
leaders and the vulnerable poor. The ultimate price is the benefit of exemption. 
Obviously the extent of group self interest in how the poor are defined, is not 
only striking, but gives cause for concern in as much as it can negatively impact 
the sustainability of insurance schemes. But is it likely that the problem of 
determining who constitutes the poor are is unique to Irene’s district? 
Nkoranza offered another opportunity to examine the issue further. I had the 
privilege to talk to Dr. Ineke Bosman, the Dutch born Ghanaian under whose 
dual leadership as district director of health services and senior medical officer 
in charge of the Nkoranza hospital the scheme was set up. Her concern for the 
plight of the poor is so strong that at the onset of the scheme, she decided 
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against the making of photo identity cards for subscribers. The reason as she 
told me was her “worry that photographs will increase the fees and anything 
that increases the fee will create problems because the people have little 
money”. On the basis of the relatively longer experience in Nkoranza, how had 
the definitional problem of “the poor” manifested in the community? Her view 
about the issue, based on her long experience in Nkoranza was as follows: 
 
Actually I agree that there is a margin that is “poor poor” but my experience here 
indicates that “the poor” has a wider meaning. The way it presents in relation to the 
insurance is either in the mind or money wise or both. “The poor”, so to speak, may 
be about 10 to 20 percent but that includes believers in faith healing who say you 
can only be healed by prayer, so insurance is not necessary. Some people are also 
poor only in the mind. It is not poverty in the sense that they cannot pay the money. 
Rather their attitude is that “I will pay next year” or “I haven’t been sick for three 
years but I have been paying and so I cannot continue”. So it’s not always poverty. 
That does not mean it does not hurt me that some people who are genuinely poor 
cannot insure themselves. 
 
Based on her last statement about the genuine poor, does health insurance 
provide a solution to the vulnerable poor or what she herself referred to as the 
“poor poor”? Her reaction: 
 
That is the actual problem. We do not actually reach the “poor poor”. It’s the 30% 
that is the most affluent or the most sensible that is benefiting. The marginal people 
that you want to benefit cannot join because they do not have the means. The way to 
achieve that is to keep the premium low. The main goal of this health insurance is to 
make the hospital accessible to the marginal poor but we have only managed to 
make the hospital economically self-sufficient. The whole idea of making health 
care accessible and reaching the poor, I doubt if they [the scheme’s present 
management] have done that for them.  
 
What can we deduce from the foregoing? Dr. Bosman’s previous remarks about 
the meaning of the poor provide a useful analytical and practical distinction. 
Conceptually, it emphasises that being poor is not only about having the 
monetary resources, but goes beyond conventional poverty profiles. In the 
context of people committing money for their health in a risk sharing mecha-
nism, “being poor” tends to be very much mediated by social and mental 
processes. Irene made reference to the fact that who “the poor” are in the 
community is contested. The insights suggest a potential source of difficulty in 
any proposal in that direction. Literally district implementers acknowledge that 
people are poor and some are indigent and need help because they cannot afford 
to pay. However, contrary to conventional economic images of the poor, which 
the written policy issues deal with, representations of the poor in the community 
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are socially constructed and thus make their identification complex. To what 
extent do the foregoing views of policy implementers reflect the actual situation 
of the people of the community themselves? I turn to examine this from the 
perspective of the people themselves.  
 
 
Community perspectives  
 
How “the people” conceptualise “the poor” and express the benefits of social 
health insurance scheme to the poor? 
The way people in the community conceptualise or refer to “the poor” and 
discuss the benefits of health insurance reflects ambiguities and analytical 
complexities. In reality the way they perceive “the poor” depicts the problem of 
definition of “the poor” in the African rural context, about which much has been 
written. (See for example Iliffe John 1987). The categories they use confirm the 
view Irene presented to me about the elusive nature of the meaning of “the 
poor” among community members themselves. Literally, they conceive the poor 
in two respects. In a wider sense the entire community perceives itself as poor 
“without exception”. However, in a limited sense, people also accept that some 
are poorer than others within the entire poor community based on certain 
circumstances such as old age, physical deformity or calamity. I will illustrate 
this with two cases from the Nkoranza district. 
 
Case 1: Alice 
I first met Alice (a pseudonym) on July 18th 1999 when she joined a focus group 
discussion of mixed subscribers, one of three I organised in Nkoranza. Aged 46 
years, she had no formal education and eked out a subsistence existence through 
farming. She also described herself to me as a Christian and married with two 
children. She looked quite reserved but very confident and made very practical 
and useful contributions during the discussion. A short testimony she gave 
about the benefits of the Nkoranza scheme aroused my curiosity for a follow up 
conversation with her. 
 
I was admitted at the hospital two years ago for a long time and after some time I 
could virtually be mistaken as one of the workers on the ward. When I was eventu-
ally discharged, my bill ran into millions of cedis. But I was discharged without 
paying anything. The only reason why I am still alive is because of the insurance; 
there was no way that I could have found the money anywhere to pay for treatment. 
 
My follow up conversation with her indicated that Alice was a diabetic who 
went frequently for insulin injections. Both the medical doctor in charge of the 
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Nkoranza hospital and one of my field assistants who was a coordinator at the 
insurance office corroborated that. For the managers of the scheme, she was one 
of their high-risk clients. But since the objective of the scheme was non-profit 
risk sharing, people like Alice were a good example of how risk sharing makes 
health care accessible to otherwise poor people who could not have afforded 
health care without the scheme. In fact her last admission at the hospital lasted 
about three months. She was discharged just a few days before my arrival in the 
district. The charges amounted to 2.6 million cedis and the scheme paid every 
penny from beginning to end. 
In terms of outward physical appearance, Alice looked very well without any 
visible trace of her chronic condition. And she was very appreciative of the 
insurance scheme: 
 
[It is] the saviour of the poor in the community; you wouldn’t have been talking to 
me today. My husband and I could not have afforded the cost of my treatment. As 
for my family members they only visited me at the hospital.  
 
They “try their best to pay” their premiums and that of five other members of 
their household whenever they were due. 
In summary, this is one poor person for whom social health insurance has 
provided regular access to health care. Without health insurance she had no 
solution to health care. She is thus a good example of how risk sharing in health 
care solves the problem of the poor. Alice also typifies the ambiguity of the 
meaning of the poor in the community. In one sense, the entire community 
considers all of their own situations as poor and similar to that of Alice and her 
family because economically they face the same problems. They are all subsis-
tence farmers, have identical family sizes and encounter the same socio 
economic problems. This is the wider sense in which people in the community 
perceive “the poor”. As many of those that manage to pay their premiums, the 
scheme provides an answer to their health care needs.  
  
Case 2: Comfort 
I met Comfort (a pseudonym) on July 21st 1999 when my field assistant took me 
to her house to meet someone, who in his estimation was destitute. Her handi-
cap was clearly visible. As a leprosy sufferer I was deeply moved by the her 
physical deformity. Despite her condition, she had a family of three children 
and one grandchild but no husband. She was 56 years old and had her three 
children with different “partners” she associated with at various leprosaria 
across the country where she underwent treatment. The oldest of the three 
children appeared to be in her late teens or early twenties and was the mother of 
Comfort’s grandchild. Her other two children were a daughter aged about 9 
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years and a son aged around 12 years. She lived with all the children in a small 
house and subsists by farming.  
The other purpose of our meeting was to administer a short semi-structured 
interview guide in connection with this research. As soon as she learnt of my 
mission she started telling me a story about what in her perception was a recent 
“unfair treatment” she had received at Nkoranza hospital. She was a bit upset 
with Nkoranza hospital because during the previous year she once sought 
treatment there and was treated and discharged the same day. However, she still 
felt unwell so she visited Techiman Holy Family Catholic hospital, which was 
nearer to her village and was admitted for one week before she was discharged. 
In her view, Nkoranza did not admit her because of the insurance.  
As I later found out, her story was not as simple as she had presented it. In 
the first place she was not an insured person who would have been given “free” 
treatment even if she had been admitted. Secondly, a tricky dimension of her 
situation was that although she was entitled to free treatment for leprosy, the 
provision of free treatment for conditions not related to leprosy was ambiguous. 
It was therefore uncertain whether her situation merited free treatment or not. 
She categorically told me that with her physical state, it was not possible for her 
to work and save to pay for insurance. However, based on our conversation, it 
appeared that the exemption privilege she had as a result of her illness did not 
always make health care access easy. Indeed, the most difficult and pathetic 
aspect of her personal circumstances was the implication for her four depend-
ants. She was too poor to insure them, so none of her four dependants had 
regular access to health care.  
Comfort is the example of “the poor” in the smaller sense of the meaning in 
the community. She, and by extension her four dependants, are considered as 
“needy and less fortunate” because of her health or physical deformity. People 
like them are the ones at the lowest level of socio economic existence and are 
the vulnerable poor who are handicapped by reason of gender, age, physical 
deformity, orphanage or disease. They barely manage an average economic 
existence. They are a good example of what Dr. Bosman describes as the “poor 
poor”. For such people as Comfort and her four dependants, the scheme does 
not provide an answer because they still cannot find the money to pay their 
premiums to entitle them to health care. Ironically these are the ones who often 
need the insurance most because of their vulnerability to diseases. As one health 
staff in Dodowa summed up during a conversation, “because of their poor 
situation the quality of food they take is very poor and the nutrition is equally 
poor so they easily fall sick. They need something to build them up. It is a 
vicious cycle of poverty and poor health.” 
The foregoing two cases illustrate the two senses in which people in the 
community conceptualise “the poor”. In common speak, the entire community 
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considers itself poor because in their perception, the socio-economic context of 
the rural economy does not only naturally constrain them but in their estimation, 
the consequences impact them disproportionately. As one local leader described 
it to me, “for most of them in the villages, its subsistence farming that they are 
doing and it’s just hand to mouth. Whatever they get it’s not sufficient to sell to 
pay for the insurance scheme”. Thus in Nkoranza, the typical saying was yεn 
nyinaa yε ahiafo. We are all poor. “We all deserve sympathy because we are 
all suffering;” as one worker in the insurance office at Nkoranza put it when he 
explained the ambiguity to me. This is more so the case when it involves money 
or the payment of fees. A brief illustration will bring out the sensitive nature 
with which this view is carried in the community. I cite a brief excerpt of a 
conversation with one participant, John (not his real name), when the issue 
about why some people who do not pay their premiums came up. Dan refers to 
me.  
 
John: The whole issue about people being poor or not boils down to what we do 
and earn for a living. If you ask all of us gathered here what work we do for 
a living you would understand our poor existence. There are no job oppor-
tunities here so we are just struggling with “small” farming. This man is 
struggling, that one is also struggling, only one of us here is a teacher and 
the rest of us are just “unbiz” [a popular term meaning not in any gainful 
employment] people, struggling. Children, adults, men and women in the 
whole community are all not gainfully employed. If I am a hanging frog, 
any day you come across me, you will find me hanging. (εnti sε meyε 
aponkyerεni a mesεn h a, da bi a wobehu me no na mesεn h daa.) Do 
you understand? We are all just there, hanging. [Laughter by the group.] 
Dan: So you are all hanging frogs?  
John: Some of us are even crabs, both mother and child are crawling so you 
cannot distinguish which of them is teaching the other how to walk. 
[Another outburst of laughter by the group.] We have no help. 
Dan: Can you explain?  
John: That is what I am coming to. We have no help. If you have the time, let us 
visit some of the villages with a vehicle pretending to be looking for yams 
to buy. The farmers in the villages will give them to us for free. They will 
ask us to take whatever we want away without asking for even half a 
penny. The yam has been in the barn for so long that it has started germi-
nating again. And so if you are a farmer what will be the motivation to 
farm? Nowadays, we are merely surviving from hand to mouth. There is 
nothing to fall on in case of emergency. People are so poor that even 
thieves have become redundant (akrmfo  koraaa ab asesa). If I have 
ten children, then together with my wife, my family comes up to twelve. 
Paying six thousand times twelve is a problem. So it is because we have no 
good jobs in the community that is why we cannot pay the premiums. This 
is a problem that affects all of us in the community. There is no antelope 
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and there is no tiger, we are all animals. (Yε nnyi twe εnnyi  sebo, yεn 
nyinaa yε mmoa dmma.) Do you understand? 
 
John’s remarks show in a vivid way one sense in which the community 
abstracts “the poor” in a wider sense. It emphasises the point that structural 
poverty affects the entire community and so they all consider themselves as 
poor. That is, however, not to suggest that the community does not recognise 
indigents among them. In so doing, the distinguishing feature becomes the local 
concept “ohia buroburoo” which literally means ‘abject poverty’ although 
“destitute”, “pauper” and “poorest of the poor” convey the meaning very well. 
That is the sense in which the vulnerable poor is conceptualised by the commu-
nity. The commonly cited categories are orphans and widows but in general the 
aged, children and women are cited as deserving support when the community 
accepts them as “needy and less fortunate”.  
I should mention that there are quite a number of malnourished children 
walking around in the communities and the sight of frail looking old people is 
not uncommon. There are also teenage mothers struggling with life. But when 
community people are making distinctions about the poor and vulnerable, they 
might not necessarily refer to these alone because “the poor” is not merely 
economic or physical want or appearance. Nevertheless, the terms “needy and 
less fortunate” and the “poorest of the poor” would refer to a few of them. In 
other words, although the community accepts that there are some who are poor 
and cannot pay, in practice, “the poor” is highly contested. This is the height of 
social ambiguity in the way people conceptualise the vulnerable poor when it 
comes to ability to pay insurance premiums. Why? Based on several discussions 
and conversations with the people, the following provide some explanations. 
 
Why ‘the poor’ is contested 
In the Nkoranza district, the fundamental reason why many contest the defini-
tion of the poor is related to the premium level per annum. Despite the relatively 
low levels of total subscriptions, the popular view among people in the commu-
nity is that the premium per se is affordable, particularly when compared with 
other expenditures that accompany other needs for assistance such as funerals. 
There is, therefore, a school of thought that believes that with a little effort each 
individual should be able to pay. This idea was carried across to me in several 
discussions and conversations. The following statement made by the pastor of a 
local branch of one of the mainline Christian churches in Ghana typifies the 
view: 
 
I don’t think I will agree entirely with you that people cannot afford to pay ¢6,000 
for the whole year. I know we have poor people but unless you have so many 
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children then if you refuse to pay 6,000 for the whole year for yourself and your 
children, I don't think I will sympathize with that person if he falls sick. Yes, 
because you see when someone dies, they spend huge sums of money. That, they are 
able to do. You see if you are a “responsible” adult and you cannot afford paying a 
yearly premium for your parents but when it comes to funeral you can contribute 
more than necessary, then I don't think that person is being reasonable. The ¢6,000 
will cater for any expense that will be made when that person goes to admission.  
 
A counter school of thought exists that believes that the responsibility for 
paying usually falls on one person, who usually is the breadwinner. With a 
rather large average family size, payment of any premium collected within three 
months becomes a problem. 
Closely related to the above is a culturally motivated argument that since 
everybody belongs to a family, “the poor” ought to be catered for by their 
families. This argument was often made against the background of the hypo-
critical show of family solidarity during funerals at the expense of the care of 
the poor and indigents. A local assemblywoman of Nkoranza explained it this to 
me during a conversation with her: 
 
There is need to help paupers but they should be people who really need help. For 
example, there are people who have no offspring and are quite sick. For such people 
the scheme could help. But even the handicapped belong to families and so their 
families should pay for them.  
 
There is another socially constructed argument that even the so-called indigents 
are only poor because of their laid-back attitude towards the scheme. A female 
informant at Nkoranza expressed the following sentiments: 
 
Why should some people be classified as poor? This is wrong. Once they can eat, 
they are not poor. If you consider what people spend when they go to hospital each 
time it is nothing. They are not poor. Everybody is doing something and manages to 
make ends meet so they ought to be able to afford.  
 
Another aspect of the perceived attitudinal problem against “the poor” is that 
they are prepared to help themselves when efforts are made to help them. In 
other words, some in the community hold the view that some of those who 
claim to be too poor to pay have not been challenged to attempt to succeed. 
Ernest, who used to be a premium collector for the insurance scheme in a 
suburb of Nkoranza, explained this while in the company of other participants 
of an all male FGD:  
 
Some are really poor; but the reason why I can also not hold brief for many is that 
sometime around 1993 the scheme implementers tried some susu scheme to help 
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those who were poor. The people did not patronise it. At the moment, the registra-
tion is open but people are not paying till when it is three days to the end, you will 
see them rushing. So some people can actually not afford; but they would be quite 
few in the very remote areas of the district. They blame their attitude on being poor; 
they make no effort to help themselves. 
 
Conventional notions about the poor and vulnerable who do not receive health 
care due to difficult access to money often include women. This was one reason 
I took great pains in including a proportionate number of women in my 
sampling. One of the striking observations in Nkoranza district was that the 
group of informants who most strongly contested “the poor” argument on the 
basis of affordability happened to be women. Infact, during a conversation with 
the Omanhene of Nkoranza at which community female activist and leader was 
present, he suggested that the economic situation of women was not as bad as I 
perceived it:  
 
 As for women if you need any big loan in the community, they are the ones who can 
give it to you. The women of today are very resourceful and enterprising so they are 
not poor. It is the women who buy the yams in the villages and send them to Accra 
for sale. Some take them to Kumasi while others sell them here. It’s the same with 
maize. So, now, the money is not in the pockets of men but the purse of women. As 
for the aged, their children look after them. Some children send money from abroad 
to pay for their aged parents. But as for the women if you need any loan, don’t stop 
at the door of any man. Go to the women.  
 
Depending on how one looks at it, the above perception of the economic power 
of women could on one hand be taken as an affirmation of the enterprise of 
women in the community. On the other hand, when I consider it against the 
strong vocal stance of women that the premium rate in Nkoranza was afford-
able, the message of women could be a protest against spouses who use non-
affordability as an excuse to deny women and children health care. Indeed, in a 
later interview with the only female representative on the Nkoranza insurance 
advisory board, she explained to me that many of the men in the district had 
divorced their wives or separated from them and left the burden of care 
including health care on the women to struggle to deal with. Accordingly, 
women are conveying a protest against this irresponsible attitude of some men. 
Another ground upon which the definition of the poor is contested is associ-
ated with how the community judges the way individuals make choices between 
the necessities and the pleasures of life. The poor, therefore, lose the support 
and sympathy of the community if they over indulge in socially disapproved 
behaviour such as “excessive” or habitual drinking of alcohol at the expense of 
their expected social responsibilities. One local leader in Kranka put it bluntly: 
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People still manage as much as 20,000 cedis to buy lotto ticket every week when 
they have not paid their children’s premium. If tomorrow the child is admitted and 
he is asked to pay 300,000 cedis then he will start crying. Someone has spent about 
1000 cedis drinking alcohol this morning. One year is long enough for people to 
save towards it [the premium] but they still ignore it. 
 
What the foregoing yet again suggests is that the meaning of “the poor” that is 
commonly manifested as economic or physical want is highly mediated by 
social and cultural determinants. Although “the poor” exist, distinguishing them 
in the rural setting in the context of perceived ability and willingness to pay 
premiums involves social complexities. One obvious outcome emerges from 
this ambiguity. The task of identifying the poor must involve processes that do 
not only take the views of the community at large into consideration but as 
much as possible include their active involvement. I will take up the issue later 
in the discussion but I now turn to examine how the community expresses 
benefits of social health insurance scheme to “the poor” who are able to afford 
the premiums. 
 
How people perceive benefits of insurance to the wider poor in the community 
In the absence of quantitative data (which in all sincerity would require a 
separate study), I rely on the testimonies and accounts of people in the commu-
nity to illustrate how they perceive the benefits of the scheme to “the poor”. 
Discussion of the benefits for the poor here refers to the poor who fall under the 
wider meaning of the poor in the community who are able to afford and pay 
their premiums. Given that wider definition, community people perceive the 
benefits of social health insurance to “the poor” in three mutually exclusive 
social dimensions, namely the individual, the family and the community.  
At the individual level people commonly speak of insurance as being “the 
saviour” of the poor who previously or otherwise would have found it difficult 
to afford the cost of hospital care. The case of Alice is a good example of how 
health insurance benefits the poor who, as a result of insurance, now have 
regular access to health care. Given the financial cost of the treatment that saved 
her life, she testified that it would have been impossible for her and her family 
to have met the cost of health care alone. Apart from her declaration, there are 
other testimonies about individual benefits were quite common from subscribers 
as the following from two participants at a male FGD in Nkoranza illustrate.  
 
I have been admitted there for 2 weeks before and that was 2 years ago. My father 
has also been admitted there before and was operated upon for a “sore in the 
intestine”. At the time of discharge his medical bill was 880,000 cedis. Fifty-three 
year-old farmer  
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My experience is that my mother was hypertensive and became a regular customer 
at the hospital. Everybody in this room knows about her because she was admitted 
every month. The doctors did not get fed up with her and anytime they did every-
thing to save her life. Most of the time she spent about 10 to 14 days and it contin-
ued for 5 good years. When she died, the receipts that I obtained from the insurance 
that are on file amounted to 12.2 million. Where would we have obtained that 
money? So, as for the insurance, chief [a reference to me], it has helped us a lot. 
Forty-four year-old farmer and saw miller 
 
On one occasion, during a conversation with a sixty-seven year-old opinion 
leader, he aptly described the benefit of the Nkoranza scheme as having 
empowered the poor to be in control of their own health needs and those of their 
families. He cited his own personal situation before and after the introduction of 
the scheme to explain this point to me.  
 
Sometime ago, discharged patients used to knock at my door every now and then 
asking for a loan to pay their hospital bill before they were allowed to go home. You 
see when the hospital discharges someone from admission, it detains the person if 
she or he is unable to pay until the charges are paid. The poor people always had 
difficulty paying. Before the insurance started people used to knock at my door at 
dawn for assistance. Sometimes they pledged their maize or cassava and that would 
be the end. But since the scheme started, that has stopped considerably. Now I 
would not never mind anyone who comes to me to say that they could not register 
their child so I should give them money to go and pay their bill. Paying about eight 
thousand cedis a year to benefit from hundreds of thousands in a year has made the 
insurance a great benefit for the otherwise poor and deprived who could not afford 
health care and were just dying. 
 
Significantly, the individual benefit of the scheme was something that virtually 
every person recognised irrespective of their membership status, whether they 
were subscribers or non-subscribers. At a FGD with four non-insured men and 
two non-insured women at Nkoranza, the consensus was that “it is good 
because when you are a member it takes care of your medical expenses when 
you are admitted”.  
At another level of abstraction, people describe the benefits of insurance to 
the community-wide poor in relation to the family. Before the introduction of 
the scheme, many families experienced hospital care as a desperate financial 
situation. Sometimes loans or credit facilities were sought for urgent conditions 
at the expense of family assets and reputation. Dora, a native and local assembly 
representative of one of the electoral zones in Nkoranza described this typical 
situation in the district to me: 
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The insurance has been very helpful to families and has improved the health care 
situation of many families. People are so poor that when the scheme did not exist, it 
was very common for families to call a meeting to collect contributions before they 
could discharge relatives who went on admission at the hospital. Now everything 
has changed. Provided you have paid your premium, you only have to carry your 
card when you need admission. When you are discharged you walk home without 
paying anything. It has brought well being to all of us. It has been very helpful to 
most families and I know that some communities even wish to have a similar thing 
as we have here. We are very pleased with it.  
 
Significantly, many recalled with joy the fact that there is now “no cause” for 
family financial burdens due to health care because of insurance. “People don’t 
have to sell a family property or mortgage one of them, as was the case in the 
past, to take care of the sick,” the Omanhene of Nkoranza asserted during one 
conversation. Indeed in some rural situations either the purse or the decision of 
a male head of household was required before women and children could seek 
medical care at the health facility. In such situations, health insurance, as one 
nurse in Dodowa pointed out to me “has offered a great opportunity for women 
and children who are the most vulnerable to have access to timely health care”. 
At an even wider level of abstraction, the community also acknowledges the 
benefit of insurance to an entirely poor community. When participants referred 
to this wider aspect of benefit, the historical context prior to the introduction of 
the scheme was usually mentioned. A participant at a male focus group discus-
sion in Nkoranza captured this point very well: 
 
One reason why insurance was started at Nkoranza was that the death rate at the 
hospital was very high. People were just dying like that in the hospital and the 
doctors became very alarmed. After an investigation by the hospital, they found out 
that when people fell sick, they stayed at home for so long because they did not have 
the money to go to hospital. As a result they sought treatment only when the 
sickness had got to a critical point, which was the stage the family was prepared to 
contribute money to assist hospital expenses. It was the concern for this that 
prompted Dr. Bosman and her team to search for assistance to establish the scheme. 
Due to poverty, people were unable to report early for treatment and it was this that 
led to the introduction of the scheme. Since the scheme was established, that health 
profile of the district has changed for the better.  
 
At Kranka, one of the scheme’s field collectors (as the premium collectors are 
called), characterised the benefit of the scheme to the “entire poor community” 
to me:  
 
This community is entirely made up of poor farmers. Many people were not able to 
pay their medical bills and some were detained for weeks. Some run away after 
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undergoing treatment and others even died. It has therefore been very helpful to our 
poor farming community. I know of a man who lives across the street. He embodies 
poverty. (Ohia ayi no.) He used to be frequently ill and seeking medication was 
always a problem for him. When the scheme started I advised him to register and he 
took my advice. The scheme became the solution to his poor health and since then 
he has become its disciple, spreading its virtues. He is an example of our poor rural 
folks who have difficulty attending hospital when they need it. Indeed, because of 
insurance many poor farmers in the community have had their “parkers” (strangu-
lated hernia) removed. 
 
In talking about the benefits of insurance with reference to the poor, one impor-
tant qualification that did not escape mention was the clear-cut condition that 
benefit is only possible “if the poor are able to pay their premiums”. That 
consideration usually opened a door to discuss ways in which the community 
feel “the poorest of the poor” or destitute and indigents could be assisted. The 
next section briefly deals with that.  
 
How can “the poor” who cannot pay be helped? 
It is the view of people in the community that one way by which the poor who 
cannot pay can be assisted is through their families. This was a popular idea in 
various focus groups. In light of their own admission that the family has 
become less effective in providing support I always challenged this suggestion. 
But the family support suggestion was always offered as a moral argument on 
the ground that the family ought to support its indigents just as it supports its 
dead. At one of the sessions in Nkoranza one participant expressed the view as 
follows: 
 
Our elders have a saying that the family is one. Although the inheritance system has 
changed in recent times, some families are still able to help their members who fall 
into needy situations. However, some families are selective when it comes to 
providing support. It all depends on the character of the members in the family. As 
the saying goes the family loves the dead (abusua d  funu). When it is a matter of 
death, they will support but giving money to help during sickness does not happen. 
Since everyone belongs to a family, I feel in every family those who are capable 
should help those who are not capable of paying for themselves.  
 
Some in the community would also rather have “the church” take responsibility 
for the “the poor” by paying for their insurance for both religious and social 
reasons. Many expect that the church, more than any other social group has a 
responsibility to look after the sick, orphaned and widowed. “True worship or 
Christianity is looking after the poor, orphans and widows; this is godliness 
with contentment,” one professional teacher and local church leader at 
Nkoranza said. Socially, many expect the church to offer assistance as a recipro-
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cal gesture for “such people who fulfil their obligatory church contributions in 
the form of church collections and tithes”. Using church funds for such 
assistance is perceived as helping the work of God. 
For an overwhelming number of informants, the care of “the poor” and 
indigent in an era of health insurance must be assumed by the state, just as it 
had been under fee payment at the point of use. Since this is the most pragmatic 
suggestion among the lot, I discuss it in the concluding section of this chapter. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The primary goal of creating a community social health insurance in Ghana is to 
provide access and equity to health care for the poor and the vulnerable. 
Because of their voluntary nature, however, benefit from such schemes is 
contingent on the payment of premiums. Since affordability is a key criterion, 
those who cannot afford premiums lose out. In this respect, the important 
lessons learned about mutual insurance in Europe were that insurance did not 
gather the poor and vulnerable with it. Mutual aid societies in 19th century 
Europe, according to de Swaan (1988) “represented a form of authentic solidar-
ity and collective care, widely and densely spread, and managed on a small 
scale by autonomous members”. However, the collective arrangements 
excluded the less privileged because apart from being excluded on the basis of 
being bad risks, “to these paupers, wretches, lumpen, the pressures of daily 
survival were often too great for them to afford a penny a week for the burial 
society, let alone for the sick fund” (De Swaan 1988: 147). It took the interven-
tion of state free care policy in the course of time to bring services to the poor 
(De Swaan 1988). Within Africa, Criel (1999: 115) has also reported that in 
Bwamanda, the poor are underrepresented. 
This situation cries out for a need to design strategies to take care of the 
vulnerable poor. Invariably, the effectiveness of insurance in protecting the 
vulnerable poor returns to the question of effectiveness of exemption mecha-
nisms for the indigent. Exemptions and waivers are seen as strategic design 
features of most cost recovery programs that are used to ensure access to the 
poor and medically vulnerable.  
In practice, Ghana’s experience with exemption has been a dirge of disaster 
and tremendous abuse. Institutions abused the official policy on exemptions and 
as one report has noted, “exemptions as provided for the Hospital Fee Act and 
by the Legislative Instrument was not focused on the socially disadvantaged. 
Though provisions have been made for paupers and indigents, a lot more have 
been made available to other categories of people who may be in the position to 
pay”. The less privileged thus lost out (MoH, Ghana 1996:7). Exemption 
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mechanisms have not been effective in achieving the main goal of ensuring 
access of health care to the poor. One aspect of the problem has been in relation 
to the definition and processes involved in defining the poor. While the policy 
set criteria for various groups of patients, including health staff as well as 
patients with certain conditions, no criteria were made for the poor. That task of 
determining “the poor” or pauper was conferred on a social welfare officer at 
health institutions where one was available. Failing that, it was vested in the 
authority of the head of institution.  
However, since many hospitals did not have a social welfare officer and the 
institutions were more interested in maximising revenue, the pauper privilege 
was often ignored. The application of the exemption policy had been rather 
abused to serve the needs and desires of health staff and their relatives and 
friends. This has often left paupers and the poor without care. For instance, a 
study of exemption practices in the Volta region involving the 25 main provid-
ers of health services, found that the bulk of exemption (72% compared to 6% 
of paupers) were granted to health staff and their dependants, some of whom 
had sound financial base to pay for service (Nyonator et al. n.d.). To date, the 
country still has still not been able to fashion an efficient exemption mechanism 
that functionally provides ready and easy health care for the exempted class.  
The problems of abuse through exemptions are not unique to Ghana. De 
Swaan has noted that when a government introduces exemptions and subsidies 
in an attempt to persuade funds to include the most vulnerable groups, it is the 
well to do who make the most of these privileges (De Swaan 1996). This was 
true in nineteenth century England, when Anglican clergymen used their 
privileges to increase their own pension funds, and it is true today in India, 
when housewives from the educated classes contrive to obtain governmental 
loans on favourable terms that are intended for the financially weak, but seldom 
reach them.  
Notwithstanding the problems with exemption mechanisms, they constitute a 
necessary means for protecting the poor against the problems of access and 
equity. Indeed, most informants in this study perceive it as a moral responsibil-
ity of the state to provide exemptions for those who cannot afford health care in 
view of their socio-economic deprivations. Mechanisms that can be adapted to 
local realities through negotiation with community people need to be consid-
ered. The strong, socially mediated meaning of the poor in the communities 
makes such an approach necessary. This is all the more important since exemp-
tion plans for the poor have a tendency to create problems of confidence and 
interest in the health care system. Confidence has a moral connotation but given 
the strong social dimensions in the meaning of being poor, some amount of 
community representation in decision-making will be a realistic option. 
  
  
170
 
One sociological consistency that De Swaan emphasises in his analysis of 
forms of solidarity and collective arrangements in the 19th century is that “a 
system of small, autonomous, collective provisions always excludes a substra-
tum” (De Swaan 1988: 147). This phenomenon accounted for the exclusion of 
the poor from the mutual funds of the better off workers. In the present analysis, 
we can explain the relationships of the poor and indigent in social health 
insurance within a context of balanced reciprocity involving solidarity. The 
“payment of premium” in insurance is a predetermined balanced transaction. In 
line with the principle of balance therefore, those who pay their premiums are 
those who receive support when in need, according to the defined policy. “The 
poor” and indigent who cannot afford the premium are left out. The importance 
of the exchange is that it shows the negative side of the concept of reciprocity: 
that those who are vulnerable and poor and whose circumstances do not permit 
them to pay are those who also miss out. As much as the reciprocity underlying 
the solidarity arrangement rewards those who participate in the exchange 
agreement, in the case of the poor, it also acts as a mechanism of exclusion.  
A lot has been said about the potential of insurance to provide access to the 
poor. In this chapter, I have shown that two types of poor people exist but 
typically this is conceived in relation to the wider meaning of the poor. The 
vulnerable poor are left out. While governments or states (the subject of the 
next chapter) in sub-Saharan Africa are pursuing ways of developing schemes 
based on universalistic solidarity, there is also a pressing need to design 
effective exemption strategies to take care of the indigent if the goal of univer-
sal access is to be attained. Although no hard quantitative data has been used 
here, the testimonies of implementers and community people have provided 
ample exploration of the existing problem. It will however, require further 
quantitative, population-based study to know the magnitude of the problem of 
the poor in order to plan effective exemption policies to tackle it.  
 
 
 
 
8 
The role of the state in the  
making of community health  
insurance schemes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the basic components of any health insurance scheme is fund ownership 
and management. In any evaluation of the efficiency of community health 
insurance or protection mechanisms, an essential ingredient is the level of 
funding that can be generated and the ability of that revenue to sustain the 
scheme. The continuity of the scheme depends on the extent of people’s 
participation in it. In voluntary health insurance schemes such as those in the 
informal rural sector, people’s participation depends in particular on their 
acceptance of the concept of risk sharing solidarity that underlies the scheme. 
But also of crucial importance is how they conceive those who own and manage 
the funds on their behalf. Fund ownership and management can be run by 
government (state) organisations or non-governmental (non-state) organisations. 
Against the background of the emerging context of health insurance schemes in 
Ghana (particularly those suited to the rural informal sector), this chapter asks 
the question: Do people look upon the state as a possible financial caretaker or 
bursar of their health insurance scheme? If so, how? 
In order for community health insurance to be scaled up as a national 
strategy, the state needs to play a major role. In taking the state as my central 
focus, I consider the existing context in Ghana in which the state has been at the 
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forefront of on-going attempts to implement a comprehensive health insurance 
scheme as an alternative health care financing mechanism to replace the 
problematic “cash and carry system” in the country. Since comparison is a 
central focus of this study, I look at the situation of a planned scheme in which 
funds are (or would be) owned and controlled through a hierarchy of state 
officials (such as the failed NHIS pilot scheme), together with the decentralised 
district alternative Dodowa scheme. I compare those with a scheme in which 
funds are owned and controlled by officials of a non-governmental organisation 
as is the case with the present Nkoranza scheme.  
Although the focus is on community members, in order to place the discus-
sion in a wider policy framework, I begin the analysis with a qualitative exami-
nation of the prevailing policy context based on conversations with policy 
makers, implementers and health staff. This is followed by a qualitative analysis 
of how the people also perceive the state as a bursar of their health insurance 
scheme based on prevailing assumptions and previous experiences with local 
mutual and/or micro finance schemes. Based on data from Nkoranza and 
Dodowa, I further contrast and discuss quantitative findings in which who the 
people trust most to be the owner of their insurance scheme, the government or 
an NGO, is discussed, and why that is. I conclude with a discussion of whether 
it is possible for the state to exert or inspire the necessary social influence or 
social capital on the community to make insurance succeed.  
 
 
Policy, implementers and health staff perspectives 
 
No legislation on health insurance in Ghana exists yet, but since the government 
accepted the final feasibility report in 1995 to implement a national scheme, 
several papers, reports and documents have been written, some of them in 
political party manifestos. For my present purpose, however, one notable 
reference is the 1995 final report on the feasibility study for the establishment of 
national health insurance scheme (NHIS) in Ghana. In its key recommendation 
for a generic NHIS, the consultants noted that sponsorship ought to be borne by 
the state in recognition of “certain weakness and problems1, which will make 
the establishment of the NHIS in Ghana difficult”. In retrospect it is possible to 
see that the state funding and management of Ghana’s NHIS partly explains the 
function and character that the ill-fated pilot health insurance scheme in the 
                                                 
1 Among the identified problems and weaknesses are “the unduly large proportion of 
self-employed which makes premium collection difficult and cumbersome, the state of 
disrepair of the infrastructure and the distribution of health institutions which is skewed 
in favour of the urban centres” (pp. xii-xiii).  
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Eastern region assumed. A former Director of Medical Services and later 
deputy minister of health, Dr. Moses Adibo, explained the background of the 
aborted plan that the MoH had accepted:  
 
At the time we initiated the implementation, many of those in the ministry (who 
were mainly medical doctors) who were involved in the implementation had studied 
in Germany. They therefore only knew about the German social insurance. That 
system as far as I know is mainly based on contributions from workers. And that 
unfortunately was how they thought the Eastern region scheme was going to be run. 
In fact they had done everything and they had even written a memo to cabinet to 
authorize them to set up a company to run it. But when I was brought back as deputy 
minister in 1998, and I looked at it, I thought the approach was wrong so I said that 
government would not be involved in running health insurance schemes.  
 
This is a typical story of state projects that are hastily implemented with 
enormous resources but which go down the drain. The obvious question to ask 
here is: What accounted for the change in direction? When and why did policy 
makers like the former minister begin to feel it was not necessary for the state to 
be involved in the funding and the running of health insurance?  
Primarily, the shift in policy appeared to have started even before the pilot 
study, after an ill-fated sensitisation programme in the four pilot districts. 
Overall, the lessons of that abortive pilot, together with the outcome of several 
activities and reviews undertaken by the ministry of health and other interested 
parties and organisations in health insurance led to the change. The new 
orientation appears to be that the state should not be an agent or fund owner in 
community schemes. This was the overriding consensus conveyed to me by 
policy makers and implementers as well as health staff at various levels of the 
health service headquarters in the present study. Why? 
One reason is that the processes involved in having a scheme under state 
control would entail unnecessary bureaucracy that would make overhead costs 
relatively too high. Specifically, the view is that when financial administration 
and management goes under state or parastatal institutions, the scheme carries 
the brunt of all its administrative features as well as the difficulties and 
inefficiencies of that bureaucratic organisation. Consistent with his position that 
the state should not be involved in running health insurance, Dr. Adibo further 
explained his worries about state ownership: 
 
If the state has to do it then it has to be one huge national one. The overheads would 
be too much. If you take SSNIT they say that their overheads are 40% and that 
suggests outright that you should not give it to SSNIT because if you involve them 
then immediately your overheads are 40%. Health care costs are going up so you 
will lose. For me that is all the more reason why community based ones centred 
around the district are more attractive… more so because less than 10% of the 
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population are salaried workers. The best alternative was for us to look at some 
traditional practices like susu and see if we could not modify or refashion them to 
suit our circumstances. 
 
Accordingly, current policy and on-going activities tend to stress the develop-
ment of multi schemes owned by specified groups and communities rather than 
the ones centrally funded and managed by the state.  
It is quite phenomenal that in civic life most citizens rationally pursue what 
they would get out of the state and community but not what they would contrib-
ute to it. This attitude is reflected in several spheres of life in state-citizen 
relations. People are always quick and proud to exercise their rights to the 
privileges of what belongs to the state, but reluctant to take up responsibilities 
to the state. This has become a real problem in the Ghanaian society, and as a 
result there is some concern that if the state takes centre stage, people would shy 
away from it. Dr. Adibo reaffirmed his dissenting view on government partici-
pation in health insurance as follows: 
 
The Ghanaian’s concept of government is such that they think it’s some benevolent 
organisation sitting somewhere who will do everything for them for free. That is the 
way Ghanaians see government. They don’t see themselves as part of government so 
they like free things and they expect everything to be free. They don’t know that 
there is no free lunch. The irony is that usually it is the ‘big men’ who want things 
free. You have a friend who is a manager somewhere and walks into your consulting 
room or office and say I want some ampicillin and they expect you to dish it out free 
when as a matter of fact by his status he is the one who should pay more. So these 
are some of our own practices that create problems for us in health care financing. 
When I look at such things I get more convinced that the government should not be 
involved in running health insurance schemes.  
 
It is important to recall a similar observation by the manager of the Nkoranza 
scheme:  
 
Anything that is owned by the government people think is free (bontu2). They 
consider it like elephant meat and so they are not judicious in how they cut it… It is 
state property (ah aban dea) and that actually spoils everything that belongs to the 
government”.  
 
Probably Ghanaians at large take the paternal role of the state too literally or 
they just do not care about what happens to an entity like the state. Public 
apathy towards state property remains a phenomenon too disturbing to ignore in 
any state plans. Yet this is only one out of many reasons. What are the others? 
                                                 
2 An old local expression which is probably appropriated from the English “booty”. 
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Although the Eastern region pilot project never concretely began, it taught 
one important lesson. It acknowledged that state participation in insurance is 
essential for attaining the necessary legislative, political and to some extent, the 
economic context for success, even though at the same time state bureaucracy 
and political clout makes state ownership and control a nuisance. Each step in a 
community scheme is a new experience that must be learned within each new 
geographical region. Mistakes are made and corrected in the course of progress, 
and a lot of learning is gained through experience. The lesson of the defunct 
pilot scheme, which seems to be evidence against state ownership and control, 
is that because the state was in the driver’s seat, elaborate legislative processes 
at every stage slackened the pace because every decision had to be politically 
agreeable. Another aspect of political clout is that when people perceive the 
state in terms of the political authority in power, then political ideology might 
unduly influence people’s attitude towards it. At any one time those who are not 
in favour of the government of the day might not join merely because of 
political differences. Based on privileged information he acquired through his 
position, the regional coordinator of the abortive NHIS characterised the 
problem as follows: 
 
Something that is being done by the government has some political inclinations and 
that was why they were so cautious about whatever step they took [in the abortive 
scheme]. I was always convinced that we may not know all the problems before the 
take off, but here was the other side that let us try to unearth a lot of problems, and 
so we had to go through meticulous calculations. Someone made an analogy to me 
the other day that if a child falls to the ground he gets up and brushes off his side 
and walks off. But when an adult falls, his immediate worry is who is looking at me? 
In other words, children move on after little slips without worry because society 
perceives them as learners who pick up lessons along the way. But because adults 
have to explain their slips they move too slowly. That is the argument for the state 
and non-state situations. If it is initiated by a group of individuals or community 
without political undertones, it’s easy to move on. Whether it succeeds or not is 
known by experiment. 
 
Yet another view from Suhum closely related to the above is that based on 
previous bad experiences with micro finance schemes in the communities, 
“people are tired of contributing and their voluntary spirit is exhausted”. As a 
result any scheme in the community ought to “be the simplest of its type so that 
if you have to abandon it you do not leave a big building in Suhum”. 
It was from the relatively longer existing insurance scheme in Nkoranza 
district that I picked up on a lot of arguments against state funding and running 
of schemes from a range of implementers and health staff. A number of those 
arguments were related to the work culture of public institutions and the 
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behavioural norms of its staff. One of the key worries about state run schemes 
was associated with financial accountability. By their nature, community health 
schemes are necessarily non-profit, yet as with all financial activities, account-
ability is essential for monitoring performance to ensure financial discipline. 
Most implementers that I spoke to in Nkoranza, however, did not think highly 
of the level of accountability and financial discipline in the state sector. The 
diocesan public health coordinator of Sunyani, who directly oversees the 
Nkoranza scheme, lamented the lack of efficient accountability in the state 
sector:  
 
Spending is more strictly controlled in mission than in government hospitals. Then 
also in mission hospitals, we tend to assign people to jobs and so you are held 
personally accountable for lapses. In the government sector even though that also 
ought to be the case, it is an array of staff that normally tends to be blamed so it is 
easy if you are getting difficulties to move away. In our mission areas that is not the 
case. For instance, if this scheme [in Nkoranza] collapses, I am going to bear the 
brunt, the same applies to the manager and the coordinators. You cannot push that to 
any other person or persons. In government circles that is easy to do and as soon as 
the thing collapses then I would go on transfer. That kind of informal monitoring 
process makes people feel secure even when they are doing the wrong thing.  
 
Apart from financial inadequacies, there was also the view that compared to 
mission institutions, the state system generally lacks an adequate and efficient 
administrative monitoring of its health staff. There are worries that this may 
negatively impact the efficiency of any schemes that may come under the 
control of the state. Inefficient administrative monitoring is acknowledged as 
having been responsible for undue laxity in the attitudes of health staff which 
has in turn led to poor discipline and poor work ethic. A 46-year-old nurse 
midwife at the Nkoranza hospital who was enrolled in the insurance program 
explained the situation to me this way: 
 
My experience is that although I do not work at a government facility, I have 
attended Sunyani government hospital before and I have friends working there so I 
know what is going on. The attitude of the staff working in government institutions 
is different. In mission hospital the monitoring is strict but in government hospital it 
is not so. For example in the government hospital, it is possible for two nurses on 
duty to plan the routine to excuse one from duty so that instead of two people one of 
them will be working. In mission hospital like here [Nkoranza] it is not like that. 
The authorities are very strict and serious with monitoring, so two staff members 
cannot arrange cover for one another without express permission from the head. 
Indeed, usually it is not possible and you can cover for someone if you are off duty 
so that there is no shortage. I am not saying government hospitals are not firm, but 
when you compare the two places one is stricter than the other. 
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Related to accountability, implementers from the NGO run insurance scheme 
had concerns about corruption in the state sector. The problem of corruption is 
well known in Ghanaian public life. One major cause of corruption is the low 
wages of staff. In order to survive, it has become a norm typified by a common 
saying among all shades of salaried workers, but particularly those in the public 
sector that everybody chops3 from his job (obiara didi n’adwuma ho). A para-
medical male staff of Nkoranza hospital explained it this way:  
 
I have been party to collecting monies for doctors in their consulting rooms before 
when I was in training in a government hospital. The system there is such that you 
can’t say “no” because they say every patient that comes for consultation pays it.  
 
However, further conversations revealed a significant irony in the public health 
service: the practice of bribe taking and corruption has not only become part of 
expected wages, but it has become entrenched in everyday life. The public has 
been active accomplices to the point that they sometimes become suspicious or 
doubtful of health staff or officers who refuse to accept voluntary “cash gifts” 
from clients. The district director of health services, who also practiced as a 
clinician at the Nkoranza hospital, narrated to me his own experience as an 
intern in a teaching hospital: 
 
You see when I was in Komfo Anokye teaching hospital, a patient once told me: “If 
you refuse to accept money, it means that you are not going to look after my child 
well”. (Sε wo angye sika no a, na εkyerε sε wo nnhwε me ba no yie.) That is how the 
norms in the public sector change, because of the perception of people about that 
sector.  
 
The reality of the situation in the public sector is that the realisation by citizens 
that things sometimes do not move as expected without greasing the palms of 
relevant officials, is not a new phenomenon; but it is worrying since in health 
care it leads to a vicious cycle of poor care and/or further exclusion of the poor 
and vulnerable.  
I ought to point out these “allegations” from Nkoranza, which is a mission 
outfit, against the public sector does not rule out some element of bias, nor does 
it make the “allegations” untrue. Dodowa, with its shorter period of experience 
but very effective district health management team, however, provided an 
opportunity for a defence of the public sector. The reactions of entirely public 
sector implementers and health staff to some of the foregoing issues are inter-
esting. 
                                                 
3 This word is  Ghanaian slang for eating.  
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They do not deny the problems or allegations. Many in that sector feel that 
the problems are explainable in their total social context. For example, one 
medical officer briefly explained poor staff attitude as follows: 
 
 From the point of view of the client what we always know and hear is that the nurse 
is being rude and she kept us waiting for two hours and we are dying… It is not an 
easy problem and we may not have all the resources to solve them. There are very 
big obstacles and some of the things need systemic change. For example, if you take 
the issue of staff salary you cannot do anything about it at the district level. And yet 
that is just one aspect of the problem. In order to look at the problem of staff attitude 
holistically, we cannot ignore education for their children. Unfortunately people in 
the system sometimes do not want to hear about new ideas, which seem radically 
different from the way they do things especially if you meet a proper bureaucrat. 
That is why the public system remains the way it is.  
 
At a later opportunity, I bluntly asked the district director whether in her view 
and experience the state could be trusted to be a fund owner and administrator 
of a community insurance scheme. Her response, while discounting fully state 
schemes and accounting for the human and social deficiencies of the state 
sector, justified why in her view the district model that she had been spear-
heading was a better alternative: 
 
The scheme can be easily mismanaged if the state is in control because it would be 
too large to control. The administrative, organizational and monitoring systems are 
so weak that it is in our interest to decentralise to the district. The way things are if 
there are bad nuts in the system, it can ruin the whole scheme. The only way the 
good talent can come up is to decentralise at the district level. At worst it is good to 
keep it at the region because of lack of manpower and knowledge. The state could 
then focus on building, handling and processing and thereby creating an even 
climate for the lower levels to have the freedom to grow. 
 
From the foregoing analysis, we could summarise the key strands of policy 
implementers’ views on state funding and ownership of insurance. Beyond the 
well-known technical reasons, pertinent social and contextual factors make state 
funding and/or management of health insurance schemes in Ghana ill advised. 
The interesting aspect of the arguments of policy implementers is a view that in 
order to deal with the myriad of problems “the system first has to deal with the 
problems of the working staff”. For the present analysis however, it is important 
to acknowledge that social concerns about staff attitude and credibility based on 
inadequacies of a system in terms of its ability to deliver services has implica-
tions for the trust and confidence that are essential for people’s participation in 
voluntary schemes.  
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I will later discuss how trust could influence solidarity towards schemes, but 
in the meantime I turn to examine the people’s side of the argument for and 
against state agency in health insurance. 
 
 
People’s perspectives: Do the people also look up to the state?  
 
In general, people look upon fund ownership by the state with mixed expecta-
tions that are usually more pessimistic than optimistic. The mixed expectations 
are derived from considerable interest in obtaining social protection against an 
ever increasing cost of medical care, but many are doubtful about the ability of 
the state to offer such a service. The minimal sense in which people favour state 
ownership is expressed in two ways. Significantly, both views come from 
informants in Suhum and Dodowa Districts. The first is based on a miscalcu-
lated assumption that the nation state more than any other entity is in a better 
position to provide the financial resources to capitalise and offer the technical 
capacity needed to get the scheme going. Unfortunately, the reality of the 
Ghanaian economy does not support such an assumption. As a free market 
economy, the competing demands of various social sectors simply do not entitle 
any one service or sector to have more than its essential quota from the national 
coffers.  
A second argument that a few people use in favour of state funding and 
administration, also a hypothetical one, is that since public health facilities 
cover the entire length and breadth of the country, state ownership would 
facilitate a wider geographical coverage. To paraphrase one informant in 
Suhum, “The government is a big body; it reaches everywhere”. A few 
informants were indifferent about ownership. “What is important is that the 
nurses will speak nicely to us and the doctor will give us the correct drugs when 
we join the association. I don’t mind whether it belongs to the government or 
the district assembly,” said one informant in Dawa during an FGD session. 
What is obvious from the remark is that ordinary folks sometimes mix up 
central government administration and decentralised district administration 
when such issues are being discussed. 
Most of peoples’ perceptions of state ownership of insurance schemes were 
sceptical. Many aspects of this scepticism, stem from lack of trust or faith in 
public officials and politicians as a result of their failure to deliver on most of 
past promises. Some of the concerns were morally conceived and derived from 
what people consider right and wrong or good and bad behaviour and attitudes 
of officials and politicians. As expected, in the absence of a functional scheme 
at the time of my first visit in Suhum and Dodowa Districts, peoples’ views 
about the state were impressionistic and vague. Their concerns were lack of 
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integrity, the potential for bribery and corruption and the tendency of state 
officials towards favouritism. On the other hand, informants in Nkoranza, 
whose opinions are based on eight years of experience, tended to focus more on 
practical operational issues involved in managing community schemes. Issues 
that frequently got highlighted were: inefficient administrative and financial 
monitoring systems, a lack of proper accountability in the public sector and a 
lack of commitment by state officials and state bureaucracy. In both districts, 
however, one common concern about state ownership was trustworthiness.  
 
Suhum and Dodowa District 
The underlying sentiment towards state funded and owned schemes in Suhum 
District is well captured in the following remark of a participant in a male focus 
group discussion in Suhum: 
 
The only concern about state ownership is trustworthiness on the part of those who 
will be in charge. Would they faithfully give ‘equal treatment’ to clients? When it 
comes to state schemes such as insurance those in charge rather have a tendency to 
benefit by living fat on the money and riding in big cars, such as the case of SSNIT. 
 
This message, although short, was too powerful to ignore. For analytical 
purposes, it is important not to lose sight of the reference to “trustworthiness”. 
The expression ‘equal treatment’ in the remark was meant to convey that trust 
was perceived as the essential ingredient for fair play in office holders’ dealings 
with the people. Most informants were quite suspicious about the character of 
state officials on the basis of previous experiences in spheres of state organized 
initiatives. SSNIT was always the common reference point. As the official 
social security system for the country (that however covers only the formal 
sector) SSNIT often came under public criticism for several reasons, including 
the affluent lifestyle of its senior executive and a host of perceived malpractices 
in the way the fund was managed.  
In the context of social or mutual schemes, trust is about assurance that 
monies paid or premium contributions would be used for the benefit of 
members. But whether negative public perceptions about SSNIT is justified or 
not, it is just one cited case. In virtually every community, unfavourable tales 
about the state were shared. At Dokrochiwa in Suhum District, for example, one 
female informant told me a story of how past promises to fix the deplorable 
road and to provide potable water and electricity to their village were all 
broken, in spite of the modest financial contribution the community had made 
towards those projects. In the case of the road, she lamented how a road to 
another village was shown on television to deceive the entire viewing nation 
when a minister went to visit their village during a political campaign. She 
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concluded: “I have therefore swore never to contribute money towards state 
projects in the community”.  
To some people, the state is not credible enough to hold their funds because 
of the alleged indulgence in bribe taking and corrupt practices of state officials. 
In re-emphasising the well-known problem of shop floor malpractices through 
the collection of ‘under the table monies’, one participant at a male FGD in 
Suhum gave his personal experience: 
 
 A friend of mine had an electric shock and almost died. He was later referred to 
Korlebu4 for further treatment and the hospital here (Suhum) advised him to go very 
early. He complied and on the day he attended Korlebu he was the seventh person in 
the cue. But he noticed that others who came later were entering the consulting room 
ahead of him to receive treatment. It went on until someone hinted him that he had 
to pay “something” if he wanted to go home early. Soon after he had done so he was 
called into the consulting room.  
 
In this particular story, I probed in order to gain further insight. I asked the 
speaker if the money was perhaps not paid to the doctor, but possibly to an 
orderly. But another participant quickly cut in with a fascinating remark. “The 
doctor also gets his share of the monies collected, unless you have not had the 
experience of sending a relative to a hospital before”. Indeed in the seeming 
existential doubt and uncertainty about the integrity of state officials concerning 
‘equal treatment’ or fair play, several informants also assume a position most 
often conveyed in a simple message: “unless we start...we just have to wait”. 
Similarly, in Dodowa, concerns about credibility based on honesty, 
commitment and reliability take centre stage in the way people conceive and 
describe their impressions about state funding and management of schemes. 
Some were so distrustful of the state as a result of previous experience with 
money mismanagement, that they did not even consider the decentralised 
district administration to be a reliable agent in “money matters” because of fear 
that they may misapply the funds. Rather, the district health administration was 
preferred in most cases. The reason given was “because the issue concerns 
health”. One traditional leader at Dodowa described this view as follows: 
 
These days they talk of decentralisation but if these monies are channelled through 
the assemblies all may not get to health. What we know is that sometimes when 
there are disasters like floods, the assembly would take that money and divert it. The 
Ministry of Health (district health administration) should therefore be solely respon-
sible. That money should not go into the central coffers of the district administra-
tion. 
                                                 
4 Ghana’s foremost and largest teaching hospital in Accra. 
 
 182
Quality of care has been a perennial problem in the health services in Ghana 
especially in public health institutions. The great hue and cry of people about 
quality of care in relation to the present issue was mainly about poor staff 
attitudes. Many are dissatisfied with staff, especially nurses for not working 
around the clock and because the entire service is not organised around their 
needs. One female informant and leader in Dodowa explained:  
 
I do not know why a nurse says, “I’m tired”. One is a nurse throughout 24 hours. 
Even after shifts, people will call him/her from the house”. And then the language 
they use on the patients, they have to polish it up a bit. Sometimes they will insult 
you because you were late, but they have to be patient, use polite language and seek 
to improve the service. 
 
Some were also very strongly against what they perceive as staff dishonesty. At 
Dawa in Dodowa District, for example, the group consensus at one FGD group 
discussion was the fear that if management of insurance goes under government 
control, “health staff will send drugs meant for members to their homes to treat 
their relatives and friends at our expense”.  
 
Nkoranza District 
People in this district, speak with pride about ‘our insurance’ being first and 
foremost a product of the honesty, good work and concern of the diocese and 
hospital officials for the community on one hand and their own trust and 
confidence in the implementers on the other hand. Indeed trust was emphasised 
as the miraculous foundation of the scheme. One informant at Kranka said: 
 
People were prepared to pay and join because they trusted the leadership. Everybody 
trusted Bosman (the doctor who initiated the scheme) and although it took some 
convincing, people were saying that since the white lady is involved, it will work 
(Oburoni no w mu yi deε, εbε yε yie). They trusted her and the other opinion 
leaders who got involved in it to sensitise the community. The people were God-
fearing and so the only way the government would succeed is to get God-fearing 
individuals to be in charge. 
 
In contrast to these perceptions of the mission run project, some people in 
Nkoranza District perceive the state as being unreliable, dishonest and notorious 
for misapplying, embezzling funds and lacking accountability in ‘the way it 
conducts business’. Past experiences with state enterprises and public corpora-
tions have undoubtedly contributed to this negative image of the way finances 
are handled by the state. One local leader illustrated the situation by contrasting 
the state owned mass public transport companies in Ghana with mission institu-
tions: 
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The missions control their things such that nobody can manipulate their funds. The 
state on the other hand has a lackadaisical attitude and approach to the way it 
conducts its business. One example is the state transport companies. They cannot be 
trusted, taking the accounting system into consideration. The drivers pick anybody 
up on the road without issuing tickets to them. Most state companies conduct 
purchases by buying in bulk yet at very exorbitant prices and people do not buy it. 
These are some of the things. Sometimes, when it belongs to the state, nobody takes 
the credit but once it belongs to the mission, the credit goes to the diocese. As for 
the state there will be lapses here and there. 
 
Another reason for people’s aversion to state ownership and control is that they 
perceive the state as largely bureaucratic, relatively remote and an institution 
that is difficult for ordinary folks to establish a close relationship with. Some 
informants therefore hold the view that this remote feeling leads to a loss of 
sense of identity, ownership and loyalty for ‘state owned things’. The district 
chief executive in Nkoranza referred to the phenomenon as breeding “a type of 
mentality people have towards the state property; whatever is happening, 
nobody cares”. At a male focus group discussion, one participant who was an 
officer at the district office of the Ghana Education Service supported sugges-
tions for district-based schemes with the following explanation: 
 
Size is very important when it comes to manageability of many things. Anything 
that is packaged in the name of the government has problems. Here we are able to 
check corruption, loopholes and other lapses…and people will have confidence in it. 
If it’s for Nkoranza district we love it because we believe it is for Nkoranza and 
Nkoranza alone and we feel close to it. On the other hand if it is owned and 
managed by the state from Accra my concern for it would probably not be so 
good… because Accra is too far away for me to identify with it. What belongs to us 
and what belongs to them are never the same. (εwo yεn ne εwo wn εnnsε.)  
 
There is also a strong feeling among some in Nkoranza district that the soul 
winning ideals of the church that stresses compassion and close identification 
with the community leads to a stronger integration and for that matter, better 
commitment on the part of mission staff to their work and their community. In 
contrast, the state as personified by its officials, is commonly seen as people 
who are merely working to earn a living and who are not committed enough to 
the community to devote the effort and make the sacrifice that is required to run 
an insurance scheme successfully. To paraphrase a popular opinion leader in 
Nkoranza who made a reference to the issue: 
 
You know in government hospitals people really do not think much of the commu-
nity. But in this instance the mission has established churches in even remote 
villages all over the district. They have fathers and priests who live in the communi-
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ties and so they are aware of the problems of their members. It is part of their work 
to help them and therefore if there is something, they have them more at heart than 
the government people.  
 
The difference in attitudes of the staff employed by the mission and by the state 
also receives frequent mention. The relative lethargic approach to work that 
staff in the state sector have does not go unnoticed, nor do people wholly blame 
the staff of not being more dedicated to their work. Rather, the observation is 
made that “the missions are able to monitor and control the staff” while the 
public sector is perceived as having “no time to control the staff”. As one 
opinion leader in Nkoranza lamented: 
 
They do not think about the job but how they get their money. Whether they work or 
not they get paid. Some report for work and then go away because the attitude is that 
the work is not for his or her father but for the government. They tend not to appre-
ciate that we are the government.  
 
The same opinion leader also conceded a commonly held view that Ghanaian 
citizens are important partners to the problem. “They tend to think that govern-
ment is just the president in Accra whom they blame for everything wrong with 
the state. Therefore when it is for the government we do it anyhow.” 
In general it is fair to conclude from the views of people that they identify a 
problem of credibility in how the state conducts its business based on past 
experience. Significantly, the human problems of the health sector in terms of 
the way officials carry themselves reflect the situation of the whole society. 
  To summarise, the analysis so far, it is important to observe here that both 
implementers and citizens at large have similar amounts of scepticism about 
state ownership. The state is no longer perceived as credible on the basis of the 
trust, honesty and reliability that it has not shown in the past. But is the forego-
ing evidence that people do not trust the state as a possible caretaker or bursar 
of their insurance scheme?  
 In a follow up study to subject some of the preliminary qualitative findings 
to more rigorous analysis, sampled households in Nkoranza and Dodowa, 
(chosen on the basis of functional experience) answered a few questions in a 
survey. A striking finding was that altogether, the relative majority of subscrib-
ers and non-subscribers in Nkoranza District (40.8%) favoured the state as the 
most effective organiser of a health insurance scheme. In Dodowa the relative 
majority cited the district (35.4%) but the state followed closely (32.0%). This 
rather high endorsement of the state contrasts the dominant negative outlook of 
the state in the qualitative study. A brief explanation of that quantitative survey 
analysis will suffice here. 
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Altogether, 502 and 518 respondents in Nkoranza and Dodowa Districts 
respectively were interviewed. Respondents were health staff and community 
members. In Nkoranza 5.8% were health staff compared to 9.3% in Dodowa. 
While there were more subscribers (55%) than non-subscribers (45%) among 
the community members interviewed in the survey in Nkoranza district, the 
opposite was the case in Dodowa where there were twice as many non-
subscribers (71.4%) as subscribers (28.6%). This reflects the low level of 
subscribers and the difficulty in obtaining them for interview in Dodowa 
district, which is attributable to the young life of that scheme. Specifically, in 
order to test whether the community trusted the state to be the bursar of their 
scheme, respondents in the survey were asked to indicate who they “preferred 
most to organise their health insurance scheme effectively and why” among a 
choice of alternatives (mainly governmental and non-governmental). Part of the 
results is presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 below.  
 
 
Table 8.1 
Believe health insurance can be most effectively organized by…. 
Organiser Nkoranza Dodowa 
 Subscribers  Non-Subscribers Subscribers  Non-Subscribers 
State 23.3 17.5 8.4 23.6 
District 5.4 4.4 11.6 23.8 
NGO 4.8 3.4 3.7 10.4 
Church  14.1 11.4 3.9 10.8 
Village 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.4 
Others 5.6 5.8 - 0.8 
No response 0.4 1.0 - 0.2 
Total 55.0 45.0 29.1 70.9 
 
 
For analytical purposes, the response categories make a distinction between the 
centralised state administration and the decentralised district administration.  
How then do we explain the variation between the qualitative and the survey 
data? The most likely explanation is offered by the underlying reasons for 
people’s preferences. The dominant indicator upon which people based their 
choice in the survey was perceived financial ability. Accordingly a majority in 
each district (43.0% and 37.9% in Nkoranza and Dodowa respectively) cited 
“best financial capacity” as the most important reason upon which their choice 
was based. This is further reinforced when various organisers are considered 
individually in relation to the reasons for selecting them. Among those who 
favoured the state, the overwhelming majority of subscribers and non-subscrib-
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ers together in Nkoranza (83.9%) and Dodowa (93.7%) based their decision on 
the perceived financial capability of the state to support a scheme. 
 
 
Table 8.2  
Key reasons upon which choices about effective organisation are based 
 Nkoranza  Dodowa 
Reasons Subscribers  Non-Subscribers Subscribers  Non-Subscribers 
Better organisational/ 
management capacity 6.0 4.4 2.4 5.6 
Best financial resources 24.2 18.8 9.9 27.9 
Trusted & non-corrupt 6.0 6.8 4.0 12.9 
God fearing 7.4 5.4 1.4 4.2 
More community  
oriented 4.2 2.4 5.3 8.9 
Experienced in scheme 5.8 5.0 5.9 10.5 
No response 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.8 
Total 55.2 44.8 29.3 70.7 
 
 
Furthermore, an interpretation within a broader social context does not suggest 
a contradiction. First, it is important to acknowledge that apart from financial 
capability, the other indicators upon which people based their decisions in the 
survey emphasise social attributes: trust and similar qualities such as perceived 
fear of God, lack of corruption, orientation to the community and the capacity to 
organise and manage the scheme based on experience and competence. Signifi-
cantly, these qualities together outweigh the financial factor and places social 
attributes at the centre of what people consider important for their preferences 
for scheme ownership. Accordingly, the ultimate choice might in fact not be the 
state when all the options and preferences are evaluated. The relative majority 
preference for the state in the survey ought to be viewed with caution, given the 
common Ghanaian perception that the state is some benevolent organisation or 
entity that provides free things. The survey finding might therefore be people’s 
way of saying that they expect the state to provide the necessary financial 
support if they cannot afford the charges themselves in a social insurance 
scheme.  
A further comment on the other top choice apart from ‘the state’ in the two 
districts is worthwhile. In Dodowa, the district was actually the most preferred 
choice. Practically, this was also the decentralised state, but the difference in 
emphasis could be explained by the fact that the Dodowa community considers 
effectiveness more in terms of the district because “district” has been a key 
concept in the education and mobilization drive of the Dangme West District 
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community health insurance initiative. On the other hand, although all residents 
and non-residents of Nkoranza are eligible to be members of the scheme in that 
district, apart from being a single facility based scheme, “district” as a concept 
per se has not been a key organising principle of the Nkoranza scheme. On the 
other hand ‘the mission’ was the next preferred option in Nkoranza district after 
the state. Again this was consistent with what the community had known and 
were used to, since they associate the hospital and the scheme with the Catholic 
mission. In essence, this indicates that familiarity also plays a key role in 
people’s confidence in scheme ownership. Peoples’ preference for the church 
was based on moral grounds such as fear of God (48.8%) and trustworthiness 
and non-corruption (31.5%). Similarly, when people refer to the district, they 
imply the district health management team or health administration in a more 
narrow sense. People’s preference for ‘the district’ is thus an endorsement of 
their perceived familiarity with the organisational drive in health insurance by 
the DHMT in the district. Despite its short period of operation, the important 
reasons why people chose it as the next in importance after the state was 
because it was better experienced in organisation (43.3%) and better community 
oriented (35.0%).  
 
 
Discussion: Can the state inspire popular collective will in  
community schemes? 
 
Emerging community health insurance schemes in Africa have either been 
initiated by health facilities, NGO’s, local communities or cooperatives and 
owned and run by any of these organisations (Atim 1998; Criel 1998b). It is, 
however, important to recognise the increasing interest of states in such 
schemes and attempts by some governments to implement such initiatives on a 
national scale. State intervention is crucial for a number of reasons. First, it 
provides a means for achieving the objective of basic health care for all its 
citizens. Secondly the declining support by the extended family imposes a 
stronger responsibility on the state to fill the void. Again, there are also practical 
social reasons that justify state control or administration of non-profit schemes. 
These include control of cost to consumers, maintenance of quality, provision of 
a comprehensive package rather than partial coverage and assurance of 
provision for the poor and indigent. 
Furthermore, from a social historical perspective, de Swaan has noted that 
state intervention in nineteenth century mutual fund societies in Western Europe 
introduced three unique and novel elements: permanence, national scope and 
legal compulsion. The state, by virtue of its enormous resources, became the 
oldest and most creditworthy risk-bearer. It also had the largest encompassing 
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organizational structure. Most important of all, the state could exert effective 
and legitimate compulsion and thus impose obligatory insurance upon the vast 
majority of wage earners (de Swaan 1988: 149).  
However, in the developing country context such as Ghana, state interven-
tion presents its own problems and complexities. First is the problem of a lack 
of adequate financial resources to implement and support such schemes. Second 
is that the socio cultural context of the informal sector makes the application of 
a generic scheme on a national scope implausible, since communities vary in 
terms of socio economic and cultural realities. In addition, legal compulsion is 
untenable because neither the government nor any implementer has control over 
people’s incomes. Whether people want to pay their premiums, how much they 
can pay and what type of benefit they want are all issues with the people. 
Furthermore, state intervention in health care financing through community 
schemes presents an interesting analytical paradox. While the nation state seeks 
to implement community insurance schemes as social protection mechanisms, 
that need has become all the more necessary due to the failure of the state to 
provide adequate social support for its sick.  
Voluntary or mutual co-operation originates from people themselves, and is 
often informal in nature and intertwined with local culture. In the field of social 
security, they offer alternatives that compliment what the nation state or 
bureaucratic formal organisation inadequately provides. Of great significance is 
that voluntary cooperation is more likely to be accepted, and for that matter 
effective, where substantial stock of social capital exists. Social capital here can 
be understood as networks of social relations which are characterised by norms 
of trust and reciprocity and which lead to outcomes of mutual benefit. In the 
traditional Ghanaian extended family or village particularly in the past, people 
trusted those they knew: relatives and neighbours. Society’s social capital was 
intrinsic in primary social groups in the form of norms of reciprocity and 
networks of community engagements.  
On the basis of the analysis in this chapter, the relevant analytical questions 
that ought to be asked are: Is whether it is likely or even at all possible for the 
state to exert, exercise or inspire the necessary social influence or social capital 
on community members in informal community schemes to achieve a desirable 
result in the Ghanaian context? Can the state as a formal bureaucratic institution 
generate loyal feelings of solidarity among its citizens, just as small social units 
like the family are able to do in informal settings? Furthermore, can the state 
inspire movement towards the scaling up of informal security mechanisms into 
formal or market based national schemes? 
 Views expressed by many community members as well as health staff in the 
foregoing discussion indicate that they associate public institutions with poor 
quality services, inefficiency and to a far greater magnitude, corruption. A 
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World Bank study in June 2000 made a similar observation about public 
institutions in Africa in general. The problem of corruption, defined simply as 
the abuse of public office for private gain, deserves some attention here because 
of its far-reaching social and cultural dimensions. As a concept with wide 
social, economic and political dimensions, a comprehensive discussion of the 
subject obviously falls outside the scope of this discussion. A brief reference to 
relevant aspects will be therefore be made here. First, what are the causes? 
As already mentioned, one aspect of the problematic nature of corruption in 
all public services in Ghana is typified by the common Akan phrase that every-
body chops from his job (Obiara didi n’adwuma ho). This association with 
gastronomy has been found among public institutions elsewhere in Africa. 
Bayart (1993: 242) in his classic comparative study of Africa noted that in 
Cameroon, they talk of the politics of the belly. “They know that ‘the goat eats 
where it is tethered’ and those in power intend to ‘eat’”. He explains the term 
“eating” in relation to the concept “politics of the belly” thusly: 
 
It refers not just to the belly, but to ‘politics’…. A man of power who is able to 
amass and redistribute wealth becomes a ‘man of honour’. In this context, material 
prosperity is one of the chief political virtues rather than being an object of disap-
proval. 
 
Although Bayart’s case referred to the situation of politicians and politics in 
Africa, it has wider applications for the widespread phenomenon of private 
gains from public good. Indeed, the fact that the practice finds expression on the 
shop floor of public health services makes its application here very relevant. 
Several structural and cultural factors have been identified as encouraging 
corruption within Africa’s public health services and public administrations in 
general. The relevant ones for our purpose here include the practice of gift 
giving. Scott (1972) has explained that the survival of the traditional practice of 
gift giving and granting of services in a society with salaried civil servants 
constitutes a form of petty corruption. The ‘persuasion’ of a doctor to take a gift 
as an assurance for the satisfactory treatment of a client is a case in point.  
Again the prevalence of kinship ties, clientilism and other traditional 
loyalties over modern bureaucratic obligations leads to nepotism and corruption 
as people in government service allow their family and traditional interests to 
prevail over those of the state. This situation is worrying to many community 
members who speak about kinship, friendship and other social ties as the basis 
of favouritism. They believe these factors will affect how insurance scheme 
officials would treat them. Furthermore, the over-centralisation of power in the 
state also contributes to the phenomenon. In a study of medicine distribution in 
South Cameroon, Van der Geest also linked the custom of gift giving and most 
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importantly “the overwhelming position of the state as the main source of 
goods, services and employment” to the socially accepted practices of privately 
using medicines belonging to the state. Other causes of corruption that have 
been mentioned by other authors include absence of transparency in public fund 
management, low salaries and lack of media freedom to expose scandals 
(Hakeem et al. 2001).  
How does corruption affect the health services? Or how could it potentially 
affect financing schemes? Institutionalised or systematic corruption that allows 
officials or staff of health institutions or health schemes to extort money from 
patients is socially corrosive. One consequence of the position of the state as the 
main source of goods, services and employment is the expectation from its 
citizens that the state should provide them with free services irrespective of 
their ability to afford the services or not. Ironically, prevailing kinship ties and 
traditional loyalties nurture the practice in the public sphere and constitutes a 
major drain on health resources and a potential bottleneck to the social and 
economic feasibility of community financing schemes. As Van der Geest (1982) 
observed in relation to the distribution of medicine in South Cameroon, corrup-
tion has the tendency to “maintain the status quo in the unequal distribution of 
health resources and economic resources in general”.  
According to a recent Transparency International Report, there are other 
social consequences of corruption (Global Corruption Report 2001).  
 
[It] adds to poverty as it transfers real resources from official state coffers to a few 
rich and powerful individuals. Corruption also has a tendency to distort economic 
factors because those who benefit from it are rewarded for little or no work done, 
and the costs of projects turns out to be higher than would normally be the case.  
 
To sum up, in the establishment of schemes, public confidence and trust are 
important in order for them (schemes) to have a strong social and legitimate 
foundation. However, this legitimacy of the public service in Africa has come 
under serious challenge due to diminishing public confidence caused by 
corruption.  
When economists and health planners discuss the potential for health 
insurance in Africa, they commonly ignore or treat these important social issues 
as piecemeal. For example, in a 1995 World Bank classification by Shaw and 
Griffin (1995) and later Ensor (1997) to explore the potential of social health 
insurance in Africa, they used a scoring system based solely on supply and 
demand factors as if the social contexts did not matter. Yet community schemes 
cannot be seen purely in terms of supply and demand without due regard to the 
associated social expectations and social environment of those for whom it is 
planned. Indeed as Criel (1998: 78) has rightly noted, a perspective that ignores 
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the social dynamics is ahistorical and incomplete. Yet again where local 
attitudes and conditions are recognised, there is a tendency to perceive them as 
static without adequate attention to their dynamic aspects (see Chapter 6). 
I wish to emphasise here however that neither the present world nor the 
formal bureaucratic state meet the social criteria for the functioning of 
solidarity. In other words, societies today, even the remotest ones in an old 
indigenous village where economic survival was once based on reciprocity and 
social capital was central to community engagements are no longer so. Society 
at present does not stand and fall by the social relationships in the community. 
Of even greater significance is that in a health insurance scheme, the underlying 
concept that binds people together is the premiums they pay. The transaction 
therefore precludes any form of social capital for the individuals involved, 
although it is probable that where greater stocks of social capital exit in a 
community the people may be more willing to share risks with others and vice 
versa. In order for the state to achieve or enhance voluntary cooperation in the 
community, there must be other ways of building the sense of voluntary 
cooperation. What the findings in the foregoing analysis suggest is that trust and 
credibility are very important. Thus, we return to the question: Would people 
trust the state? 
People might be more willing to enter into an insurance arrangement if they 
are confident they will get the best outcome from the transaction. Hypotheti-
cally, a high level of trust is necessary to generate people’s confidence to 
cooperate voluntarily. Trust might also be necessary for the way people behave 
in the scheme, such as their tendency towards moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Under conditions of trust, therefore, people and/or informal social 
groups are more likely to be co-operative and supportive. A high level of trust is 
likely to lead to a high level of support, and vice versa. However the corrupt 
image of the public service poses problems for confidence and is a critical 
setback to the ability of the state to scale up informal community insurance 
schemes to national level schemes. In conclusion, apart from the administrative, 
institutional, technical and financial limitations, a lack of trust and credibility in 
the state provides many reasons to not to be too enthusiastic about what the 
state can achieve through voluntary insurance schemes. The urge or power of 
solidarity for achieving success rests with the people. 
 
 
 
 
9 
Summary and conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summing up 
 
This study set out to investigate how “the people” for whom health insurance is 
planned view a formal or state-based health insurance and how they are likely to 
participate in such a scheme. The purpose has been to provide insights into how a 
sustainable insurance system can be implemented in Ghana by taking into 
account the local traditions of mutual insurance or social security. The focus has 
therefore been kept on the dynamics of both traditional social security arrange-
ments in the Ghanaian society and the emerging health insurance schemes since 
the driving force behind the ‘new’ insurance schemes are the similar principles of 
equity and solidarity. 
Contrary to official policy assumption and existing empirical propositions 
that rural households will participate in risk sharing insurance schemes because 
of their cultural affinity and past experience with solidarity associations, this 
study has as one of its main findings that the overriding motivation of people to 
participate is based on enlightened self-interest. Again, the common assumption 
that tends to associate potential positive influence of social capital in a commu-
nity with people’s desire or willingness to share risk and thereby enhance health 
insurance is questioned. In practice, the nature and social context of community 
wide or district wide health insurance schemes do not provide opportunities for 
the accumulation of social capital. Another key finding is that, although people 
perceive the state as more capable of providing the resources for setting up 
insurance schemes, they literally do not trust the state as a credible fund holder 
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in view of perceived official corruption, bureaucracy and inadequate monitoring 
and accounting systems in the public sector.  
Polanyi’s analysis of the rise and influence of “the socially embedded 
market” in The Great Transformation provides a useful starting point for my 
theoretical perspective. His three basic “principles of social organisation” which 
are the principle of reciprocity (solidarity networks), the principle of (state) 
authority (command networks) and principle of the market (exchange networks) 
explains how the needs of society determine economic behaviour in pre- 
industrial and primitive economies, whereas in modern market economies the 
needs of the market determine social behaviour. Following Polanyi, the moral 
economy theory of James Scott and the political or rational economy theory of 
Popkin provide the basic arguments for my conceptual framework. Scott 
embodies the thoughts of Polanyi and argues that the peasant life is geared 
towards altruistic motives. In Popkin’s rational economy approach, he opposes 
Scott. He believed that the actions of the pre capitalist peasant were directed 
towards individual, self-interested values. Writers after them joined the debate as 
proponents and opponents reconciled the two viewpoints. De Swaan’s theory of 
collective action explains the collectivisation process as a result of self-interested 
behaviour that arises from the realisation of interdependence and external effects 
of people on one another’s actions. In Chapter 1, I provided an overview of the 
community health care financing problems in sub-Saharan Africa by emphasis-
ing the point that health insurance there owes its increasing popularity to the 
problems of health care financing. Community based health insurance schemes 
are conceived of as a response to the negative side effects of user fees on access 
to health care for the poor and socially disadvantaged.  
In order to situate the discussion in its proper historical context, Chapter 2 
dealt with the historical developments of public health in Ghana and how it was 
paid for from the pre-colonial period. That history reminded us to not lose our 
perspective on the social and political forces that have shaped the service and 
people’s attitude towards health care and its payment. It revealed that the public 
health services available today developed directly from, and are to a large extent 
reflective of, the curative biased character of the legacy bequeathed by colonial 
Britain. The financing of that service has gone through a chequered history from 
nominal fees to fee free health system and back to user fees. That chapter also 
pointed out that colonial health services were financed mainly through general 
taxation, with the exception of small fees charged to non-civil servants. 
Financing the service became a chronic problem after the immediate post 
independence government of Nkrumah in the late 1950s introduced the free 
health care policy. In general though, the pattern of public health financing did 
not change significantly after Nkrumah. The problems of health care financing 
became compounded after the economic problems of the seventies and the entry 
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of nominal fees into the realm of public health services during the time. The 
pragmatic introduction of user fees in public health care facilities started in the 
mid-1980s, with full cost recovery for drugs when World Bank and Interna-
tional Monetary Fund structural adjustment programmes became a major 
feature of Ghana’s economic policy reforms in the health sector.  
The background information in Chapter 3 pointed out that the three commu-
nity initiatives that constitute the subject matter of this study were all conceived 
against the backdrop of the foregoing contextual problems. They were initiated 
or planned with the intention of making health care accessible to poor house-
holds, particularly in rural communities, who face chronic payment problems. 
They thus represent attempts to inject and institutionalise traditional reciprocal 
solidarity principles into innovative insurance schemes in rural communities. 
They share certain common features. They are all planned as voluntary but 
household mandatory schemes, they are based on prepayment of contributions 
to an identifiable fund and they offer a clearly specified benefit package. The 
pioneer community health insurance scheme in Ghana, Nkoranza, has never 
really met its projected membership target since its inception, but it has been 
able to survive the challenges of an innovative community scheme for a decade. 
The Dangme West district scheme, which is in a very infant stage, offers 
another experience in community schemes. It is the first district wide and also 
public sector scheme that offers both in- and out- patient services from all 
public health facilities in one district. Its greatest challenge remains how it will 
be able to meet its in-patient obligations by relying on hospitals in adjacent 
districts. The NHIS pilot scheme became a stillborn highhanded social 
engineering programme, but understanding the path it treaded while the idea 
lasted fills a useful information gap on what is known about community health 
insurance schemes planned by the state.  
Overall, the critical challenge for the emerging community health insurance 
schemes is how to secure culturally appropriate ways of creating or attaining 
larger risk pools beyond familial and small homogenous groups and transform-
ing them into more anonymous mutual insurance schemes. Understanding the 
dynamics at work in such a process is what the study set out to investigate. In-
depth insight into the traditional social security arrangements in Ghanaian 
society in Chapter 4 therefore provided the necessary socio-cultural background 
for situating the discussion. In the Ghanaian traditional support system, the 
extended family was the basic unit of social organisation. The system revolved 
around it and provided the social and juridical framework for long-term reciproc-
ity. Social relations, defined by kinship served, among other functions, the 
purpose of determining in advance the rights and duties of members during 
times of emergencies. These relations became customary laws governing 
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groups; they decided social norms relating to property, inheritance, ownership 
of land and collection of family contributions.  
Although it had its limitations, the traditional system was a relatively 
effective way of assisting the members of society who adjusted their norms to 
insure their daily survival. There is, however, a common tendency to idealise 
the past in relation to the present when it is discussed. More significantly, 
traditional arrangements are disintegrating as a result of the common processes 
of social transformations discussed by several authors and mentioned in 
previous chapters that are also taking place in Ghanaian society. Factors that 
contribute to social disintegration include modernising features of state forma-
tion, education, new economic opportunities and aspirations, urbanisation, 
westernisation, globalisation as well as concomitant changes in attitudes and 
patterns of consumption as well as radical changes in work roles and social 
stratification. For example, education and Christianity have provided people 
with values that fall outside of the traditional organisation of society, while the 
new economic order has put money at the centre of economic survival. The 
processes of state formation also led to the addition of a new Western style of 
social security system to the existing one, which was based on the principles of 
the market and the state. The continued importance of traditional social security is 
explained by the fact that the formal social security arrangement has been limited 
to the formal sector of the economy, thereby leaving out the largest proportion of 
the population who earn their livelihood in the `informal' sector. People suffering 
the greatest insecurity, such as the aged, the young, women, children and particu-
larly the handicapped are often excluded from this new form of social protection. 
Chapter 5 opened with the primary empirical findings that a range of 
contextual factors shape lay perceptions of health insurance in Ghana. Key 
factors among them are the weakening traditional social security mechanisms, 
past experience with other community micro-finance schemes, financial and 
social problems that individuals encounter with the public health system and 
existing beliefs in the efficacy of alternative medicines. Significantly, both 
implementers and community people conceptualise and share the value of 
community-based health insurance in terms of its social protection ability. The 
prepayment feature is perceived as immensely helpful in enabling rural house-
holds to gain regular access to health care. Community people also credit 
insurance with psychological benefits, as once they are insured, they do not 
have to worry about money when they need health care. The scheme’s contrac-
tual nature (composed of a set of formal rules and regulations) is also regarded 
as more secure and reliable compared to traditional support mechanisms. 
Altogether, the opportunity to share risk through solidarity with others is 
perceived as a noble alternative to the disintegrating traditional system.  
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There are however, popular concerns and worries about community 
schemes. The different logic of local savings and credit schemes make people 
sometimes question the redistributive effect of risk sharing in health insurance 
in which the return of the investment to an individual is not always guaranteed. 
Some feel it is ‘cheating’ when ‘nothing is offered’ for conditions or situations 
that in their own estimation ought to be covered or when they do not get 
anything after a long period of not falling ill. This finding suggests that risk 
sharing is not always understood or accepted by people in the community. The 
most far reaching concerns that people have about community schemes are 
related to poor quality of health care and services, which are manifested in poor 
staff attitudes towards patients, favouritism, cheating and other negative 
misconduct and malpractice by health staff.  
In discussing the relationship between traditional solidarity and mutual 
health insurance, one question that comes out strongly is whether it is possible 
to transfer the solidarity as exhibited for example in funerals into mutual 
insurance. A careful understanding of the social context and dynamics of the 
organisation of funerals and how they differ from mutual insurance reveals that 
the economic appropriation and social accumulation or affirmation of prestige 
involved in funerals explains why such a transfer is difficult. An important item 
of economic appropriation is donations offered during funerals. Moreover, the 
social setting of funerals and donations provide opportunities for collective 
action to strengthen social identities and prestige through generalised reciproc-
ity in the public sphere. On the other hand, the payment of premiums in 
insurance only provides an opportunity for balanced reciprocity where social 
ties might never be experienced between the individuals involved. This funda-
mental social difference between funeral support and insurance schemes is an 
important finding in light of the widespread tendency to cite community support 
during funerals as an example of the solidarity that could be achieved with 
health insurance. Another culturally complex difference between funerals and 
insurance is the emotional aspect of the former. Funerals instantly revive 
solidarity and mutual assistance, not only among family members, but among 
the entire community because the emotional sentiment to assist is influenced by 
the level of precariousness. This is the context within which I interpret 
Ghanaian people’s differential attitude towards situations such as old age and 
sickness on the one hand and funerals on the other hand. 
Chapter 6 took the analysis further and examined the reasons why people 
join or do not join insurance. Most of what we know about the feasibility of 
community insurance schemes in sub-Saharan Africa comes from economic 
studies. One of the dominant themes in those studies is that community 
members’ willingness to participate and pay into an insurance scheme is based 
on household or aggregate expenditure surveys or from attitude surveys using 
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contingent valuation analysis. The findings in this study caution against the 
reliability of findings or predictions derived through such approaches. I 
produced qualitative evidence, especially in Nkoranza, that shows that the pious 
and favourable statements people make about their willingness to join commu-
nity schemes that do not yet exist must be taken with a pinch of salt. They are 
likely to behave otherwise when the scheme becomes operational. If people 
know and feel strongly that a certain behaviour or phenomenon is desirable, 
they are likely to endorse it in the theoretical social research situation but in 
practice they might reject it. The views of Maame Akosua, a 44-year-old 
businesswoman from Dodowa, in the Greater Accra region, during one of my 
field visits regarding the need to look beyond rhetorical flourishes of people on 
the field was very incisive:  
 
I live and mingle with people in this community so I can confidently attest that I 
know them very well. When they first hear about something new, they will tell you 
that it is good, they like it and they will do it. But I can assure you that when the 
time comes for them to do it, they will behave as if they were not the same people 
who previously said they would do it. It does not matter how well you try they will 
ignore you. That is their attitude and you will see it when the insurance starts. Mark 
my words.  
 
What then is the rationale for some people to join insurance schemes while 
others do not? Instead of solidarity being the organising principle of policy 
makers, the key finding of this study is that the underlying motive for people to 
join insurance schemes is based on enlightened self-interest. This finding 
questions the common health policy assumption in Ghana that households will 
join community insurance schemes because of past traditions of solidarity. It is 
quite ironic that while every Ghanaian accepts the fact that traditional support 
networks have weakened because of anibue (the Akan word which literally 
means ‘civilisation’), in the context of the discussions of this study, claim is still 
made on traditions without recourse to the dynamics of change. It is important 
to underscore the point on the basis of the evidence in this study that the 
effectiveness of solidarity in the traditional support system was occasioned by 
social attributes such as the homogeneity, the small size of group and network-
ing within that group. These attributes are lacking or at best are overlooked in 
the new insurance schemes. 
One of the key objectives in the development of community financing 
schemes is to reduce health inequalities and improve financial access to health 
care for the poor. I emphasised in Chapter 7 that attempts to focus on the poor 
began with a problem of conceptualising ‘the poor’. There are at least two 
levels of poorness: economic and social. In the first sense, the whole of the rural 
community considers themselves as poor. In their perception, the socio-
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economic consequences of the rural economy affect them equally; incomes are 
seasonal but they survive. In the second sense, the poor comprise a relatively 
smaller group of people who are consistently in physical want due to disability, 
gender or social want. These are often referred to as the poorest of the poor, 
indigents or paupers. Beyond these economic meaning of the poor, ‘the poor’ in 
the context of community schemes has other relative social dimensions. Most 
people consider themselves poor and unable to afford the premiums not because 
the premiums are unaffordable per se but due to large family size and the timing 
of the collection. Even though these arguments are sometimes circumstantial. 
There are also others who are “poor in mind”; these include all those who do 
not join because of highly self-interested reasons such as faith that they will not 
fall sick or belief in indigenous medicine.  
Overall, the irony of community voluntary schemes is that the people in 
greatest need, people like paupers and indigents who struggle for everyday 
survival, whom the schemes seek to assist, are often the ones least likely to 
benefit from them. This is because of their inability to pay insurance premiums, 
which would entitle them to use services at a later period. This attests to the 
lessons of history that the autonomous provision of care always leaves out the 
poorest substratum. In 19th century Europe, it took the intervention of the state 
to create a free health care policy, and bring services to the poor in the course of 
time. From a policy relevance point of view, the issue of insurance for the poor 
returns to exemption policies for the poor. The implementation of exemption 
policies for the poor in Ghana has however, been fraught with problems that 
include unclear guidelines, a varying social definition of the poor, inadequate 
funding and delays in reimbursement. 
Such problems with the poor lead this analysis to the role of the state in 
insurance schemes. In a developing country such as Ghana, the role of the state 
in community health insurance is necessary for providing the political, legal and 
infrastructure back up for its implementation. In the Ghanaian rural context, 
policy makers and health planners consider the key role of the state as particu-
larly critical in view of the particular social setting which makes health 
insurance difficult to implement. Chapter Eight therefore analyses people’s 
reception to the state as a bursar or fund owner of insurance schemes. The 
striking findings showed that people look upon state controlled insurance funds 
with mixed expectations; most were pessimistic. On one hand people perceive 
the state as having more resources than any other entity to support insurance 
schemes. They also thought it offered opportunities for a wider coverage in the 
entire country. On the other hand, there is greater scepticism about the state, 
which is related to a lack of trust and faith in public officials and politicians 
concerning “the way things are done in the public sector”. This negative public 
perception comes out of dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the past 
performance of state enterprises and public corporations. One of the most 
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frequently cited examples is the formal social security institution in Ghana, 
SSNIT. Images of state institutions commonly convey notions of dishonesty, 
misapplication and embezzlement of funds and a total lack of a culture of 
accountability. In short, people do not consider the state as credible to hold their 
funds. In their view even on the shop floor of health care, the collection of 
illegal fees, bribes and other corrupt activities take place. People therefore 
attribute their scepticism about state initiatives as due to fears that they might 
not work. The ill-fated NHIS pilot scheme is a monumental example of those 
worst fears. In essence, people’s attitudes towards public health institutions are 
ones of protest against lethargic health staff attitude and poor quality of service. 
Interestingly, implementers sometimes conceive the problem of people’s 
lack of confidence in the state as a phenomenally Ghanaian apathetic attitude 
towards state owned institutions or initiatives. But significantly, health 
implementers deride the work culture in the public sector as generally lacking 
adequate and effective monitoring and systems for accountability. There is 
some consensus among them that if schemes are run by the state they could 
inherit bureaucratic encumbrances, inefficiencies, financial mismanagement and 
corruption from the state. Implementers also explain away the problems as 
being the consequences of poor remuneration and logistics, a lack of good 
social amenities particularly in rural areas and the conservative posture of some 
key policy makers who ought to effect necessary changes to improve the health 
service.  
 
 
Is health insurance socially and culturally feasible? 
 
Theoretical implications of findings  
It has not been the purpose of this study to test any grand theory about people’s 
rationale for collective action to solve individual health problems. It is, never-
theless, necessary to situate the findings alongside existing knowledge. How do 
existing explanations of mutual schemes in sub-Saharan Africa and other places 
in the developing world help us to explain the findings here?  
Analytically, any attempt to understand what impels individuals towards 
collective action and whether family solidarity could translate or be scaled up 
into a modern mutual health insurance must of necessity be based on an under-
standing of the comparative and functional dynamics of both the traditional 
(past and present) and the emerging health insurance systems.  
To recall some of the issues already discussed in the previous chapters, the 
effectiveness of reciprocity in the traditional Ghanaian social support system 
was clearly facilitated by the homogenous nature of the kinship based system. 
Members of exchange systems knew each other and functionally interacted with 
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one another. The sense of belonging and trust served as a check on one another 
and prevented abuses. The obligation to share was also supported by existing 
social sanctions. Thus, those who refused to share did not only stand the risk of 
not benefiting from similar or alternate provisions themselves, but in the 
perception of the community risked incurring the displeasure of the social 
group. People were willing to share in order to avoid tainting their reputation 
(dinseε) or bringing disgrace (animguaseε) upon themselves and their families. 
This is forcefully conveyed by the Akan proverb that the death of a family 
member is considered as the death of an individual while the disgrace of a 
member was seen as shame that infested the whole family. (Wo busua ni wu a 
na wo nwuu bi, na mmom, sε fεre a na wo nso wo afεre bi). The urge to share 
and give to other members rather than keeping ones resources for oneself was a 
highly valued trait, because the ideal set in that reciprocal system was that of 
mutual helpfulness and co-operation for the common good of the group of 
kinsfolk.  
Clearly, in the Ghanaian traditional system, the conditions in which people 
lived and worked would have compelled them to seek cooperation and share 
what they had with others. Indeed, the economic as well as the inheritance 
system ensured that family assets were shared among members and remained 
within the group. Family and community thus relied on each other and shared 
with each other in order to satisfy their social and material needs. As a 
consequence, such a system provided an effective motivation to seek coopera-
tion with others. It is significant to observe however, that on the whole, the 
collective arrangements of the traditional Ghanaian social security system have 
gone in the direction of decreasing efficiency as the involvement of the scope of 
social networks has become increasingly weaker. As a result, the internal 
mechanisms or dynamics of the solidarity networks in the traditional system is 
not as strong as it used to be. In the area of health care this weakened process 
has had more untoward consequences for the poor and indigent in society in 
their ability to access health care when the need arises.  
I have emphasized the historical processes involved in the emergence of the 
schemes analysed in this study. Like most similar schemes in sub-Saharan 
Africa, they represent an attempt by the state to secure additional revenue in 
health care for its citizens. In other words, it is a subtle way by which the state 
seeks to mobilize revenue it cannot directly raise by taxation. It cannot raise this 
money through taxation because of the highly informal nature of occupations in 
the vastly rural economy. In this context, health insurance is one way of what 
Scott (writing in another context) refers to as the “state’s attempt to make a 
society legible… in ways that simplified the classic function of taxation” (Scott 
1998: 2).  
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Secondly, the goal of planners is based on the principle of solidarity. 
However, unlike the traditional system, which was based on generalised 
reciprocity, the emerging schemes are based on balanced reciprocity. Members 
voluntarily contribute at a certain point in time in order to benefit when sick. 
Sickness is therefore a precondition for benefit. Not all will have their turn, but 
once sick, help is assured. The main finding in this study however indicates that 
for the people for whom insurance is planned, the over-bearing motivation to 
seek cooperation with others is based on enlightened self-interest. This has 
implications not only for the desire of members to participate, but also for how 
they behave within the scheme. The idea of a higher self-interested motive 
therefore implies that people only want to pay premiums or are willing to join 
the insurance scheme if they feel that it will benefit them rather than cause them 
to share risk with others. This partly explains the high levels of adverse 
selection and moral hazard, factors that bear on the feasibility and long term 
sustainability of such schemes. How do we explain this? 
As I pointed out in Chapter One, Polanyi’s thoughts on economy and society 
in The Great Transformation (1940) provide the lead that has influenced the 
debates on interpreting the rationale for collective behaviour. His analysis of 
reciprocity and redistribution shows that other modes of social exchanges with 
concurrent motives exist in society apart from market exchange. He thus 
provides a tool for identifying and explaining traditional social protection or 
security arrangements and the importance of social networks in mutual health 
insurance schemes. One of Polanyi’s key points regarding the motive for 
exchange in traditional society is that such traditional systems were altruistic in 
the sense that they ensured a living out of the resources of the group. Some of 
Polanyi’s allies have emphasised this point. Among these, Scott, writing about 
risk insurance in a South East Asian village, notes:  
 
It is above all within the village — in the patterns of social control and reciprocity 
that structure daily conduct — where the subsistence ethic finds social expression… 
All village families will be guaranteed a minimal subsistence niche insofar as the 
resources controlled by villagers make this possible (Scott 1976: 40).  
 
He insisted that although the desire for subsistence security grew out of the 
needs of individuals, it was thus socially experienced as a pattern of moral 
rights and expectations.  
Romantic as the moral explanations of collective behaviour were, they make 
sense if considered against the background that they represented cultural 
solutions to inherent problems in the objective social conditions of their 
occurrence. Indeed Scott was careful to note, “where they worked… they were 
not so much a product of altruism as of necessity” (Scott 1976: 6). Platteau 
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(1991) has made reference to Evans-Pritchard (1940) who wrote at about the 
same time as Polanyi. Of his study of the Nuer, he remarked that, “it is scarcity 
not sufficiency that makes people generous”. Other writers such as Posner 
(1981) and Fafchamps (1992) have also explained that extreme precariousness 
in life in pre-industrial societies often aroused solidarity. How then does the 
moral economy approach accommodate self-interested behaviour? Like his 
forebear Polanyi, Scott concluded that two major transformations, capitalism 
and the related development of the modern state under a colonial aegis radically 
led to processes that served to undermine the pre-existing insurance system. The 
transformation of land and labour into commodities for sale brought a profound 
impact on pre-existing social insurance in pre-capitalist societies. 
The fundamental assumption of Popkin (1979), gives much credence to the 
self-interest motives frequently observed in this study. As Popkin points out, the 
individual is forever calculating about how to improve his well being or at least 
maintain his own standard of living, rather than that of the village. In his view, 
therefore, such an assumption is more powerful than the ‘romantic’ notion of 
‘communal man’ who is an altruistic actor or passive subject willing to respect 
social norms of conduct and moral principles of reciprocity employed by Scott 
and his moral economy followers. Rather, he argues, transfer behaviour may 
result from repeated interactions of self-interested individuals or households 
who share risk or generosity for the sake of future reciprocity.  
It is significant to point out that later contributions to the debate have tended 
to see the two approaches not as being in opposition but when taken together 
permit an adequate understanding of the rationale for collective action. For 
example, Posner’s (1980: 4) contribution to the debate, which he wrote from an 
economic theory perspective, stated that much of the ‘moral’ behaviour in so 
called pre-capitalist societies including gift-giving and reciprocal exchange 
were “adaptations to the pervasive uncertainty and high information costs ” that 
prevail in such a system. Both explanatory approaches are therefore contextu-
ally and historically situated.  
An attempt to understand the over-bearing presence of self-interest provides 
insight into the dilemma of solidarity in insurance. The reason for a bigger 
group to make the scheme more effective through the benefits of economies of 
scale is also the reason that makes self-interest more prominent than the 
solidarity principle. How does this happen? An adequate risk pool of health 
insurance even at the community level must go beyond the family or proximate 
individuals in order to become a viable ‘mutual insurance company’. The 
propensity therefore is that the widening process in a community or district 
wide ‘mutual insurance company’ also has the effect of loosening or weakening 
the bonds of the web of social connectedness as the group widens and becomes 
more heterogeneous. The tendency is that people in the heterogeneous group 
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become freer of social group pressure to conform to group norms, as they would 
do in traditional morally obligated associations. Accordingly, the social 
solidarity networks that compel conformity do not in practice exist, or function 
to obligate members merely to share in written legal contracts for the insurance. 
In effect achieving a higher level of integration in a wider insurance arrange-
ment as de Swaan has noted involves a higher level of dilemmas. On one hand a 
larger and more heterogeneous membership potentially enhances the risks 
sharing capacity and costs across the group. On the other hand, the processes of 
expansion impede mutual control and diminish common solidarity (De Swaan 
1988: 7-8). 
I have also argued that the character of the widening insurance group has 
consequences for the influence of social capital. The potential for social capital 
in the group diminishes because from the point of view of social connectedness, 
it does not enhance solidarity since it is the premium people pay more than 
anything else that connects them. Paying the premium through third parties does 
not provide the opportunity for group interaction nor accumulation of social 
rewards such as prestige, recognition and patronage. The social ties in insurance 
through premiums collected by a third party in this sense are merely synony-
mous with what Putnam (1995) calls ‘tertiary associations’.  
The overbearing significance of self-interest as a motivation for collective 
action has well been expounded by De Swaan in his analysis of the processes of 
how and why people come together in collectivised arrangements to deal with 
deficiency and adversity that appeared to affect them separately. Based on a 
case study of Europe and the United States in the 19th century, he shows how in 
these societies the collectivisation process extended from the bourgeois to the 
working class and then to the entire society. Using the theory of the civilising 
process of Norbert Elias, he explains that this was achieved as a result of the 
realisation of the growing interdependence of people and the external effects of 
their actions upon others. He points out that: 
 
The constraints upon affective and impulsive behaviour were not imposed from 
outside, but adopted…. They became social constraints to self constraint… as part 
and parcel of one’s person” (De Swaan 1988: 248).  
 
About workers’ mutual societies in which these processes were highly visibly 
exemplified, he observes that “the propensity to save epitomises the tendency to 
subordinate momentary affects to more distant goals, the orientation to more 
distant future, constant self constraint and the deferral of gratification” (De 
Swaan 1988: 249-250). He points out that one underlying development essential 
to the process is the acceptance of risk aversion, which implies the subordina-
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tion of momentary affects for the sake of more distant goals. People accept this 
by their reliance on their capacity for self-constraint to restrain spending.  
By way of analogy, the process described by De Swaan is synonymous to 
that which takes place in the traditional, morally obligated, Ghanaian social 
security system. People’s desire for future cooperation in that system was 
compelled by social constraints to cooperate in case of future adversity. The 
obligation to cooperate was achieved through the pressure people exerted on 
one another, by self restraint based on the recognition of their interdependence 
and the external effect of their actions on others. The unwritten code of that 
system was, in the parlance of a common Ghanaian Akan saying: “Those who 
offer help to their neighbours in need also receive help when they need it”. (Sε 
wo yε ma obi a, na sε asεm to wo a, yeyε ma wo so.) Social constraints in 
insurance schemes do not possess the same force of moral obligation. This 
situation may be attributed to the fact that it is practically less easy for autono-
mous public and/or voluntary institutions to exert the specific type of social 
pressure that members of families or traditional mutual associations used to 
encourage one another to refrain from spending in case of future adversity.  
Applying the same explanatory model here, the process could be described 
as one of self-constraint to cooperate. In this respect, the emerging voluntary 
insurance schemes studied here and their counterparts in other countries in sub-
Saharan Africa introduce another theoretical paradigm to the collective process 
in mutual insurance: In the social context of contemporary health insurance 
schemes, participants are under self-restraint towards self-constraint. Typically 
the immediate and most frequent reason for incapacity for self-constraint to 
restrain spending is lack of adequate resources. In the midst of too much 
poverty, people would naturally pay less heed to unforeseen risk aversion 
because under such circumstances, the necessity to survive here and now 
becomes more pressing and leaves little room to put aside money for a future 
event. But a more socially poignant argument based on the evidence adduced in 
this study is the lack of an effective moral binding force to impel coercion, or 
what Atim (1999) describes as the ‘social movement dynamic’. In the light of 
the foregoing, the clear challenge to emerging insurance schemes is to identify 
conditions under which bonding social forces and self interest can be harnessed 
to the benefit of schemes.  
In summary, Polanyi's theory about the three forms of integration, reciproc-
ity, redistribution and market, provides a tool to situate the analysis in an 
appropriate historical framework to reveal the dynamics of the past and present 
in the social security arrangements in Ghanaian society. By emphasising that 
reciprocity and redistribution are institutionalised with the help of a social 
organisation disciplined by general principles of behaviour, the theory also 
enables us to highlight the centrality of culture and society in human concerns. 
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It also endeavours to pay attention to them when looking at social security or 
health insurance arrangements. His emphasis on cooperation and reciprocity as 
a function of custom, law, magic and religion gives us a sense of the tendency 
to romanticise traditional social security arrangements. His attention to the 
effects of the emergence of the market on the ability of traditional arrangements 
to remain functional helps us to explain increasing self-interested behaviour in 
mutual insurance. 
When we consider the range of insecure situations in Ghanaian society, such 
as funerals and sickness, we see that people cling to the moral economy or 
engage themselves in rational attitudes according to the context and general 
situation in which they find themselves. Scott and Popkin and those following 
them also reinforce the tools that permit an adequate consideration of how 
people order their social needs in the practical situation. By emphasising self-
interest as the sole motive for collective behaviour, de Swaan’s theory of 
collective action provided a tool for interpreting the dynamics of increasing 
self-interest in mutual insurance with a social face. An important utility of the 
theory for our analysis is that it helps us to understand the dilemmas of 
voluntary insurance provisions. The fact remains that autonomous provisions do 
not necessarily provide a complete answer to the problems with health care 
access of the entire society, and especially not to the rural poor. The theory also 
enlightens us about why intra family solidarity does not transform into inter 
family solidarity in a society like Ghana. What then are the policy implications 
from the foregoing discussion? 
 
 
Policy implications of findings 
 
Social context of insurance 
Traditional social support mechanisms might have been efficient and were the 
only means by which Ghanaian society met its social security needs in the past. 
Indeed for a vast proportion of the population it remains the only source of 
social security. In implementing any new schemes it is expedient and necessary 
to take cognisance of the operating principles by which they work in order to 
learn from them. However, any attempt to apply the principles in the formal 
context must take into account the dynamics of the context in which they 
worked. In this respect, it is important to remember that traditional social 
protection arrangements functioned better as small groups and communities. 
The good counsel of a former Deputy minister of health, Dr. Adibo, is worthy 
of recollection here:  
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Let’s start small and expand. By our nature we are good at looking after 
small things. Our towns are small, buildings are small and we look after 
small things better than big ones. 
 
Another contextual issue related to the above is that population growth, market 
penetration and state formation are factors that limit the functioning of 
traditional social security. This has come about as a result of the opening of new 
and varied avenues for social and economic mobility and the growth of the 
market that tends to encourage the overt expression of individualistic propensi-
ties and aspirations. This further dissolves cooperative ties and disentangles 
individuals’ interest from those of the social group. The penetration of market 
values has also had the effect of loosening the web of traditional social ties so 
people are at liberty to conform to the pressure of the group to which they were 
previously closely bonded.  
 
Popular participation 
In setting up community health insurance schemes, I believe there is no 
challenge more important than the building up of trust and confidence of people 
in it. A lot of this depends on the extent to which people believe that the 
implementers or officials involved are honest and trustworthy. One way to build 
confidence is through effective community participation. 
One of the preconditions to bear in mind in the design is that contexts differ. 
The attitudes even within one district towards insurance in village A might run 
opposite to those of community B because of deep seated beliefs about the 
efficacy of indigenous healing and practices. The diverse and transitional nature 
of Ghanaian society therefore makes multiple approaches to the provision of 
health insurance essential for achieving a near-universal or at least wider 
coverage of the population. In order to increase the potential for the success 
schemes, and particularly those in the rural informal settings, there is a need to 
pay heed to the particular social setting with due regard to what is feasible in 
each specific locality. In light of this, the design ought to take into account not 
only the social characteristics of the locality but also the expectation and fears 
of various stakeholders. Stakeholders who need to be brought into the picture 
from the beginning include traditional authorities, the churches, various trades 
and professional associations as well as the health staff. It is important to 
remember that health insurance is not socially neutral. The interests of the 
private not for profit sector as stakeholders must also be of prime concern, 
particularly against the background of the important role they play in health 
care in rural communities. It is also prudent to ensure that the input of ministries 
of other sectors such as local government, employment and manpower 
development and youth is brought to bear on any plans for optimum benefits. 
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Most of all, community structures such as traditional and local authorities and 
church leaders as well as bodies and associations including teachers and other 
‘professional’ groups ought to be involved. It is important to appreciate and 
make explicit what the respective expectations and fears of all shades of opinion 
and representations in the community are and take these into consideration.  
 
Solidarity, risk sharing and self-interest 
The dominant self-interest motive in peoples’ decisions to join health insurance 
suggests that the concept of risk sharing and its financial implications need to be 
well addressed. The discussion indicates that people are not sufficiently aware 
that there is an element of self interest in participating in insurance for a period 
of time even if one does not get sick. There is therefore the need to begin the 
dissemination of information that will make people appreciate, understand and 
accept the collective meaning of risk sharing. When people think of insurance in 
terms of its short-term benefits they will stay away because they might consider 
themselves as low risk or low priority relative to other household demands. 
Insurance should be better explained by planners in terms of its merits given the 
needs and circumstances of the present, instead of the pious statements about 
solidarity and the past. 
Practically, what the dominant self interest motive in people’s attitude 
towards insurance schemes means is that it is very essential not to underesti-
mate the expectations of people for whom the scheme is planned in the design 
and implementation. Other researchers have noted the importance of paying 
attention to acceptable quality of care to motivate people to participate in 
community health financing schemes such as availability of prescribed drugs 
and medical supplies, friendly and expedient staff and the provision of expected 
laboratory investigations1. I wish to add here that because the concept of risk 
sharing is not well-understood or accepted, community participation by local 
leaders in the decision making of the scheme from its very outset could 
motivate community interest. Regular consultations and dialogue with them 
must take place in order to be able to take into account their point of view of the 
various stages of implementation. This would assure that important policy and 
operational decisions are based on a compromise acceptable to the community 
and the operations are transparent to them. In the rural context this is of critical 
importance inasmuch as it may increase people’s preparedness to patronise the 
schemes, ensure more openness and build trust and confidence.  
 
 
                                                 
1 See in particular Arhin, D.C. 1995: 87.  
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The poor and insurance 
It is common knowledge that in mutual insurance schemes the poor are better 
off if everyone contributes to the fund. In reality however, the poor stand the 
greater disadvantage of not benefiting, in view of their inability to pay the 
premiums. The critical policy issue in insurance remains: how to extend the 
provision to the poor and needy? The effectiveness of the schemes in protecting 
the poor must therefore factor into them the effectiveness of exemption 
mechanisms. In Ghana there is already an exemption policy for certain catego-
ries of patients. One way of securing and strengthening the policy is through 
channelling funds meant to subsidise indigents directly to insurance schemes to 
strengthen their financial base and their fund management. This begins to 
address the issue of the implementation of exemption policies in a manner that 
will benefit the poor. There is need to integrate the existing exemption policies 
into insurance but before then there is a need to study exemption practices in the 
past in order to design effective means of factoring them into insurance schemes 
to provide support for the poor. 
 
The role of the state 
The main purpose of insurance in Ghana, is to improve access to otherwise 
deprived and vulnerable populations. Politicians also know that one way to 
court public goodwill is by influencing initiatives aimed at improving health 
infrastructure and access by the people. High profile political clout is therefore 
usually part of the rules of the game in ongoing efforts to implement community 
schemes. Two unintended negative consequences are likely to emanate from 
this. Political propaganda about insurance tends to send wrong signals to people 
about their own responsibility in insurance with respect to payment of premium. 
Some people live in the false expectation that health insurance, particularly in 
the present context, which is targeted at removing an existing ineffective 
payment system, is perceived as a ‘free lunch’. Secondly, politicised messages 
about health insurance tend to send different signals to people across the 
political divide. People who do not support an existing government in power 
that is championing insurance might stay away from it. I emphasise that it is 
important for governments to be aware of this in order to maintain a reasonable 
distance about what statements and promises they make about health insurance 
to the people. 
 
Monitoring systems 
The need for comprehensive monitoring systems from the onset cannot be 
overemphasised. Monitoring should be targeted not only at the technical aspects 
such as coverage and financial data; social impact should also be tracked. 
Indeed, carefully designed schemes may even have a greater potential in 
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improving not only access to health care but also quality of care and ultimately 
the efficiency of the health service. Issues such as kinds of people for whom 
access has improved and to what extent the quality of care issues such as staff 
attitude and clinical interactions have improved in the perception of consumers 
are all important for the sustainability of any scheme and therefore need to be 
monitored. Measuring social impact is better done through observations of 
routine clinical and pharmacy encounters than rigid quantitative procedures.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Community health insurance is seen as the answer to the problems of health 
care exclusion suffered by the vast numbers of poor in rural Ghana. From 
people’s perspective this view is often based on two main assumptions. In the 
first place, it is believed that the prepayment principle of risk sharing will make 
it easier for poor families to pool funds together during favourable times when 
they are more capable and more likely to afford the required premium. 
Secondly, the principles of solidarity and risk sharing are considered familiar 
and in tune with time tested traditional support mechanisms of Ghanaians. But 
will people really participate and give health insurance the same attention and 
loyalty as they use to do in family support arrangements on the basis of the 
foregoing assumptions? The exploration of the issue in this study has unearthed 
a number of challenges about such official optimism. 
The idea of community insurance schemes appears quite popular and its 
potential tends to be over-romanticised. In my view, these high expectations and 
romanticisation is the result of the fact that when policy makers discuss health 
insurance, they tend to look only at the benefit of the underlying solidarity 
principle while ignoring its dynamic aspects. Those dynamic aspects that I have 
focused on in this study reveal that the dilemma of the collective process is 
highly present in community financing schemes in the Ghanaian rural context, 
just as they were in 19th century Western European and American attempts to 
provide health care for all. It should be obvious that irrespective of the cultural 
antecedents of rural households to solidarity, their links in insurance become 
weaker as the group becomes more and more heterogeneous. This actually 
limits the romanticised benefits of solidarity in community insurance schemes, a 
fact that policy makers are overlooking.  
Without suggesting that the contexts are similar, the social dynamic lessons 
of history in the genesis of social health insurance in Western Europe and the 
United States again indicate that voluntary solidarity took on other features 
when it involved people who did not have common social ties such as kinship 
or convictions. When that happens, solidarity is ‘reduced’ to solidarity of 
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interests because as far as the members are concerned, the motive for sharing 
risks in a group whose members have no common ties in the conventional sense 
is driven by enlightened self-interest. This view is consistent with those of 
Dunning et al. (1992). Writing about choices in health care in the Netherlands, 
they believed that that ‘solidarity of interests lies at the bottom of most 
voluntary insurance schemes’. It explains the dominant self-interest rationale of 
people in the present Ghanaian context, which in the decade old Nkoranza 
scheme is typified by the high degree of adverse selection, moral hazard and the 
generally low subscription rates.  
To conclude, issues of contextual importance need to be taken into account 
in the socio-cultural feasibility of schemes. The findings in this study have 
shown that no matter how culturally sensitive schemes are perceived, people 
tend to be ambivalent towards the state as a fund holder because it is not seen to 
be accountable to society at large. Again insurance still does not provide a 
remedy for the poor who cannot afford any premiums that are charged. 
Certainly the magnitude of the problem of poverty actually suggests that only 
an integrated approach that also improves rural incomes would be the most 
adequate solution to the problem of social exclusion in health care. But in the 
light of the foregoing, a response to what is socially and culturally feasibility 
could be that effective initiatives are likely to be those in which the state plays 
only a facilitating role. An appropriate response would also have to consider 
that the greater part of the operational matters should be fostered through 
support and mediation with preferred organizations and stakeholders from 
within communities. The message should also emphasise that it is in the self-
interest of people to join insurance schemes even if they do not see the immedi-
ate benefit because the long-term benefit would accrue to someone they know. 
In summary, by focussing on micro level practices, this study has given some 
insight into issues of socio-cultural dynamics and feasibility of community 
health insurance in Ghana as a contribution to the intellectual search that is 
needed to deal with the problems of health care financing in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
 
 
 
Appendix 1:  Map of Ghana showing study areas  
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 Appendix 2: Tables of selected survey results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1 
What people think is the main idea behind health insurance  
 Nkoranza Dodowa 
Main idea Subscribers  Non-Subscribers Subscribers  Non-Subscribers 
Provide access to poor  45.4 34.2 18.8 41.0 
Provide health security 3.7 4.3 6.4 19.3 
Improve health care in  
the district 5.4 3.1 2.1 6.1 
Replace cash and carry 0.4 0.2 1.0 3.7 
To make profit - 0.8 - - 
Can’t tell 0.4 0.8 - 1.2 
Others 0.6 0.6 - 0.4 
Total 55.9 44.1 28.3 71.7 
 
 
 
 
 
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS 
IN SURVEY 
 
 
Table A2 
Respondents involved in the study 
 Nkoranza Dodowa 
Type of respondent Male Female Male  Female 
Community member 237  (47.7) 231 (49,4%) 12   (2.3%) 36  (6.9%) 
Health staff 8  (1.6%) 21 (4,2%) 206 (39.8%) 264 (51.0%) 
Total within district 245 (49,3%) 252 (50,7%) 218 (42.1%) 300 (57.9%) 
Overall district total 502  (49.2%) 518 (50.8%) 
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Table A3 
Age of respondents 
 Nkoranza Dodowa 
Age variable Subscribers  Non-Subscribers Both Subscribers  Non-Subscribers Both 
Mean  44.935 40.813 43.084 40.662 37.147 38.151 
Median 42 39 40 39.5 35 36 
Variance 267.142 223.992 251.495 224.905 178.011 193.529 
Std. Dev. 16.344 14.996 15.859 14.997 13.342 13.911 
Minimum 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Maximum 100 90 100 99 84 99 
 
 
 
Table A4 
Education 
Level of education Nkoranza  Dodowa  
 Subscribers  Non-Subscribers Subscribers  Non-Subscribers 
No formal education 19.4 18.2 7.1 20.1 
Primary 6.6 5.2 2.3 11.2 
Middle 21.4 17.0 10.0 25.5 
Secondary 3.0 2.4 4.6 7.3 
University - 0.2 0.2 0.8 
Polytechnic/Other tertiary 3.6 1.4 3.9 6.2 
Other 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Total 55.0 45.0 28.6 71.4 
 
 
 
Table A5 
Occupation 
Type of occupation Nkoranza Dodowa 
 Subscribers  Non-Subscribers Subscribers  Non-Subscribers 
Farming/Fishing 35.0 31.4 6.0 18.5 
Trading/Services 6.4 5.6 8.3 19.7 
Artisans 3.4 2.2 3.5 12.5 
Teaching/Clerical 4.6 2.6 3.1 6.9 
Nurse/Health staff 3.2 1.0 4.6 4.4 
Labourer 0 0.2 0.4 1.4 
Unemployed 2.2 1.4 1.7 6.6 
Student/Other 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.4 
Total 55.0 45.0 28.6 71.4 
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Table A6 
Marital Status 
Status Nkoranza Dodowa 
 Subscribers  Non-Subscribers Subscribers  Non-Subscribers 
Married 43.6 31.5 19.3 48.7 
Single 7.0 9.6 4.4 14.1 
Widowed 3.0 2.0 1.7 1.9 
Divorced 1.4 1.4 0.4 1.2 
Separated - 0.4 2.5 5.6 
Total 55.0 45.0 28.4 71.6 
     
 
 
Table A7 
Ethnic background 
Ethnicity Nkoranza Dodowa 
 Subscribers  Non-Subscribers Subscribers  Non-Subscribers 
Akan 45.5 34.7 1.9 4.1 
Ewe 0.4 0.2 2.1 7.2 
Ga Adangbe - - 23.2 58.6 
Northerner 9.0 10.0 0.6 1.2 
Guans/Buem 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.4 
Non Ghanaian - - - 0.2 
Total 55.1 44.1 28.4 71.6 
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